DOMINIC J. SQUATRITO, District Judge.
The plaintiff, Charles Chamar Lumpkin ("the plaintiff" or "Lumpkin"), filed this action under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("the defendant" or "the Commissioner") denying the plaintiff's applications under Title II of the Social Security Act for Social Security Disability benefits ("SSD") and under Title XVI of the Social Security Act for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").
The plaintiff Lumpkin filed concurrent applications for SSD and SSI on September 29, 2009, alleging disability since January 1, 2009. His claims were initially denied on November 3, 2009, and upon reconsideration on October 7, 2010. Lumpkin subsequently reqested a hearing, which was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on October 18, 2011. The plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at the hearing. In a decision dated October 28, 2011, the ALJ found Lumpkin not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Acting through counsel, the plaintiff thereafter requested a review of the ALJ's decision. On November 1, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Lumpkin's request for review. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, this Court must "determine if the correct legal standards have been applied and if the decision is supported by substantial evidence." Bushey v. Colvin, 552 F. App'x 97 (2d Cir. 2014). "Substantial evidence is `more than a mere scintilla' and `means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Prince v. Astrue, 514 F. App'x 18, 20 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The Court must carefully review the entire administrative record to determine the reasonableness of the ALJ's factual findings. See Plouffe v. Astrue, No. 3:10 CV 1548 (CSH), 2011 WL 6010250, at *14 (D. Conn. Aug. 4, 2011). The Commissioner's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, regardless of whether the reviewing court might have found otherwise. Id.
In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Court notes that "[w]here there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have [his] disability determination made according to the correct legal principles." Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 504 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). While credibility determinations are within the exclusive province of the ALJ, a finding that a witness is not credible must be "set forth with sufficient specificity to permit intelligible plenary review of the record." Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 1988). Additionally, with regard to any finding that is potentially dispositive on the issue of disability, the ALJ's decision must include a discussion that is sufficient "to enable a reviewing court to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support that finding." Schupp v. Barnhart, Civ. No. 3:02CV103 (WWE), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14071, at *6 (D. Conn. March 12, 2004).
Lumpkin was born in 1970 and was 38 years old on the initial alleged disability onset date
Beginning in early 2008 and continuing until April 2009 Lumpkin had a series of hospitalizations and underwent multiple surgical procedures relating to his esophagus. While his diagnoses upon discharge varied over this period of time, the predominant diagnoses were tracheoesophageal fistula
Dr. Fielding Johnson, a specialist in pulmonary medicine, began treating Lumpkin in 2007 and continued to treat him throughout the time period relevant to this action. In a Multiple Impairment Questionnaire ("the Questionnaire") dated August 14, 2011, Dr. Johnson indicated that he treated Lumpkin on a monthly basis. (Doc. # 18-12, at 2). Dr. Johnson's diagnosis of Lumpkin in the Questionnaire was tracheoesophageal fistula status post-surgical repair with chronic non-cardiac chest pain. (Id.). The doctor identified right chest wall swelling, chronic narcotic use, and recurrent lower back infections as clinical findings that support his diagnosis. (Id.). He further identified a 2008 CT scan and a 2011 upper GI series as the laboratory and diagnostic test results which support his diagnosis. (Id. at 3). The prognosis listed for Lumpkin's condition was "fair." (Id. at 2). Dr. Johnson indicated that Lumpkin had moderately severe chest wall pain on a daily basis. (Id. at 3-4).
The Questionnaire completed by Dr. Johnson included a "residual functional capacity" section. In that section, Dr. Johnson indicated the following: Lumpkin could sit for only four hours in an eight-hour day and could stand/walk for only one hour; he could not sit continuously in a work setting, but would have to get up hourly and move around for 15 minutes; he could lift up to five pounds frequently, up to ten pounds occasionally, but never more than ten pounds; he could occasionally carry up to ten pounds, but never more than ten pounds. (Id. at 4-5).
Dr. Johnson indicated that Lumpkin would have significant limitations in doing repetitive reaching, handling, fingering or lifting, because his chest pain would worsen with increased breathing or repetitive activity. (Id. at 5).The degree of limitation noted by Dr. Johnson for use of the upper extremities was moderate for grasping on the right side, moderate for reaching with the left arm, and marked (essentially precluded) for reaching with the right arm. (Id.).
