CHARLES B. GOODWIN, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff John Wagner brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denying Plaintiff's application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. Doc. No. 16. The Commissioner has answered and filed the administrative record (Doc. No. 11, hereinafter "R.__").
Plaintiff protectively filed his application for SSI on November 7, 2012, initially alleging a disability onset date of December 24, 2011, but later amending the date to November 7, 2012. R. 30-31, 150-55, 164-66. Following denial of his application initially and on reconsideration, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing. R. 26-58, 61-90. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on August 29, 2014. R. 11-25. The SSA Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's unfavorable decision the final decision of the Commissioner. R. 1-6; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481. Plaintiff then filed this action for judicial review.
As relevant here, a person is "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act if he or she is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine entitlement to disability benefits. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 7, 2012, the application date. R. 13. At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: "shortness of breath; depression; anxiety; diabetes; hypertension; sleep apnea; substance abuse; [gastroesophageal reflux disease]; rheumatoid arthritis (knees); and chronic pain in the back, hands, and fingers." R. 13. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal any of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. R. 13-15.
The ALJ next assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") based on all of his medically determinable impairments. R. 15-19. The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work, specifying that Plaintiff is able to "lift and or carry 20 pounds; stand and/or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; and sit 6 hours in an 8-hour workday all with normal breaks." R. 15; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) (defining "light" work). The ALJ assessed the following additional limitations:
R. 15.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work and that transferability of job skills was not a material issue. R. 19. At step five, the ALJ considered whether there are jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff—in view of his age, education, work experience, and RFC—could perform. Taking into consideration the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") regarding the degree of erosion to the unskilled light occupational base that is caused by Plaintiff's additional limitations, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform occupations such as marking clerk, hotel or housekeeper cleaner, routing clerk, and document preparer, all of which offer jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. R. 20-21. On this basis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from November 7, 2012, through the date of the decision. R. 21.
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and whether correct legal standards were applied. Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A decision is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting it." Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court "meticulously examine[s] the record as a whole," including any evidence "that may undercut or detract from the ALJ's findings," "to determine if the substantiality test has been met." Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (internal quotation marks omitted). While a reviewing court considers whether the Commissioner followed applicable rules of law in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, the court does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical evidence, alleging that the ALJ did not properly consider the opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians. Pl.'s Br. (Doc. No. 15) at 14-19. Plaintiff further alleges that the ALJ failed to evaluate Plaintiff's subjective complaints under the correct legal standards. Id. at 19-22.
The record includes treatment notes from treating physician Hiep Cao, MD, through April 2014 as well as a Physical Medical Source Statement dated April 2, 2014. See R. 371-418, 419-22, 423-31. The record also includes the January 28, 2013 report of reviewing consultant Suzanne Roberts, MD. R. 68-69.
Dr. Roberts reviewed Plaintiff's medical record, including the 2011 and 2012 treatment records of Dr. Cao. See R. 68. Dr. Roberts assessed a physical RFC for light exertion work. R. 68-69; see also R. 16. The ALJ gave Dr. Roberts' opinion "great weight," stating that "it appears consistent with the totality of medical evidence of record." R. 16.
Dr. Cao, in his April 2014 Physician Medical Source Statement, assessed greater limitations than those found by Dr. Roberts. Compare R. 419-22, with R. 68-69. The ALJ considered Dr. Cao's opinion and "afford[ed] it little weight," stating:
