Filed: May 12, 2017
Latest Update: May 12, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Michelle Rodriguez, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Juan Carlos Maldonado, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a change of plea hearing on May 16, 2017. 2. By this stipulation the defendant now moves to co
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Michelle Rodriguez, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Juan Carlos Maldonado, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a change of plea hearing on May 16, 2017. 2. By this stipulation the defendant now moves to con..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Michelle Rodriguez, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Juan Carlos Maldonado, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a change of plea hearing on May 16, 2017.
2. By this stipulation the defendant now moves to continue the change of plea hearing until June 6, 2017 at 9:15 a.m. and to exclude time between May 16, 2017 and June 6, 2017 under Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. The United States has produced 144 pages of discovery, 14 videos, and 2 audio files.
b. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, interview potential witnesses, and discuss USSG calculations. Additionally, Mr. Maldonado's immigration status is somewhat nuanced. As such, as counsel for Mr. Maldonado I am not comfortable advising Mr. Maldonado on the potential immigration related consequences of pleading guilty (or being found guilty by a jury). I have engaged the services of the U.C. Davis Immigration Law Clinic to assist the defense in accurately determining the potential immigration related consequences to Mr. Maldonado should he plead guilty or be found guilty by a jury. This process has just begun and additional time is necessary to gather the information requested by the U.C. Davis Clinic and they (the "Clinic") will need further additional time to review the material and prepare an analysis for the defense. Unfortunately, as of yet, the report/analysis is not available. However, the primary need for the continuance is I have been unable to meet with Maldonado to review the material, answer his questions and otherwise prepare Mr. Maldonado for his COP hearing due to, if not a dental emergency, then certainly an unplanned, on-going, dental issue, which culminated in a tooth extraction lasting almost 3 hours.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of May 16, 2017, to June 6, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order.
The Court orders that the time period of May 16, 2017 to June, 2017, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), and Local Code T4 (reasonable time for defense counsel to prepare
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