Dr. Johnson noted that Lumpkin could tolerate only low stress in a work environment. In support of that conclusion, the doctor stated that Lumpkin was able to work until the time of his surgeries, but that his "attempted return" to work was not successful. (Id. at 7). Dr. Johnson listed psychological limitations and the need to avoid fumes, gases, temperature extremes, dust, bending, and stooping as other limitations that would affect Lumpkin's ability to work at a regular job on a sustained basis. (Id. at 8). In Dr. Johnson's "best medical opinion" the earliest date that his description of symptoms and limitations applied to Lumpkin is 2009. (Id.).
In a narrative report also dated August 14, 2011, Dr. Johnson stated as follows:
(Doc. # 18-11, at 112-13).
Dr. Christopher Morse treated Lumpkin for his TEF between March 1, 2008, and October 27, 2009. On September 28, 2011, Dr. Morse issued a narrative report in which he stated as follows:
(Doc. # 18-11, at 115). In 2010 Dr. Morse had completed a "Gastrointestinal Disorders Impairment Questionnaire" which indicated that Lumpkin could sit and stand/walk for a total of three hours each in an eight hour day, could occasionally lift or carry no more than ten pounds, and would likely be absent from work more than three times a month as a result of his impairment. (Doc. # 18-11, at 76-77).
Dr. James Ryan performed a consultative examination of Lumpkin on September 23, 2010, at the request of a Social Security Administration disability examiner. Dr. Ryan's report indicates that "[t]he patient is the historian for this exam and the quality of the history is fair to good." (Doc. # 18-11, at 69). Under the heading "impression," Dr. Ryan noted as follows:
(Id. at 71). The report also stated that:
(Id. at 72).
Dr. Firooz Golkar issued an opinion on or about November 2, 2009, in which he concluded that Lumpkin was not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act. According to the ALJ, Dr. Golkar, who was characterized as a "[s]tate agency medical consultant," based his opinion "on a review of the record." (Doc. # 18-2, at 22). Dr. Golkar's Disability Determination Explanation identifies the "evidence of record" as medical records from Massachusetts General Hospital and St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center — Mt. Sinai. (Doc. # 18-3, at 5). The report also states that additional evidence had been requested from Hartford Hospital. Under the heading "weighing of opinion evidence," the report states, "There is no indication of medical or other opinion evidence in file." (Id. at 7). There is no mention of either Dr. Johnson or Dr. Morse in Dr. Golkar's report.
Dr. Golkar listed "HIV" as Lumpkin's primary impairment diagnosis and "Diseases of Esophagus" as his secondary impairment diagnosis. (Id.). As to both diagnoses, Dr. Golkar indicated "Yes" under the heading "Severity." (Id.) Under the heading "symptoms and credibility," Dr. Golkar's report states that Lumpkin's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce his pain or other symptoms, and that Lumpkin's statements about the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of the symptoms were substantiated by the objective medical evidence alone. (Id.).
Dr. Golkar's report included a residual functional capacity section. The doctor stated that Lumpkin had certain exertional limitations. According to Dr. Golkar, Lumpkin could: occasionally, i.e., 1/3 or less of an 8 hour day, lift and/or carry 20 pounds; frequently, i.e., more than 1/3 up to 2/3 of an 8 hour day, lift and/or carry 10 pounds; stand and/or walk for a total of about 6 hours in an 8 hour day; and sit for a total of about 6 hours in an 8 hour day. (Id. at 8). At the end of the exertional limitations section of the report form, Dr. Golkar was asked to "Explain exertional limitations indicated above." (Id.) His response was "Projected exertional limitation following recent repair of TE fistula by 9-2010." (Id.).
Dr. Golkar also stated that Lumpkin had postural limitations. His report indicates that Lumpkin could occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl, but could never climb ladders. (Id.). This doctor further indicated that Lumpkin had certain environmental limitations, which were avoiding concentrated exposure to extreme cold or heat, and avoiding even moderate exposure to hazards, e.g., machinery, heights. (Id. at 9).
After noting that Lumpkin did not have the residual functional capacity to perform his past relevant work, i.e., iron worker, Dr. Golkar concluded that he demonstrated the maximum sustained work capability for "light" work. (Id. at 10). Dr. Golkar's report concluded with a "personalized decision notice" in which he stated the following:
(Id. at 11).
Dr. Virginia Ritter completed a Disability Determination concerning Lumpkin on October 6, 2010. Dr. Ritter conducted a record review in the same manner as had been done by Dr. Golkar. Dr. Ritter's Disability Determination Explanation indicates that she reviewed medical records from St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center — Mt. Sinai, Massachusetts General Hospital, and Hartford Hospital. With regard to Dr. Johnson, Dr. Ritter indicated that "records were not attainable from PCP [primary care physician] due to office issues with their medical recor[d]s system."