R. 17.
Plaintiff asserts that the opinion of Dr. Cao (Plaintiff's treating physician) was entitled to more weight than the opinion of Dr. Roberts (a nonexamining agency consultant). In evaluating a treating physician's opinion, "the ALJ must complete a sequential two-step inquiry, each step of which is analytically distinct." Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 2011). First, the ALJ must consider whether the opinion is entitled to controlling weight. That requires finding the opinion is both "wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques" and "not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record." Id. Second, if the opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must "make clear how much weight the opinion is being given (including whether it is being rejected outright) and give good reasons, tied to the factors specified in [20 C.F.R. § 416.927]
Plaintiff is correct that a treating physician's opinion is presumed to be entitled to controlling weight so long as it is well-supported and consistent with the record. Pl.'s Br. at 15; see Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). But "[m]edical evidence may be discounted if it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other evidence." Pisciotta v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 1074, 1078 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the ALJ determined Dr. Cao's opinion was entitled to "little weight" for specific reasons. The ALJ noted that the limitations set forth by Dr. Cao were not supported by "the totality of medical evidence of record," including Dr. Cao's own treatment records, and specifically by no objective medical findings. See R. 17; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3) ("The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion."); .927(c)(4) ("[T]he more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion."). Additionally, the ALJ stated that Dr. Cao's treatment records showed intact range of motion, ability to move all extremities, and a normal gait, as well as that Plaintiff had been doing well with medication. R. 17; cf. Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004) (indicating that the ALJ should "specifically highlight" portions of the record that were inconsistent with treating physician's opinion); Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that ALJ properly rejected treating physician's opinion because, among other things, the opinion was "not supported by [the physician's] own records which indicate[d] improvement and stabilization on medications"). These are legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Cao's opinion, supported by substantial evidence. See R. 371-418, 423-31; Bales v. Colvin, 576 F. App'x 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2014) (upholding ALJ's decision to give treating physician opinion limited weight when ALJ provided adequate reasons for the decision).
Plaintiff does not contest the reasons given by the ALJ; he does not point to treatment records from Dr. Cao that are consistent with the restrictions set forth in the Medical Source Statement and he does not point to objective medical evidence that supports Dr. Cao's restrictions. See Pl.'s Br. at 17. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ "failed to consider Dr. Cao completed his [Medical Source Statement] over a year after Dr. Roberts completed her RFC opinions" and "Dr. Roberts did not have the opportunity to review Dr. Cao's opinions before she issued her opinion." Id. Plaintiff further argues that "[w]hen there is an inconsistency between a treating physician's opinion and the opinions of a nontreating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ must examine the other physician's opinions to determine if they outweigh the treating physician's opinions, `not the other way around.'" Id. (quoting Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215). Plaintiff thus implies that the ALJ erred because he gave Dr. Cao's opinion little weight due to its inconsistency with Dr. Roberts' opinion. However, that is not the case—the inconsistency cited by the ALJ was with Dr. Cao's own treatment records, as well as the overall lack of supportive objective medical evidence. The Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Cao's opinion.
Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Roberts' opinion, arguing that the opinions of nonexamining consultants "are entitled to the least weight compared to the opinions of treating or examining physicians." Pl.'s Br. at 16. Plaintiff contends that an ALJ "can only rely on the opinions from State agency medical . . . consultants if their opinions have adequate support from the medical evidence." Id. at 16-17 (citing Lee v. Barnhart, 117 F. App'x 674, 678 (10th Cir. 2004); SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (July 2, 1996)).
The ALJ determined that Dr. Roberts' RFC determination was consistent with Plaintiff's medical records, with the exception of Dr. Cao's Medical Source Statement, and addressed that difference in opinion. Plaintiff does not point to any other evidence in the record to argue that Dr. Roberts' opinion did not have adequate support. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ "incorrectly presumed Dr. Roberts' opinions were entitled to more weight than Dr. Cao['s opinion]." Pl.'s Br. at 16 (citing R. 16-17). The ALJ, however, did not "presume" that Dr. Roberts' opinions were entitled to more weight; he considered and evaluated each opinion on its own merits and determined that Dr. Roberts' opinion merited greater weight than did Dr. Cao's opinion. See Scott v. Berryhill, No. 16-1440, 2017 WL 2927624, at *4 (10th Cir. July 10, 2017) (finding that the ALJ properly examined a nonexamining physician's report to see if it outweighed a treating physician's report when "[s]he gave specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting [the treating physician's] opinion, and carefully analyzed [the nonexamining consultant's] opinion and its consistency with the evidence"). Plaintiff fails to demonstrate reversible error.
Relevant to Plaintiff's mental functional limitations, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's consideration of the opinions of treating psychologist Richard Zielinski, MD, and examining consultant Richard Kahoe, PhD.
