GORDON P. GALLAGHER, Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion to amend and supplement the pleadings (ECF #161)
Plaintiffs move to amend to add claims seven through eleven to this action and to correspondingly add to the factual allegations in the complaint by way of support and elucidation of those new claims. The new claims, and any opposition to the them, break down as follows:
When ruling on a motion to amend filed after the scheduling order deadline, as this one is, I must apply a two-step analysis. First, I must determine whether the movant has established "good cause" for the sought modification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b). If the answer to that preliminary question is yes, I then move on to determine if the motion should be granted under the more lenient standard of Rule 15(a) which states that "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires."
Pumpco, Inc. v. Schenker Intern., Inc., 204 F.R.D. 667, 668 (D.Colo. 2001) (internal citations removed).
With regard to the unopposed claims as set forth above I simply state that I find both the standards in Rule 16(b) and 15(a) have been met and the I Order that the motion to amend is granted as to each of those claims.
This leaves to be determined the following:
Claim 10 by Plaintiff McFadden against the MHA Defendants:
Claim ten is for a failure to return a security deposit under C.R.S. 38-12-103. Such a claim may arise if the deposit is not returned within one month, C.R.S. 38-12-103 (1), or no later than sixty days if so agreed to in the lease. Pertinent to this argument is (3)(a) of the statute allowing treble damages, attorney fees and court costs for "willful retention." There is no real dispute that this claim is outside either the month or sixty day time period, indicating Plaintiff would have known she had not received the return of her deposit. However, Plaintiff's argument instead focuses on the "willful retention" section arguing that certain discovery responses made plain that Defendants' failure to return the security deposit was willful rather than neglectful or perhaps an inadvertent mistake.
The information in question, imbedded within a discovery dispute chart provided to this Court for resolution of another discovery matter, is that there was no letter sent to Plaintiff McFadden telling her that she was not getting her deposit back because McFadden did not provide a forwarding address and that she filed suit four days after the damage was found (ECF #161-8, pp. 1-2, April 20, 2017). Up until that answer was provided, Plaintiff perhaps believed that the known failure to return the deposit was inadvertent, not willful. While in no way opining that any perceived failure was or was not willful, the supposed production of information leading Plaintiff McFadden to believe it was willful affords good cause which could not have otherwise been known by the exercise of due diligence on behalf of Plaintiff McFadden. Therefore, Plaintiff has met their burden under Rule 16(b). As to Rule 15(a), I find that justice requires amendment of the complaint to add claim 10 under these circumstances.
For the foregoing reasons, I hereby Order that claims 7 though 11 are added and that the second amended complaint (ECF #161-2) is accepted for filing and is now the operative complaint.