STIPULATION AND ORDER ALLOWING FORMER CLASS MEMBER NAOMI UKEI TO WITHDRAW HER REQUEST FOR EXCLUSION AND REJOIN THE CLASS

HOWARD D. McKIBBEN, District Judge.

WHEREAS, on June 2, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class as to defendants MRI International, Inc., Edwin Fujinaga, Junzo Suzuki, Paul Suzuki, and LVT, Inc. (Dkt. 255), which was granted on March 21, 2016 (Dkt. 404);

WHEREAS, on May 5, 2016 the class definition was modified by way of stipulation (Dkt. 425), which was granted on May 6, 2016 (Dkt. 426);

WHEREAS, on August 31, 2016, class member Naomi Ukei requested to be excluded from the class;

WHEREAS, Defendants Junzo and Paul Suzuki and their affiliated entities ("Suzuki Defendants") and trusts entered into a Settlement Agreement with Plaintiffs on December 11, 2017;

WHEREAS, Paragraph 2.12 of the Settlement Agreement provides that as additional consideration of entering into the settlement, the parties will stipulate that investors who requested to be excluded from the Class following the notice of Class Certification be allowed to rejoin the Class, if they so request;

WHEREAS, on June 22, 2017 Plaintiffs' counsel contacted class members who excluded themselves, inquiring as to whether they would be interested in withdrawing their request and to rejoin the class;

WHEREAS, on June 25, 2017 Ms. Ukei requested that she be able to withdraw her request for exclusion and explained that she had not initially understood the consequences of requesting to be excluded from the class. Ms. Ukei's declaration is attached as Exhibit A;

WHEREAS, according to MRI International, Inc.'s records, Ms. Ukei made two investments at 1,500,000 yen each (approximately $26,000), for which she contends she has not been repaid;

WHEREAS, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) permits the Court to alter or amend the class at any time, for any reason, before decision on the merits. See Vizcaino v. U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. Of Washington, 173 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Rule 23(c)(1), which gives the court "explicit permission to alter or amend a certification order before [a] decision on the merits . . ."); Andrews Farms v. Ca/cot, Ltd., 268 F.R.D. 380, 384 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[e]ven after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify");

WHEREAS, Courts have allowed former class members to withdraw their request for exclusion and rejoin the class. See In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 1222690 (March 25, 2013) (permitting party that opted out after class certification to withdraw exclusion after settlement approved but before settlement funds were distributed); In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 5215980 (D. Kan. Dec. 12, 2008) (permitting entities to opt back into the class after settlement approved); In re Electrical Carbon Prods. Antitrust Litig., 447 F.Supp.2d 389 (D.N.J. 2006) (allowing opt outs to return to class because defendants would have withdrawn settlement if they were allowed to do so); In re Electric Weld Steel Tubing Antitrust Litig., 1982 WL 1873 (June 30, 1982) (permitting company to opt back into class as to certain defendants after it privately settled claims against other defendants); and

WHEREAS, this Court granted final approval of Plaintiffs' settlement with LVT, Inc. on November 17, 2017 and preliminarily approved Plaintiffs' settlement with ICAG, Inc. and the Suzuki Defendants on January 3, 2018, but no settlement funds have been distributed.

Based on the forgoing, the parties stipulate as follows:

PURSUANT TO STIPULATION, IT IS SO ORDERED.