Dr. Ritter's residual functional capacity assessment was, for the most part, identical to that of Dr. Golkar. One notable difference is her response that Lumpkin did not have any environmental limitations. (Id. at 27). Dr. Ritter likewise concluded that Lumpkin demonstrated the maximum sustained work capability for light work. Dr. Ritter's personalized decision notice stated the following:
(Id. at 29).
Lumpkin appeared and testified at the October 18, 2011 hearing. When asked about his work history since the time of his surgery in 2008, he stated that he had a number of temporary jobs working as an iron worker from that time until December 2010, but that he was unable to successfully complete these jobs:
(Doc. # 18-2, at 34-35, 37).
In response to questions posed by the ALJ, Lumpkin testified that he had earned $42,000.00 in 2009 as a result of an iron worker job with Burlington Steel that lasted for approximately six months. He testified further that in 2010 he had a temporary iron worker job with Bear Steel that lasted for six weeks and another temporary position with Southern New England Builders. The ALJ characterized these as "two significant jobs." (Id. at 43).
In order to receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an individual must be under a "disability," i.e., an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which ... has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Such an impairment must be "of such severity that [the applicant] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. ..." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Commissioner must apply a five-step analysis in evaluating disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520:
Draegert v. Barnhart, 311 F.3d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The issues before this Court relate solely to step five of this process. The ALJ found that Lumpkin is not working, has a severe impairment that does not conclusively require a determination of disability, and is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work. Neither party has contested any of these findings. What is in dispute is the ALJ's assessment of Lumpkin's residual functional capacity for the purpose of determining whether he is capable of performing other gainful work. Residual functional capacity ("RFC") "is the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (a)(1). The ALJ must assess a claimant's RFC "based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3).
The plaintiff's first argument is that the ALJ failed to follow the "treating physician rule." The "treating physician rule" provides that "[t]he opinion of a treating physician on the nature or severity of a claimant's impairments is binding if it is supported by medical evidence and not contradicted by substantial evidence in the record." Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 418 (2d Cir. 2013). "In order to override the opinion of the treating physician ... the ALJ must explicitly consider ... (1) the frequency, length, nature, and extent of treatment; (2) the amount of medical evidence supporting the opinion; (3) the consistency of the opinion with the remaining medical evidence; and (4) whether the physician is a specialist." Id.
The ALJ noted in his decision that Dr. Johnson had treated Lumpkin since 2007 and that Dr. Morse was also a treating physician. The ALJ went on to state that, "The undersigned has given some weight to Drs. Morse and Johnson's assessments of the claimant's condition as severe based on their treatment and description of procedures. However, the undersigned has given no weight to their assessments of the claimant's physical limitations." (Doc. # 18-2, at 21-22). With regard to the opinion of Dr. Golkar that Lumpkin "could perform less than the full range of light work with postural limitations," the ALJ stated that, "The undersigned affords this opinion considerable weight, as it is based on a review of the record and is mostly consistent with the objective findings. Nevertheless, the medical evidence of record does not support additional postural limitations." (Id. at 22). The ALJ's decision makes no mention of Dr. Ritter or her October 6, 2010 Disability Determination.
In connection with his statement that he had given no weight to Dr. Morse's assessment of Lumpkin's physical limitations, the ALJ noted that "Dr. Morse last treated the claimant in October 2009. ..." (Id.). At the same time, however, the ALJ afforded considerable weight to the opinion of Dr. Golkar, who had signed his RFC assessment on "10/27/2009," which coincidentally was the exact same date on which Dr. Morse last saw Lumpkin: "I last saw Mr. Lumpkin on October 27, 2009." (Doc. # 18-11, at 115). Additionally, while Dr. Morse completed his impairment questionnaire in October 2010, nothing in the ALJ's decision suggests any significant change from 2009 to 2010 in the intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of Lumpkin's symptoms. The decision notes "stable chronic findings" with regard to testing done in January 2011. (Doc. # 18-2, at 22). The decision further indicates that "[w]hile there may have been a short period of time after surgery in which the claimant could not have functioned, there is nothing in the medical evidence of record to suggest that the claimant's condition worsened after recovering from surgery. He had significant earnings in 2009 and 2010. ..." (Doc. # 18-2, at 22).
