C.J. WILLIAMS, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the parties' motions in limine. (Docs. 33 & 34). On October 12, 2018, plaintiff filed a Petition at Law and Jury Demand in the Iowa District Court in and for Cherokee County against defendants.
For the following reasons, the Court
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 411, defendants seek to exclude from trial evidence of any liability insurance afforded to defendants via the Iowa Community Insurance Pool. (Doc. 33-1, at 4). Plaintiff does not resist. (Doc. 35, at 1). Thus, defendants' motion is
Defendants also seek to exclude from trial evidence related to the end of Alec Wolf's ("Wolf") employment with the Cherokee County Sheriff's department. (Doc. 33-1, at 4). In August of 2018, Cherokee County permitted Wolf to resign as deputy sheriff following Wolf's improper destruction of a dog. (Id.). As part of his resignation, Wolf "admitted under oath that he lied to his superiors[.]" (Id.). Plaintiff does not resist defendants' motion but does contend that evidence related to Wolf's resignation "is permissible for impeachment purposes and/or if [Wolf] offers testimony of his own character for truthfulness or offers testimony of his reliance on past training and/or his investigative and other law enforcement activities." (Doc. 35, at 1).
In relevant part, Federal Rule of Evidence 608 provides:
Advisory Committee Note (b)(2) states that inquiry into specific instances of conduct on cross-examination are subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which allows a court to "exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."
The Court has discretion here to allow plaintiff to inquire into Wolf's resignation on cross-examination of Wolf, should he testify. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Inquiry into these events would be directly probative of Wolf's character for truthfulness, particularly because they occurred less than a month after the conduct at issue here. Such probative value, however, must be balanced against the danger of unfair prejudice Wolf may suffer if these potentially emotionally upsetting and factually unrelated events are brought forth. See FED. R. EVID. 403. The Court notes that, in any case, plaintiff would not be permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence of Wolf's resignation. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
Given the discretionary nature of this issue, the Court finds it inappropriate to rule on the admissibility of Wolf's resignation for impeachment purposes ahead of trial. The Court does not know, at this time, whether Wolf intends to testify and, if he does, what the substance of his testimony will be. The Court is also unaware at this stage what other evidence may come to light about Wolf's character or training that would impact the Court's analysis here.
Thus, defendants' motion is
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 615, plaintiff requests the Court sequester all non-party witnesses until the conclusion of their testimony. (Doc. 34, at 1). Defendants do not resist. (Doc. 36, at 1). The Court notes that this motion is unnecessary as the Trial Management Order already invoked Rule 615 sequestration. (Doc. 10, at 5).
Thus, plaintiff's motion is
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 608, and 609, plaintiff seeks to exclude from trial evidence of her husband Michael Townsend's ("Townsend") prior criminal conviction. (Doc. 34, at 1). Defendants resist, arguing that Townsend's conviction is admissible as impeachment evidence under Rule 608(b) and that it is relevant to any claim by plaintiff for reputational damages. (Doc. 36, at 1-2).
Rule 609, not Rule 608, applies to the admissibility of Townsend's conviction as impeachment evidence. Rule 609(a) allows a civil, non-defendant witness to be impeached by evidence of a criminal conviction if the crime either (1) was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year in the convicting jurisdiction or (2) required the proving of a dishonest act or false statement. Further, the former must also satisfy Rule 403. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A). Rule 609(b) applies a different test, however, if ten years have passed since the witness was either convicted or released from confinement, whichever is later. Such a conviction is admissible only if its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect and the proponent gives the adverse party written notice in advance. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
At this time, the only information about Townsend's conviction that has been supplied to the Court is that the conviction was in Texas in 2006, there was some period of confinement (Doc. 34, at 1), and the crime was some type of "felony drug conviction" (Doc. 36, at 1-2). Without further information, the Court cannot assess the admissibility of Townsend's conviction under Rule 609 or even determine which test to apply. This lack of information also prevents the Court from assessing the relevance of Townsend's conviction at this time.
Thus, plaintiff's motion is
Plaintiff seeks to bar Alec Ohlson from testifying as a witness at trial. (Doc. 34, at 1-2). Defendants do not resist. (Doc. 36, at 2). Thus, plaintiff's motion is
Plaintiff seeks to bar Dylan Ohlson from testifying as a witness at trial. (Doc. 34, at 2). Defendants do not resist. (Doc. 36, at 2). Thus, plaintiff's motion is
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b)(1), plaintiff seeks to exclude from trial evidence of any prior allegations, criminal complaints, or criminal charges relating to plaintiff's alleged harassment of Mary Leche, an alleged paramour of plaintiff's ex-husband. (Doc. 34, at 2-3). Defendants resist, arguing that such evidence is relevant to plaintiff's damages and is not more prejudicial than probative. (Doc. 36, at 2-3).