On January 10, 2013, Dr. Kahoe examined Plaintiff. See R. 320-26. Among other findings, summarized in the ALJ's discussion, Dr. Kahoe assessed Plaintiff with a GAF score of 50.
The ALJ discussed Dr. Kahoe's GAF score as follows:
R. 17-18.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Kahoe's GAF assessment was improper because (1) the ALJ's reason for rejecting Dr. Kahoe's GAF score was invalid; and (2) it was inconsistent for the ALJ to reject Dr. Kahoe's GAF assessment while accepting a GAF assessment made by Dr. Zielinski. See Pl.'s Br. at 18.
Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ's reasoning was improper. A single low-tomoderate GAF score does not, "standing alone," "evidence an impairment seriously interfering with claimant's ability to work." Lopez v. Barnhart, 78 F. App'x 675, 678 (10th Cir. 2003). And, contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Kahoe's GAF score as altogether irrelevant; rather, he stated that he did not view it "as an absolute determination of functioning." R. 17 (emphasis added). Dr. Kahoe's opinion as a whole did not indicate that Plaintiff could not work, and his assessment of a GAF score of 50 "does not undermine, nor is it `significantly probative' evidence in opposition to, the ALJ's ultimate conclusions concerning the seriousness of [Plaintiff's] mental status or ability to work." Lopez, 78 F. App'x at 678 (quoting Briggs ex rel. Briggs v. Massanari, 248 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001)) (discussing a GAF score assessment of 40); accord Lee, 117 F. App'x at 678 (noting that while a GAF score of 50 or less suggests "an inability to keep a job," the claimant's impairment "might lie solely within the social, rather than the occupational, sphere"); cf. Butler v. Astrue, 412 F. App'x 144, 146-47 (10th Cir. 2011) ("[B]ecause the GAF scores at issue were not linked to any work-related limitations, they are not particularly helpful."); Holcomb v. Astrue, 389 F. App'x 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2010) ("`While a GAF score may be of considerable help to the ALJ in formulating the RFC . . ., it is not essential to the RFC's accuracy' and taken alone does not establish an impairment serious enough to preclude an ability to work." (quoting Howard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002))). The Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Kahoe's GAF assessment.
Nor has Plaintiff shown that the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Kahoe's GAF assessment was improper as compared with his consideration of the GAF assessment done by Dr. Zielinski. On March 16, 2014, Dr. Zielinski submitted a Mental Medical Source Statement in which he noted severe and marked limitations. See R. 18, 367-70. The ALJ gave "little weight" to Dr. Zielinski's Statement, finding that it was
R. 18. Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the ALJ did not indicate that he was fully crediting Dr. Zielinski's GAF score for its probative value. Rather, he mentioned Dr. Zielinski's GAF assessment as one of several inconsistencies between the limitations Dr. Zielinski included in the Mental Medical Source Statement and the less-severe limitations indicated by Dr. Zielinski's treatment records—inconsistencies that led him to discount the limitations in Dr. Zielinski's Statement. See Pisciotta, 500 F.3d at 1078 ("Medical evidence may be discounted if it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other evidence."); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(c)(3) ("The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight . . . will [be] give[n] that opinion."); .927(c)(4) ("[T]he more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight . . . will [be] give[n] to that opinion."). The Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Zielinski's GAF assessment, or in the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Kehoe's GAF assessment in light of the ALJ's treatment of the other physician's GAF score.
Nor does the undersigned find reversible error in the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Zielinski's opinion as a whole. Plaintiff argues that "it is unclear whether the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Zielinski's opinions was adequately supported by substantial evidence, or whether he applied the correct standards to weigh his opinions." Pl.'s Br. at 18. The Court disagrees.
As an initial matter, although Dr. Zielinski was Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, any error the ALJ may have made in failing to specify whether he was giving Dr. Zielinski's opinion controlling weight was harmless. In stating that he assigned that opinion "little weight," the ALJ made clear that he did not give it controlling weight. See Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300; Tarpley v. Colvin, 601 F. App'x 641, 643-44 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding "any imaginable oversight" to be "clearly harmless" when the ALJ did not expressly say he was not affording treating physicians' opinions controlling weight, but explained that they were entitled to no weight because they were inconsistent with the medical records, and there was substantial evidence to support that decision).
