ORDER

KRISTEN L. MIX, Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgement [sic]/Reconsideration/Reargument [sic] Rule (59) Fed. [C]iv. R [#69]1 (the "First Motion") and Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment Rule 60 Fed.R.civ.P. [sic] [#83] (the "Second Motion" and collectively with the First Motion, the "Motions"). Defendants filed a Response [#75] to the First Motion. Plaintiff did not file a reply and his deadline to do so has elapsed.2 Defendants have not yet filed a response to the Second Motion, but it is more efficient to address the Motions together, therefore, the Court rules on it pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d) ("Nothing in this rule precludes a judicial officer from ruling on a motion at any time after it is filed."). The Court has reviewed the Motions, the Response, the entire case file, and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions [##69, 83] are DENIED.

I. Jurisdiction

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. Background

A. Procedural Background

On March 4, 2015, the Court entered a lengthy Order granting Defendants' motion to dismiss. See generally Order [#60]. In that Order the Court included a detailed recitation of the background of this case. As a result, the Court does not restate the factual background and instead incorporates the March 4, 2015 Order by reference. Below the Court briefly summarizes the procedural history of this case as it is relevant to the Motions.

In short, the Court gave Plaintiff many opportunities to amend his claims, informed Plaintiff what steps he needed to take to amend his claims, provided clarification regarding the law governing his claims, and eventually, granted Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Among other things, in its March 4, 2015 Order, the Court concluded

Order [#60] at 7. As part of its more detailed analysis of Plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss, the Court explained:

Order [#60] at 10-11. When analyzing the motion to dismiss, the Court also explained that it could not consider the new factual allegations included in Plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss.

Order [#60] at 15-16. The Court then considered whether the documents Plaintiff attached to his response could be considered by the Court and concluded that they could not. Id. at 16-18.

Regarding Plaintiff's allegations, the Court divided them into four distinct claims, id. at 7-10, and then analyzed each claim based on the legal theory underlying the claim. The Court found that Defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to the official capacity claims for monetary relief, id. at 24; that Plaintiff's claims for compensatory damages were barred by the PLRA, id. at 25-26; and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against any Defendant in his or her individual capacity. Id. at. 26-50. As a result, the Court granted the motion to dismiss and Final Judgment [#61] was entered.

B. The Motions

In the Motions, Plaintiff seeks relief from the Final Judgment [#61] entered on March 4, 2015.

In the First Motion, Plaintiff argues that his response to the motion to dismiss should have been treated as a motion to amend. First Motion [#69] at 2-3. He further argues that the undersigned should have construed his allegations as asserting a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Id. at 3. In short, he relies on the new factual allegations included in his response to the motion to dismiss to argue that he properly brought an ADA claim. Id.3 Plaintiff also argues that the Court should have considered the documents he attached to his response to the motion to dismiss or appointed counsel to represent him in this case. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff further maintains that the undersigned erred in her understanding of his first claim for relief. Id. at 5. This argument is convoluted and difficult to understand but Plaintiff appears to be arguing that this claim is based on a violation of certain CDOC policies. Id. at 5-7. This argument, again, is based on factual allegations not contained in the operative complaint. Id. Plaintiff also purports to challenge the Court's determination regarding qualified immunity. Id. at 7-8. However, he does not identify which claim or Defendant his arguments relate to and the Court cannot determine which part of its analysis he wishes to challenge. Similarly, Plaintiff includes a section titled "Conspiracy Claim/Joint Action Test" that relates to a CDOC policy that was not mentioned in the operative complaint. Id. at 8. This section does not appear to relate to any part of the Court's March 4, 2015 Order. Plaintiff also includes a section titled "PLRA" that seems to agree with the Court's analysis of the PLRA. Id. at 8-9. Later, Plaintiff includes a discussion of the panic attacks mentioned in his operative complaint that were addressed by the Court in its analysis of the PLRA. Id. at 10; Order [#60] at 25-26. However, Plaintiff confuses the analysis of the PLRA with claims for deliberate indifference to medical needs. First Motion [#69] at 10-11. Plaintiff's section titled "Malebranche" appears to challenge the Court's conclusion that he failed to state a First Amendment claim against this Defendant. Order [#60] at 34. Plaintiff seems to believe that his claim should have survived the motion to dismiss because he has "favorable witness accounts" that were filed in another lawsuit that he was unable to obtain and file in this lawsuit. Id. at 9. With regard to the Court's conclusion that his denial of access to the Courts claim failed to state a claim, Order [#60] at 35-37, Plaintiff argues that his failure to name any defendant associated with these allegations should not have led to dismissal of this claims. First Motion [#69] at 11. Plaintiff further argues that there is a policy in place that explicitly sanctioned the conduct of the unnamed mail room employees who allegedly infringed on his rights. Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff next argues that the Court should not have denied a previous motion for reconsideration. Id. at 14; see also Order [#55] (denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Pursuant to Fed. R .Civ. P. Rule 60 [#47]). Finally, Plaintiff includes a section titled "11th Immunity/PLRA/Qualified Immunity." First Motion [#69] at 15-17. This section is difficult to understand. Plaintiff mentions the Spending Clause and cites to the ADA. Id. at 16. This section does not appear to relate to any issue discussed in the March 4, 2015 Order, which formed the basis for the entry of judgment.

