SMITH, Justice.

Loma Alta Property Owners Association, Inc. ("LAPOA"), petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing the circuit court's denial of Carol Mahoney's claim under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, § 12-19-270 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 ("the ALAA"). See Mahoney v. Loma Alta Prop. Owners Ass'n, 52 So.3d 510 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) ("Mahoney II"). We granted certiorari review to consider, as a material question of first impression, the appropriate appellate standard of review for the denial of a claim made under the ALAA. We also granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicts with Dickerson v. Dickerson, 885 So.2d 160 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). We adopt the standard of review applied by the Court of Civil Appeals in Mahoney II, and we conclude that this case is distinguishable from Dickerson. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.

Facts and Procedural History

LAPOA and Carol Mahoney ("Mahoney") both stipulate that the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in Mahoney v. Loma Alta Property Owners Ass'n, 4 So.3d 1130 (Ala. Civ.App.2008) ("Mahoney I"), correctly sets out the facts and procedural history in the underlying case. That opinion states:

Mahoney I, 4 So.3d at 1131-33.

In Mahoney I the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court because, it held, LAPOA had failed to present any evidence indicating that "it had an express contract with Ms. Mahoney or that it had a reasonable expectation of compensation from Ms. Mahoney on an implied contract." 4 So.3d at 1135-36. The Court of Civil Appeals remanded the action to the circuit court with instructions for that court to vacate its judgment in favor of LAPOA, to enter a judgment in favor of Mahoney on LAPOA's claims, and to then adjudicate Mahoney's claim under the ALAA. See Mahoney I, 4 So.3d at 1136.

On remand the circuit court summarily denied Mahoney's ALAA claim. Mahoney then moved the circuit court, under Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., to alter, amend, or vacate its order denying her ALAA claim. The circuit court denied the motion; no transcript appears in the record for a hearing on the motion. Mahoney then appealed the judgment denying her ALAA claim to the Court of Civil Appeals.

The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that "[b]ecause LAPOA's claims against Ms. Mahoney were groundless in law, the trial court's order denying Ms. Mahoney's ALAA claim is reversed, and the cause is remanded for the trial court to determine an appropriate award." Mahoney II, 52 So.3d at 517-18. LAPOA then petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. We granted certiorari review to consider, as a material question of first impression, the appropriate appellate standard of review for the denial of an ALAA claim. We also granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Civil Appeal' decision conflicts with Dickerson, supra.

Analysis

We first consider the appropriate appellate standard of review for the denial of a claim brought under the ALAA. The legislature enacted the ALAA in 1987 to deter baseless legal action. See Pacific Enters. Oil Co. (USA) v. Howell Petroleum Corp., 614 So.2d 409, 417 (Ala.1993). To effectuate this purpose, the ALAA provides, in pertinent part:

§ 12-19-272(a), Ala.Code 1975. Section 12-19-271(1) provides that for an action, claim, defense, or appeal to be "without substantial justification," it must be "frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or vexatious, or interposed for any improper purpose, including without limitation, to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, as determined by the court."

Only when a court awards attorney fees under the ALAA must that court "specifically set forth the reasons for such award." § 12-19-273, Ala.Code 1975. If a court denies a claim for attorney fees under the ALAA, that court is not required to set forth reasons for its denial. In Pacific Enterprises this Court advised:

614 So.2d at 418.

The standard of review on appeal from an award of attorney fees under the ALAA "depends upon the basis for the trial court's determination." Morrow v. Gibson, 827 So.2d 756, 762 (Ala.2002). In Pacific Enterprises, this Court determined, as an issue of first impression, that

614 So.2d at 418. In this case the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that "the standard of review on appeal from the denial of an ALAA claim is no different from the standard of review on appeal from the grant of an ALAA claim," despite the fact that a court is not required to enter findings supporting its decision when it denies a claim for attorney fees under the ALAA. Mahoney II, 52 So.3d at 517.

LAPOA disagrees, arguing that the appellate standard of review for the grant and the denial of attorney fees under the ALAA "cannot logically be the same when a grant of fees under the ALAA is accompanied by specific reasons in support thus giving the appellate court something to review and a denial of fees under the ALAA is usually not accompanied by any reasons in support. . . ." LAPOA's brief, at p. 24. LAPOA contends that, because a court denying an attorney fee is not required under the ALAA to enter an order stating why it declined the award, application to a denial of an attorney fee of the same standard of review for the grant of an attorney fee under the ALAA improperly requires the appellate court to "reweigh the evidence heard ore tenus . . . and to substitute its opinion for that of the trial court's judgment" in order to determine whether the action, claim, defense, or appeal was groundless in law or groundless in fact. LAPOA's brief, at p. 28. LAPOA appears to contend that the denial of an attorney fee under the ALAA, including the groundless-in-law category, should be reviewed under the ore tenus standard of review, which provides that "`[w]hen a judge in a nonjury case hears oral testimony, a judgment based on findings of fact based on that testimony will be presumed correct and will not be disturbed on appeal except for a plain and palpable error.'" Smith v. Muchia, 854 So.2d 85, 92 (Ala.2003) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So.2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996)).