Moreover, an ALJ is not required to mechanically apply all of the prescribed factors in a given case; rather, it is sufficient if the ALJ "provide[s] good reasons in his decision for the weight he [gives] to the treating sources' opinions." Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258; see SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *5 (Aug. 9, 2006) ("Not every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every case."); see also discussion of factors at n.3 supra. The ALJ's explanation "must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the ALJ's discussion of Dr. Zielinski's opinion focused on two overlapping factors—"the degree to which the physician's opinion is supported by relevant evidence" and "consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole"—both of which are valid reasons for discounting a treating source's opinion. See id. at 1301; R. 18. And, as detailed above, the ALJ's decision both made clear the weight he was giving to Dr. Zielinski's opinion and provided "good" reasons for that weight, including "specifically highlighting" portions of the record that were inconsistent with the treating physician's opinion. See Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258; Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1217. As such, the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Zielinski's opinion was adequately supported by substantial evidence and based upon application of the correct standards.
Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ improperly considered Dr. Zielinski's opinion because he did not "weigh [it] with" Dr. Kahoe's opinion and did not discuss "whether the reports from Drs. Zielinski and [Kahoe] supported or contracted each other." Pl.'s Br. at 18. However, the undersigned has found that the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Zielinski's opinion based on inconsistency with Dr. Zielinski's own treatment records and lack of consistency with the record overall. And Plaintiff has shown no need for, or prejudice resulting from a lack of, direct comparison between Dr. Zielinski's opinion and Dr. Kahoe's opinion. The burden to show prejudicial error on appeal rests with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has not met that burden here. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) ("[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency's determination."). The Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Zielinski's opinion.
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ, in evaluating Plaintiff's subjective complaints, erred in relying upon Plaintiff's daily activities and his earnings record. Pl.'s Br. at 19-22. Notably, at the time of the ALJ's decision, an ALJ's "credibility" evaluation was governed by Social Security Ruling 96-7p, but on March 16, 2016, the Commissioner issued Social Security Ruling 16-3p, which eliminated use of the term "credibility" and provided new guidance for evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant's symptoms. See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (eff. Mar. 28, 2016). Social Security Ruling 16-3p superseded Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Id. at *1. Plaintiff argues that the new Ruling is applicable to his case, while Defendant disputes the applicability of Social Security Ruling 16-3p and states that it "should not be a factor in the Court's review" because it was not in effect at the time of the ALJ's decision. Pl.'s Br. at 14-15; Def.'s Br. (Doc. No. 21) at 14.
"Generally, if an agency makes a policy change during the pendency of a claimant's appeal, the reviewing court should remand for the agency to determine whether the new policy affects its prior decision." Frantz v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Court does not see a meaningful distinction between the two rulings as they relate to this matter. Because the Court's determination would be the same under either standard, remand is not required for the sole purpose of evaluation under SSR 16-3p. See Lee v. Berryhill, CIV-16-483-R, 2017 WL 2892338, at *4 n.10 (W.D. Okla. June 15, 2017) (R. & R.), adopted, 2017 WL 2880862 (W.D. Okla. July 6, 2017).
Both Rulings direct the ALJ to consider an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms. Compare SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *1, with SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4. Both Rulings direct the ALJ to apply the same seven regulatory factors in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant's symptoms. Compare SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3, with SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *7. And both Rulings direct the ALJ to determine the consistency of the individual's statements as compared to other evidence in the record. Compare SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5-8, with SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4-10. Although the ALJ's evaluation was phrased in terms of "credibility" and evaluated pursuant to Social Security Ruling 96-7p, see R. 15, the ALJ's consideration of Plaintiff's symptoms is consistent with Social Security Ruling 16-3p. See Mirabal v. Colvin, No. 1:15-CV-00869-LF, 2016 WL 8230702, at *5 (D.N.M. Dec. 30, 2016) (finding that the ALJ's evaluation of the claim under Social Security Ruling 96-7p was consistent with Social Security Ruling 16-3p).