In the Response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to meet the high standard for reconsideration under Rule 60. Response [#75] at 1-2. They argue that he "has not pointed to any intervening change in the controlling law, any new evidence, or a need to correct clear error." Id. at 2. Instead, they argue "Plaintiff has used his Motion for Reconsideration as another opportunity to repeat much of what he has already alleged and recited several times in this case." Id. Defendants further argue that to the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert new issues in the Motion, "Plaintiff is barred from raising a new issue for the first time in a motion for reconsideration." Id. at 3.

In the Second Motion, Plaintiff purports to seek relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. Second Motion [#83] at 1. Plaintiff asks the Court to toll the statute of limitations. Id. He also states that he is no longer incarcerated and argues that this fact somehow requires that the Court relieve him from the entry of judgment. Plaintiff also cites to cases that he seems to believe require the Court to conclude that because he was recently released from prison the PLRA's physical injury requirement does not apply to him. Id. at 2. However, it is unclear if Plaintiff actually intends to make such an argument. Plaintiff maintains that this "new evidence" (presumably his release from prison) "would probably result in a different outcome." Id. at 3.

III. Standard of Review

Jaramillo v. Gov't Emps.Ins. Co., 573 F.App'x 733, 738 n.4 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished Order and Judgment). A litigant who is subject to an adverse judgment, and who seeks reconsideration by the district court of that adverse judgment, may "file either a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or a motion seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)." Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). A motion to alter or amend the judgment must be filed within twenty-eight days after the judgment is entered. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). If the motion is filed timely under both rules, how the court construes it depends on the reasons expressed by the movant. Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1200 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Jennings v. Rivers, 394 F.3d 850, 855 (10th Cir.2005)). A motion under Rule 59(e) is the appropriate vehicle "to correct manifest errors of law or to present newly discovered evidence." Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir.1997). A Rule 60(b) motion is appropriate for, among other things, "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" and "newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (2).

Notably, "the filing of concurrent Rule 59(e) and 60(b) motions circumvents the intent of the rules." Handy v. City of Sheridan, No. 12-cv-01015-WYD-KMT, 2015 WL 428380, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 30, 2015). "[T]he rules allow a litigant subject to an adverse judgment to file either a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or a motion seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). These two rules are distinct; they serve different purposes and produce different consequences." Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243. Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution, the Court will address both Motions.

The First Motion was filed within the deadline set by Rule 59(e) and in it Plaintiff argues that the Court incorrectly interpreted the pleadings and applied the law and attempts to assert new allegations. The Second Motion was filed more than 28 days after entry of the Final Judgment and in it Plaintiff argues that there is "new evidence" that justifies relieving Plaintiff from the Final Judgment entered in this case because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. Under the authority above, therefore, the First Motion [#69] is more appropriately construed as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment and the Second Motion [#83] must be construed as filed under Rule 60(b) because it was filed more than "28 days after the entry of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

In the Tenth Circuit, it is well established that grounds for a motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e) include: "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Brumark Corp. v. Samson Res. Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 948 (10th Cir. 1995)). Thus, a motion to reconsider is "appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law." Id. A motion for reconsideration is not to be used as a vehicle for "revisit[ing] issues already addressed or advanc[ing] arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing." Id. (citing Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991)). Furthermore, a motion for reconsideration "is an extreme remedy to be granted in rare circumstances." Brumark, 57 F.3d at 944.