With regard to both Dr. Johnson and Dr. Morse, the ALJ stated that "there is no indication that either doctor was aware of, or took into account, the claimant's work activity throughout this period." (Id.). The work activity referred to by the ALJ was Lumpkin's intermittent work as an iron worker in 2009 and 2010. The Court notes that Dr. Johnson's Multiple Impairment Questionnaire, dated August 14, 2011, states that Lumpkin "was able to work until recent surgery; attempted return [not]
The Commissioner is required by regulation to "always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source's opinion." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c)(2). In this instance the Court finds that while the ALJ did articulate reasons for not crediting the opinions of Lumpkin's treating physicians, these were not "good reasons" as is required. See Martinez v. Colvin, No. 12-CV-05713 (LGS) (RLE), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89096, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2014) ("Reasons that are conclusory fail the `good reasons' requirement."). "Failure to provide `good reasons' for not crediting the opinion of a claimant's treating physician is a ground for remand." Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999).
Additionally, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ `s decision should be reversed because it fails to explicitly address the factors identified in Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 2013), i.e., "(1) the frequency, length, nature, and extend of treatment; (2) the amount of medical evidence supporting the opinion; (3) the consistency of the opinion with the remaining medical evidence; and (4) whether the physician is a specialist." Id at 418. In Selian, the Second Circuit stated that "[i]n order to override the opinion of the treating physician ... the ALJ must explicitly consider" the four listed factors. Id. The defendant argues in turn that the ALJ need not explicitly address each Selian factor in his decision, but that "it is sufficient when a court can discern from context that an ALJ has applied the substance of the treating physician rule. ..." (Doc. # 17-1, at 11). Without holding that the ALJ must explicitly address each of the Selian factors in his decision, the Court finds that it is not "clear from the decision that the proper analysis was undertaken." Khan v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-5118 (MKB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106950, at *45-46 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013). There is no indication in the ALJ's decision that the factors identified in Selian were explicitly considered. The ALJ's discussion of Lumpkin's functional limitations focuses more on Lumpkin's credibility than on the opinions of his treating physicians. Since the Court cannot conclude that the proper analysis was undertaken pursuant to Selian, that too is a sufficient reason to remand the Commissioner's decision.
In contrast to the treatment of the opinions of Drs. Johnson and Morse, the ALJ afforded "considerable weight" to the opinion of Dr. Golkar. (Doc. # 18-2, at 22). Dr. Golkar was a consulting, not a treating, physician with regard to Lumpkin. Dr. Golkar never examined Lumpkin, but instead based his opinion on a review of records from two hospitals which had provided services to Lumpkin. The ALJ's reliance on Dr. Golkar's opinion "contravened the clear guidance of [Social Security Administration] regulations, as Dr. [Golkar] was a nonexamining source whose opinions are to be accorded less weight than those of examining sources and especially treating sources." Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 06-CV-3174 (ENV) (MDG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28046, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. March 18, 2011). The Court notes that the exertional limitations indicated in Dr. Golkar's RFC assessment were characterized by the doctor as "[p]rojected exertional limitations following recent repair of TE fistula by 9-2010."
The ALJ's decision also notes the findings of the consultative examination performed by Dr. Ryan. Although the ALJ does not explicitly state that he accorded any particular weight to Dr. Ryan's findings, those findings were mentioned in the section of the decision in which the ALJ concluded that Lumpkin has the RFC to perform the full range of light work. In this regard, the Second Circuit has "cautioned that ALJs should not rely heavily on the findings of consultative physicians after a single examination." Selian, 708 F.3d at 419. This is so because "consultative exams are often brief, are generally performed without the benefit or review of claimant's medical history and, at best, only give a glimpse of the claimant on a single day." Tankisi v. Commissioner of Social Security, 521 F. App'x 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). These concerns are applicable to Dr. Ryan's single consultative examination of Lumpkin. There is no indication that Dr. Ryan reviewed any of Lumpkin's medical records, and his report states that "[t]he patient is the historian for this exam. ..." (Doc. # 18-11, at 69). His report also indicates that on the day of the exam, "the patient was having a good day ..." (Id. at 71). At best, Dr. Ryan's examination "only gives a glimpse of [Lumpkin] on a single day." Tankisi, 521 F. App'x at 34.
The plaintiff next argues that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard and made insufficient findings in determining Lumpkin's credibility. The defendant counters with the argument that the ALJ properly assessed the credibility of Lumpkin's subjective complaints.