We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that the appellate standard of review set out in Pacific Enterprises applies to both the grant and the denial of a claim for an attorney fee under the ALAA. If a party appealing the denial of a claim for an attorney fee under the ALAA argues on appeal that an action, claim, defense, or appeal was frivolous, groundless in fact, vexatious, or interposed for an improper purpose, the appellate court shall not reverse the denial of the claim "`unless it is clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence.'" Pacific Enters. Oil Co. (USA), 614 So.2d at 418 (quoting Cove Creek Dev. Corp., 588 So.2d at 461). If a party appealing the denial of a claim for attorney fees under the ALAA argues on appeal that an action, claim, or defense was groundless in law, the appellate court "will test the validity of the trial court's legal conclusion" and reverse the denial of the claim only when the record shows that the trial court erred in denying the claim. Pacific Enters. Oil Co. (USA), 614 So.2d at 418.

LAPOA asserts that applying the same appellate standard of review to the award of attorney fees under the ALAA to the denial of attorney fees under the ALAA will require appellate courts to "reweigh the evidence heard ore tenus." LAPOA's brief, at p. 28. We disagree. If a court denies a claim for attorney fees under the ALAA after holding a hearing on that claim, and the party seeking attorney fees appeals that denial arguing that the subject action, claim, defense, or appeal was frivolous, groundless in fact, vexatious, or interposed for an improper purpose, the appellate standard of review is equivalent to the ore tenus standard of review.1 Compare Pacific Enters. Oil Co. (USA), 614 So.2d at 418 with Muchia, 854 So.2d at 92. If a court denies a claim for attorney fees under the ALAA after holding a hearing on that claim, and the party seeking attorney fees appeals that denial arguing that the subject action, claim, defense, or appeal was groundless in law, the appellate standard of review is de novo, which requires the appellate courts of this State to "test the validity of the trial court's legal conclusion." Pacific Enters. Oil Co. (USA), 614 So.2d at 418.

Here, Mahoney argued to the Court of Civil Appeals that "[LAPOA's] claims against [her] were without substantial justification as they were `groundless in law.'" Mahoney's brief to the Court of Civil Appeals, at p. 8. That court agreed, holding that "the record shows indisputably that LAPOA's action against Ms. Mahoney was groundless in law." Mahoney II, 52 So.3d at 517. We also agree.

As the Court of Civil Appeals noted:

Mahoney II, 52 So.3d at 517. Indeed, the amended complaint "allege[s] that Mr. Mahoney was the `owner' of unit C-1 in Loma Alta Townhomes and that Ms. Mahoney was a `resident' of the unit." Mahoney I, 4 So.3d at 1131-32 (emphasis added). Because "[a]ll four of LAPOA's claims against Ms. Mahoney—breach of contract, account stated, property owner's lien, and eviction—hinged upon its proving that Ms. Mahoney was the owner of the property," and because LAPOA did not allege that Mahoney was the owner of the property, each of LAPOA's claims against Mahoney was groundless in law.2 Mahoney II, 52 So.3d at 517. The ALAA does not define the phrase "groundless in law"; however, this Court in Pacific Enterprises stated that "the phrase `groundless in law' clearly calls for a legal determination." 614 So.2d at 418. Here, the determination that LAPOA's claims were groundless calls for a legal determination, not a fact-finding exercise. Specifically, the determination that the claims asserted by LAPOA against Mahoney in the amended complaint were groundless results from recognition that ownership of the property was a required legal element of each claim and that, at the time LAPOA amended the complaint, LAPOA alleged that Mahoney's former husband, and not Mahoney herself, was the owner of the property. We affirm the Court of Civil Appeals' decision that the circuit court erred in denying Mahoney's claim for an attorney fee under the ALAA.3

We also granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Civil Appeal' decision reversing of the circuit court's judgment denying Mahoney's ALAA claim conflicts with Dickerson. LAPOA contends that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in this case conflicts with Dickerson because, LAPOA says, Dickerson reversed the trial court's judgment awarding attorney fees under the ALAA and remanded the cause to the trial court for the entry of a judgment that did not make an attorney-fee award despite the fact that the underlying action was groundless in law. We find Dickerson distinguishable from the present case.

Contrary to the position asserted by LAPOA, Dickerson did not hold that the underlying action there was groundless in law. Rather, Dickerson held that "although we conclude that the mother's efforts to obtain reinstatement of postminority educational support ultimately must fail, we do not think it can be concluded that the mother asserted positions that were so frivolous, groundless, vexatious, or improper as to justify the award of attorney fees under the ALAA." Dickerson, 885 So.2d at 168. Dickerson follows this Court's guidance in Morrow that "[the attorney] must have been more than `simply legally incorrect' to justify an award of attorney fees pursuant to the ALAA. The legal insufficiency of his position must be susceptible to a conclusion that no reasonable and competent attorney would have advanced the contention that he did." 827 So.2d at 763-64. Indeed, in Dickerson the Court of Civil Appeals expressly recognized that "the mother argues with some justification that `it is inconceivable that the court would consider her [claims] as a frivolous.'" 885 So.2d at 168 (emphasis added). Because Dickerson did not find that the underlying action was groundless in law, it is clearly distinguishable from the present case. As discussed above, we find no error in the Court of Civil Appeals' conclusion that LAPOA's action against Mahoney was groundless in law.4

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.