In considering a claimant's subjective complaints of pain or other symptoms, an ALJ is required to consider all the relevant objective and subjective evidence and "decide whether he believe[d] the claimant's assertions of severe pain." Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1987). In doing so, the ALJ must consider and determine: (1) whether the claimant established a pain-producing impairment by objective medical evidence; (2) if so, whether the impairment is reasonably expected to produce some pain of the sort alleged (a "loose nexus"); and (3) if so, whether, considering all the evidence, both objective and subjective, the claimant's pain was in fact disabling. Brownrigg v. Berryhill, 688 F. App'x 542, 545-46 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 2012)). As part of this analysis, the ALJ should consider the following factors:
20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vii); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *7; SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3; accord Brownrigg, 688 F. App'x at 545-46 (noting that the factors to consider in the Luna analysis are "similar" to those listed in Social Security Ruling 16-3p).
Here, the ALJ recited Plaintiff's testimony that he is "unable to work due to depression, anxiety, rheumatoid arthritis in the knees, COPD, back pain, acid reflux, high blood pressure, and sleep apnea." R. 16. The ALJ noted Plaintiff's testimony regarding back and knee pain, difficulty holding items and reaching up, and complaints of depression and anxiety. R. 16. The ALJ summarized Plaintiff's testimony regarding his activities of daily living. R. 16. Upon evaluation, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff's] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in the decision." R. 16. As support for this finding, the ALJ pointed to: (1) Plaintiff's medical records, including the results of x-rays and physical and mental examinations, as well as the effectiveness of medications; (2) Plaintiff's daily activities; and (3) Plaintiff's earnings record. R. 16-19. Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's reliance on two of those grounds.
Plaintiff contends that his daily activities do not demonstrate that he is capable of performing full-time work. Pl.'s Br. at 21; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i) (stating an ALJ must consider a claimant's daily activities); Potter v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 1346, 1349 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting the claimant's assertions regarding her limitations were contradicted by evidence of her activities). However, the ALJ reasonably considered Plaintiff's and Plaintiff's brother-in-law's reports that Plaintiff has no problem with personal care, heats leftovers and occasionally prepares his own meals, does laundry and washes dishes, feeds pets, shops in stores, can handle money, and goes to friends' houses and church a few times a week. R. 18-19 (citing R. 188-95, 196-203). Although the record also contains evidence that Plaintiff's daily activities may have been more limited, see R. 16 (citing hearing testimony that Plaintiff does not do housework except laundry every two weeks and does not go shopping), it is the ALJ's role and not the Court's to resolve such conflicts in the evidence. See Allman v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1326, 1333 (10th Cir. 2016); accord Thomas v. Berryhill, 685 F. App'x 659, 661 (10th Cir. 2017).
While "sporadic performance" of activities, like performing a few household tasks, "does not establish that a person is capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity," Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 516-17 (10th Cir. 1987), the Tenth Circuit has consistently held that an ALJ may reasonably consider such activities when they are inconsistent with a claimant's reported limitations. See, e.g., Welch v. Colvin, 566 F. App'x 691, 694 (10th Cir. 2014) (claimant able to do light yard work, do light chores, do light cooking, grocery shop, drive, and visit her family); Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010) (claimant could care for herself, her home, and her children, and also drive, shop, handle finances, garden, visit friends, and go out to eat); Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1132 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that "in determining the credibility of pain testimony" ALJ may consider "the nature of [claimant's] daily activities"); accord Newbold v. Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff has not established that the ALJ erred in relying upon Plaintiff's activities in evaluating Plaintiff's subjective complaints.
Plaintiff also contends that it was erroneous for the ALJ to consider his earnings record, arguing that Social Security Ruling 16-3p makes clear that "[e]valuating a claimant's subjective symptoms does not hinge on determining whether the claimant is an honest individual." Pl.'s Br. at 21-22. With respect to Plaintiff's earnings records, the ALJ stated: "The claimant's earnings record do not lend great support to the claimant's credibility. The claimant alleges disability since November 2012. In 2011, the claimant earned $28,107, but from 2005 through 2010 the claimant had zero earnings. This evidence severely reduces the claimant's credibility." R. 19.