In the First Motion Plaintiff does not argue that there has been an intervening change in the law. With regard to the second basis for reconsideration, he does not argue that there is new evidence that was previously unavailable. Instead, he attacks the Court's treatment of the evidence he attempted to present by attaching documents to his response to the motion to dismiss. This evidence was discussed in the Court's March 4, 2015 Order and cannot be considered "new" evidence for purposes of Rule 59(e). Accordingly, it does not meet the requirements of the second basis for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e). See Brooks v. Colo. Dep't of Corrections, No. 13-cv-02894-CBS, 2015 WL 3619221, at *2 (D. Colo. June 10, 2015). With regard to the third basis for granting a Rule 59(e) motion, Plaintiff does not convincingly argue that there has been clear error or manifest injustice. Instead, he "simply contends that he, in fact, did state [ ] claim[s] against Defendant[s]." Sayed v. Broman, No. 13-cv-02961-CMA-MJW, 2015 WL 2345638, at *1 (D. Colo. May 14, 2015) (citing Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012). However, "[a] disagreement with the court and a mere request that a court rethink a decision it has already made are improper bases for relief under Rule 59(e)." Id. As the Court held when it considered Plaintiff's first motion for reconsideration in this case, "Plaintiff is attempting to revisit an issue that was already addressed by the Court and has offered no basis for the Court to reach a different conclusion." Order [#55] at 6. Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court's previous ruling on his first motion for reconsideration, he cannot use Rule 59(e) to continually ask the Court to revisit its rulings. See, e.g., Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012 (motion to reconsider is not a proper vehicle through which to "revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing"); Lacefield v. Big Planet, No. 2:06-CV-844, 2008 WL 2661127, at *1 (D. Utah July 3, 2008) (unpublished) ("When a motion for reconsideration raises only a party's disagreement with a decision of the Court, that dispute should be dealt with in the normal appellate process."). As a result, the First Motion [#69] is DENIED.

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60

As noted above, to the extent that Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its Final Judgment entered in this case based on what he considers newly discovered evidence, Second Motion [#83] at 2, the Court treats the Second Motion as being filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) because it was filed more than 28 days after entry of judgment. "Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary and may be granted only in exceptional circumstances." Butler v. Kempthorne, 532 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Beugler v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 490 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007)). A litigant shows exceptional circumstances by satisfying one or more of the grounds for relief enumerated in Rule 60(b). Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). Pursuant to Rule 60(b), in the following circumstances, the Court may grant relief from a final judgment or order:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). It is well established in the Tenth Circuit that grounds for a motion to reconsider are typically limited to the following: "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence previously unavailable; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012 (citing Brumark, 57 F.3d at 948). Therefore, a motion to reconsider is "appropriate [only] where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law. It is not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing." Id.

In the Second Motion Plaintiff argues that because he has been released from prison the Court should grant him relief from the Final Judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) ("the judgment is void" and 60(b)(5) ("the judgment has been satisfied released or discharged. . . ."). Second Motion [#83] at 2-3. Plaintiff offers no argument that either of these subsections applies in this case and, reading the Second Motion liberally, the Court cannot find any support for relief under these subsections. However, assuming that Plaintiff intended to rely on Rule 60(b)(6), the hardships Plaintiff faced because he was incarcerated and his subsequent release from prison do not provide a basis for relief under Rule 60(b). In essence, Plaintiff would like relief from the Final Judgment so that he can relitigate the entire case simply because he is no longer incarcerated. Plaintiff provides no legal support for this request. Further, it is not unusual for a litigant to who is released from prison to have more resources after he his release. This does not constitute the "extraordinary circumstances" required for relief under Rule 60(b). Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005); Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances."). As a result, the Second Motion [#83] is DENIED.

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, based on the foregoing and the entire record in this case,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the First Motion [#69] and the Second Motion [#83] are DENIED.

Because this case is closed, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motions for reconsideration, and an appeal is currently pending,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions [##74, 80, 81] are DENIED.