Rule 404(b)(1) states that "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." Such evidence may, however, be admissible for another purpose. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)(B). Here, defendants do not seek to admit plaintiff's prior arrest as propensity evidence, but instead to mitigate plaintiff's damages, presumably related to plaintiff's reputation. (Doc. 36, at 2-3). Plaintiff's prior arrest for the same crime would be relevant in assessing the extent of the damage to her reputation, if any, caused by defendants' actions here. See FED. R. EVID. 401. A jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff suffered less reputational damage because she had already been arrested for harassment in the past. Mitigation of damages is a valid, alternative purpose that does not go to propensity. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
Rule 403, however, allows a court to "exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." At this time, all the information the Court knows is that plaintiff was reportedly arrested more than eight years ago for allegedly harassing her ex-husband's paramour. (Docs. 34, at 2-3; 36, at 2-3). Without more information, the Court cannot, at this time, assess whether admitting evidence of this arrest would be unfairly prejudicial to plaintiff or confusing to the jury.
Thus, plaintiff's motion is
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 410, plaintiff seeks to exclude from trial "evidence related to plea negotiations in the underlying harassment proceeding." (Doc. 34, at 3). Defendants resist, arguing that plaintiff's agreement to pay court costs and offer of a divorce modification are relevant evidence. (Doc. 36, at 3).
In relevant part, Rule 410(a)(4) bars from both criminal and civil proceedings evidence of "a statement during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea[.]" Such statements may, however, be admissible "in any proceeding in which another statement made during the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced, if in fairness the statements ought to be considered together[.]" FED. R. EVID. 410(b)(1).
Here, if plaintiff offers evidence that the criminal charge against her was dismissed, the jury should also in fairness be told that the charge was dismissed on the condition that plaintiff agree to pay some minor court-related costs. See id. Although this condition is not ultimately relevant to plaintiff's claims here, its omission would mislead the jury as to the resolution of the underlying criminal charge against plaintiff.
Plaintiff's offer of a divorce modification, however, is wholly irrelevant. This offer does not tend to make a fact of consequence more or less likely. See FED. R. EVID. 401. The only conclusion the jury could potentially draw from this evidence is that plaintiff was to some extent guilty of harassment whether Wolf knew that during the relevant period or not. Even if plaintiff notes the ultimate resolution of the charge against her, fairness does not dictate that this offer that did not materialize be mentioned. Rule 410 does in fact bar the admission of such evidence and no exception applies.
Thus, plaintiff's motion is
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, plaintiff seeks to exclude from trial "evidence of any and all text message communications other than text messages" dated from July 25, 2018, through July 27, 2018. (Doc. 34, at 3). Plaintiff asserts that all other text messages are not relevant and prejudicial. (Id.). Defendants resist, arguing that Kent Ohlson's ("Kent") text to plaintiff on July 19, 2018, advising her to direct communications to his attorney, is relevant. The text reads "Lori, please do not contact me at all. If there is any business questions or concerns you have please contact my lawyer Dan Connell. Thank you. Kent."
Kent's July 19, 2018 text is relevant here. In his investigative notes from his conversation with Shannon Ohlson, Wolf recorded that Kent had told plaintiff that Kent did "not want to speak to her" and that plaintiff needed to "stop sending [him] text messages[.]" (Doc. 36-4, at 3). Wolf then notes plaintiff's allegedly harassing text messages as occurring from July 25, 2018, through July 27, 2018. (Id.). Wolf's notes suggest that he read or at least discussed Kent's July 19, 2018 text with Shannon in order to conclude that plaintiff's texts sent after that date were harassing. Wolf's knowledge of this text prior to filing the harassment charge at issue is relevant to whether he had probable cause to believe plaintiff had the intent to commit harassment by sending Kent texts after Kent's July 19, 2018 text directing plaintiff to communicate exclusively through his attorney. The Court sees no reason under Rule 403 to exclude this evidence, which is directly relevant to the claims and defenses of the parties here.
As to the remaining texts, the Court does not have sufficient information to rule on their admissibility at this time. Notably, defendants do not claim in their resistance that Wolf actually reviewed any text messages. It is unclear to the Court whether Wolf is maintaining his position that he did in fact speak to Kent and received and reviewed various texts via his work email. (Doc. 25-3, at 27, 43). Even so, defendants fail to state why "any other" specific text messages from Kent to plaintiff prior to July 19, 2018, are relevant here. Similarly, plaintiffs do not alert the Court of the substance of these other texts or what prejudicial content they contain. Although some texts between Kent and plaintiff are contained in the record, the Court will not parse through them on behalf of the parties in the absence of specific objections here.
Thus, plaintiff's motion is
For these reasons, the Court
