MARCIA S. KRIEGER, Chief District Judge.
Mr. Wallin filed a pro se Application for A Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (
The Respondent moved to dismiss Mr. Wallin's Petition, as moot (
When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive motion, the parties may file specific, written objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy of the recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The district court reviews de novo determination those portions of the recommendation to which a timely and specific objection is made. See U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).
Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction. See McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996). At all stages of the case, the parties must have a "personal stake in the outcome" of the lawsuit. Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990)). In other words, the petitioner must have suffered an actual injury that is traceable to the respondent and can be redressed by a favorable decision. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. An issue becomes moot if it is "impossible for the court to grant `any effectual relief whatsoever' on that issue to a prevailing party," See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1323 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1179 (10th Cir. 2001)).
The Respondent argues that Mr. Wallin's Application is moot because he is no longer in custody, having first been placed in community corrections and then paroled.
A petitioner's challenge to the validity of his conviction satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement. See Spencer, 531 U.S. at 7. But when the challenge is not to the validity of the underlying conviction, but instead to length of incarceration, the petition becomes moot if the petitioner's term of incarceration is completed or he is paroled. See e.g. Aragon v. Shanks, 144 F.3d 690, 692 (10
Here, Mr. Wallin does not attack his conviction. He attacks only the CDOC's refusals to release him from incarceration to community corrections or parole based on an incorrect criminal history in a Presentence Investigation Report. Regardless of the contents of Mr. Wallin's Presentence Investigation Report, he has now received the relief that he requested in his application — he has been released into community corrections and is now on parole. As in Spencer, the CDOC's previous denials of release—and the additional period of incarceration Mr. Wallin suffered as a result—are over and cannot be undone. Thus, Mr. Wallin's claim is moot and must be dismissed, unless an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2002).
Mr. Wallin bears the burden of demonstrating that an exception applies. United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Card, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999). He argues that there is a possibility he will be returned to a CDOC prison and, if so, he will suffer "from the inaccurate and prejudicial information in his file that prevents him (and had repeatedly prevented him) from obtaining community corrections placement or parole." In other words, Mr. Wallin argues that there is a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review. This exception applies "where the following two circumstances [are] simultaneously present: (1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same action again." Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Mr. Wallin's argument satisfies neither of these conditions. Whether he will be returned to prison is based on speculation, but in addition, any correlation between a return to prison and the criminal history in his Presentence Report is speculative. Should such event occur, there is no showing that Mr. Wallin would be unable to challenge it at that time.
Finding Mr. Wallin's Petition to be moot, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction in this matter, and the Court declines to address the Petition on its merits.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Wallin's Objections (