Though Plaintiff is correct that evaluation of subjective symptoms does not depend on whether claimant is honest, it is reasonable for the ALJ to consider evidence of record indicating that Plaintiff stopped working for reasons other than his alleged impairments. See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *8 ("In determining whether an individual's symptoms will reduce his or her corresponding capacities to perform workrelated activities. . ., we will consider the consistency of the individual's own statements. To do so, we will compare statements an individual makes in connection with the individual's claim for disability benefits with any existing statements the individual made under other circumstances."); see also Potter, 905 F.2d at 1349 (indicating that a claimant's admission that she did not leave employment as a result of a health-related impairment was relevant to a determination of disability); Gutierrez v. Colvin, No. 2:14-CV-00842-PMW, 2016 WL 3683513, at *3 (D. Utah July 6, 2016) (finding that record supported ALJ's adverse credibility finding when it revealed claimant quit working to stay home with a child or because the job was seasonal). The Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ's consideration of Plaintiff's earnings records.
Plaintiff argues that "the ALJ relied primarily on [Plaintiff's] daily activities and his earnings record." Pl.'s Br. at 19. This argument ignores the ALJ's reliance upon a lack of supporting objective medical evidence. See Bainbridge v. Colvin, 618 F. App'x 384, 387 (10th Cir. 2015) (affirming ALJ's finding on claimant's subjective complaints, which was based in part on lack of supporting objective medical evidence).
In the ALJ's review of the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff's physical symptoms, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff "has been doing well with current medications" and that physical examinations with Dr. Cao "show[] range of motion intact, moving all extremities and . . . normal gait." R. 16 (citing R. 411-12, 416-17). The ALJ also noted Dr. Roberts' report that Plaintiff's "impairments appear to be reasonably well-controlled with medical management at this time." R. 16 (citing R. 69). Finally, the ALJ noted that chest x-rays "showed a normal chest" and physical examination "showed good breath sounds." R. 17 (citing R. 424, 426).
Regarding Plaintiff's mental symptoms, the ALJ noted that
R. 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing R. 321-25). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff stated he "[hadn't] been doing so well" since he ran out of medications four days prior to an appointment (and did not refill his prescriptions because he had an upcoming appointment), but "[o]therwise, [Plaintiff] has no other complaints or side effects." R. 18 (citing R. 348). The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff's treatment records indicated that he
R. 18 (citing R. 351). Finally, the ALJ considered additional treatment records showing that Plaintiff was "oriented; has good judgment and insight; normal memory, normal attention/concentration; and normal mood and affect." R. 18 (citing R. 354-66).
After reviewing Plaintiff's medical records, including the opinions the ALJ discounted, see discussion supra, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's "alleged severity of symptoms and limitations are not consistent with the totality of medical evidence of record." R. 19. The ALJ reasonably relied on the lack of supporting objective medical evidence to find that Plaintiff's subjective symptoms were not disabling. See Newbold, 718 F.3d at 1267-68 (finding that ALJ properly considered whether the claimant's subjective complaints were consistent with objective medical evidence); accord, e.g., Thomas, 685 F. App'x at 664; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4) ("[ALJ] will consider [claimant's] statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [claimant's] symptoms, and [ALJ] will evaluate [claimant's] statements in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence, in reaching a conclusion as to whether [claimant is] disabled.").
In sum, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's subjective complaints and the correct legal standards were applied. See Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he ALJ did not simply recite the general factors he considered, he also stated what specific evidence he relied on in determining that [the claimant's] allegations of disabling pain were not credible."); cf. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 119029, at *7 ("[I]f an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and the other evidence, we will determine that the individual's symptoms are less likely to reduce his or her capacities to perform work-related activities. . . ."). The ALJ articulated sufficient reasoning and relied upon proper factors in determining that, overall, Plaintiff's symptoms did not prohibit him from performing work-related activities.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. Judgment will issue accordingly.
Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c).