AFFIRMED.

LYONS, STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, and SHAW, JJ., concur.

WOODALL and MURDOCK, JJ., dissent.

WOODALL, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from the decision affirming the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and thereby allowing that court to issue a judgment instructing the trial court to award some amount of attorney fees and costs under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, § 12-19-270 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. My dissent is based, in substantial part, upon the factors discussed by Justice Murdock in his well reasoned dissent. However, I have also been persuaded by other factors.

Loma Alta Property Owners Association, Inc. ("LAPOA"), began this case in the Baldwin District Court, where Carol Mahoney admitted that she owed "some money" to LAPOA. LAPOA prevailed in that court, obtaining a judgment against Mahoney for $5,390, plus court costs and an attorney fee. Mahoney appealed to the Baldwin Circuit Court, where, after a trial de novo, LAPOA again prevailed, obtaining a judgment against Mahoney for $6,279.10, plus an attorney fee. Although that judgment was reversed on appeal by the Court of Civil Appeals, which held that LAPOA had failed to prove its claims, LAPOA's earlier successes in the lower courts convince me that its action is not the type of action targeted for sanctions by the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act.

I agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that "LAPOA's claims against Ms. Mahoney. . . hinged upon its proving that [she] was the owner of the property[, and that] LAPOA . . . failed to prove that [she] was the owner." Mahoney v. Loma Alta Prop. Owners Ass'n, 52 So.3d 510, 517 (Ala.Civ. App.2009). However, I cannot agree that such a failure of proof rendered LAPOA's action groundless in law. Also, given the history of the litigation, the dealings between the parties before the litigation, and the deference that must be afforded to the trial court's decision, I cannot conclude that the trial court erred in determining that LAPOA'S action was not frivolous, groundless in fact, vexatious, or interposed for any improper purpose.

MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).

I first note that we should take care not to confuse whether we can decide an issue as a matter of law with whether the underlying issue being decided is itself a question of law or one of fact.

An action alleging that Carol Mahoney was the owner of the condominium and seeking condominium fees from her in that capacity states a cognizable legal theory; it therefore is not groundless in law. At least until the amendment of the complaint in the circuit court identifying Mahoney merely as a "resident" of the condominium unit, that was the nature of the action brought against Mahoney.

The fact that Loma Alta Property Owners Association, Inc. ("LAPOA"), later acquired information indicating that Mahoney was not the owner of the condominium unit (and amended its complaint to that effect) raises the question whether, from the outset, the claim was groundless in fact. I cannot conclude as a matter of law that it was.

This is a case in which LAPOA pursued its claim against Mahoney in the context of the following: (1) Mahoney filed an answer in the district court admitting that she owed a portion of the condominium fees at issue, fees that are owed only by the owner of a condominium unit; (2) in her amended answer in the circuit court, Mahoney made only a general denial of the allegations in the complaint, "demand[ing] strict proof thereof," but did not specifically deny ownership of the unit; (3) Mahoney continued to imply that she was the owner of the condominium unit by propounding, and moving the circuit court to compel an answer to, an interrogatory requiring LAPOA to "state each and every fact that you rely upon to support your claim that you have the right to charge property owners of Loma Alta for property owner fees, assessments, [etc.]" (a similarly worded request for production was propounded by Mahoney); (4) Mahoney lived alone in the condominium unit for the 9-10 years preceding the filing of the complaint; (5) Mahoney engaged in a course of dealing in which she paid and assumed responsibility for payment of fees owed by the condominium owner, i.e., the very fees that are the subject of this litigation; (6) Mahoney claimed setoffs to which only the owner of the condominium unit would be entitled; and (7) Mahoney apparently held out to the public that she was the owner of the unit and never asked that bills for the fees be directed to anyone else.

The circuit court decided that an action against Mahoney for the collection of condominium fees under the foregoing circumstances was not "frivolous," "groundless in fact," "vexatious," or "interposed for an improper purpose." Given those circumstances, I cannot conclude that this decision of the circuit court was "clearly erroneous," "without supporting evidence," "manifestly unjust," or "against the great weight of the evidence." In particular, given the history of pre-litigation dealings between the parties and, indeed, the positions taken by Mahoney in the course of this litigation, I cannot conclude that the circuit court exceeded its discretion to the extent that it rejected the notion "that no reasonable and competent attorney would have" retained Mahoney as a defendant even after December 21, 2006 pending a definitive decision by the court as to liability for the condominium-unit fees. Moreover, given the foregoing considerations, I certainly cannot conclude that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in refusing Mahoney's request for an award of attorney fees incurred by her throughout the full course of the litigation.5

Because I would affirm the circuit court's decision, I respectfully dissent.