In determining a claimant's RFC, an ALJ "is required to take the claimant's reports of pain and other limitations into account, but is not required to accept the claimant's subjective complaints without question; he may exercise discretion in weighing the credibility of the claimant's testimony in light of the other evidence in the record." Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In determining the credibility of a claimant's statements, the ALJ "must consider the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence, the individual's own statements about symptoms, statements and other information provided by treating or examining physicians or psychologists and other persons about the symptoms and how they affect the individual, and any other relevant evidence in the case record." SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *1. It is the function of the Commissioner, not the Court, "to appraise the credibility of witnesses, including the claimant." Campbell v. Astrue, 465 F. App'x 4, 7 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiff's claim that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard in determining Lumpkin's credibility is based on the following statement contained in the ALJ's decision: "[T]he claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment." (Doc. # 18-2, at 21). According to the plaintiff, this statement demonstrates that the ALJ erroneously evaluated the credibility of Lumpkin's testimony in light of its consistency with the RFC determined by the ALJ, rather than in light of the evidence in the record. The statement at issue appears to be boilerplate language routinely utilized in ALJ decisions. See Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing the quoted language as a "template," i.e., "a passage drafted by the Social Security Administration for insertion into any administrative law judge's opinion to which it pertains"). The phrasing of this boilerplate language is, at best, confusing, and if the decision did not further address the basis for the ALJ's determination regarding Lumpkin's credibility, the Court would be inclined to agree with the plaintiff.
Following the boilerplate language quoted above is a discussion about Lumpkin's post-surgery activities, including both his Activities of Daily Living and his employment, in light of his testimony regarding the functional limitations resulting from his symptoms. The ALJ found an "inconsistency between the claimant's activities and his allegations regarding the functional limitations of his impairment. ..." (Doc. # 18-2, at 21). For example, Lumpkin had "indicated that he worked only temporary jobs of two days and four weeks, but later indicated that one of the jobs lasted for six months." (Id.). Similarly, the ALJ noted that "[l]ater in the hearing, the claimant attempted to minimize his work by saying that he did not work with the steel or climb. However, he initially testified that he had `dropped things from up there.'" (Id.). On the basis of this inconsistency the ALJ "[did] not find the claimant's testimony regarding the degree of limitation imposed by his impairment to be fully credible and consequently [gave] the claimant's testimony limited weight." (Id.).
An ALJ's decision "`must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's statements and the reasons for that weight.'" Tornatore v. Barnhart, No. 05 Civ. 6858 (GEL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90397, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006) (quoting SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4). "One strong indication of the credibility of an individual's statements is their consistency, both internally and with other information in the case record." SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5. The Court concludes that the ALJ satisfied this standard with regard to his assessment of Lumpkin's credibility.
The plaintiff's third argument is that the ALJ erred by relying on the Social Security Administration's Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "Grids"), instead of requiring testimony from a vocational expert, in order to determine whether there was work in the national economy that Lumpkin could perform. The Grids "take[] into account the claimant's residual functional capacity in conjunction with the claimant's age, education and work experience ... [and] indicate whether the claimant can engage in any substantial gainful work existing in the national economy." Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "For a claimant whose characteristics match the criteria of a particular grid rule, the rule directs a conclusion as to whether he is disabled." Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996). Here the ALJ found that a finding of "not disabled" was directed by the Grids. (Doc. # 18-2, 23).
"The Grids are inapplicable in cases where the claimant exhibits a significant non-exertional impairment
The Court has previously discussed its concerns regarding the ALJ's rejection of the opinions of Lumpkin's treating physicians regarding his physical limitations. These concerns apply with equal force to the question of whether Lumpkin exhibited a significant non-exertional limitation and will need to be addressed by the ALJ on remand. With regard to the postural limitations noted in Dr. Golkar's report, the ALJ simply stated, after indicating that he afforded "great weight" to Dr. Golkar's opinion, that "[n]evertheless, the medical evidence of record does not support additional postural limitations." (Doc. # 18-2, at 22). There is no further indication as to what medical evidence of record was relied upon in support of that conclusion. Under these circumstances the Court cannot find that the ALJ had substantial evidence to support his conclusion that "[t]here is no indication in the medical evidence of record that would further restrict or limit the claimant from performing work-related activities" and then rely upon the Grids to determine that Lumpkin is not disabled. (Id.).
For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion to affirm the Commissioner's decision (
The decision of the Commissioner is reversed and the case is remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this ruling. These proceedings shall include further development of the administrative record to the extent necessary for a consideration of the opinions of the treating physicians consistent with the treating physician rule and a determination of whether the claimant exhibits a significant non-exertional impairment.
