Filed: Oct. 04, 2011
Latest Update: Oct. 04, 2011
Summary: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 MEMORANDUM DECISION THOMPSON, Judge. 1 Raymond Corey Hymer (defendant) appeals from his conviction and imposition of probation for one count of conducting a chop shop, a class 2 felony. For the following reasons, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) auto theft
Summary: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 MEMORANDUM DECISION THOMPSON, Judge. 1 Raymond Corey Hymer (defendant) appeals from his conviction and imposition of probation for one count of conducting a chop shop, a class 2 felony. For the following reasons, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) auto theft ..
More
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
MEMORANDUM DECISION
THOMPSON, Judge.
¶1 Raymond Corey Hymer (defendant) appeals from his conviction and imposition of probation for one count of conducting a chop shop, a class 2 felony. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) auto theft detectives began investigating defendant and his son, Steven Hymer (Steven), in 2005. DPS had received a tip from a confidential informant that defendant and Steven were involved in purchasing and selling stolen motorcycles and stolen motorcycle parts. Over the course of several months, the detectives conducted surveillance of defendant and Steven at five different properties in Maricopa County, including defendant's residence in El Mirage. Eventually, DPS executed search warrants on the same day at all five properties. Defendant was tipped off, and he was found leaving his El Mirage residence carrying a box full of vehicle titles and $20,000 cash. Police also found dye stamps, numerous motorcycle parts, several mini-bikes, and several motorcycles at the El Mirage residence.
¶3 The state charged defendant with forty-four crimes. Ultimately, the charges were reduced and twenty-three charges were presented to the jury, including two counts of trafficking in stolen property in the first degree, two counts of trafficking in stolen property in the second degree, ten counts of theft of means of transportation, two counts of theft, and seven counts of conducting a chop shop.
¶4 After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of conducting a chop shop in El Mirage, but found not guilty on all other counts. The trial court suspended sentencing and placed defendant on probation for two years, with thirty days in jail as a condition of his probation. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶5 Defendant raises one issue on appeal: whether substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of operating a chop shop. Defendant argues that, at most, the state produced evidence of one stolen motorcycle frame at the El Mirage residence, while the relevant statute requires evidence of at least one stolen vehicle or at least two or more parts of a motor vehicle.
¶6 Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 13-4702 (2005) makes it illegal to knowingly own or operate a chop shop in Arizona. A chop shop is:
[A]ny building, lot or other premises in which one or more persons alters, destroys, disassembles, dismantles, reassembles or stores at least one motor vehicle . . . or two or more motor vehicle . . . parts from at least one vehicle . . . that the person or persons knows were obtained by theft, fraud or conspiracy to defraud with the intent to:
(a) Alter, counterfeit, deface, destroy, disguise, falsify, forge, obliterate or remove the identity of the motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts, including the vehicle identification number for the purpose of misrepresenting or preventing the identification of the motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts.
(b) Sell or dispose of the motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts.
A.R.S. § 13-4701 (2005). On appeal, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict. State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484, 486 (1987) (citation omitted). "To set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury." Id.
¶7 Sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict. In this case, defendant's son Steven made a statement implicating defendant which was read to the jury:
On or between September 22, 2005 and March 21st, 2006, I, Steven Ray Hymer, and my father, Raymond Corey Hymer, knowingly operated a chop shop located at 13030 West Via Camille, El Mirage, Arizona, which is within Maricopa County. At that location we stored a stolen white box trailer and we altered its VIN numbers. We both knew the box trailer was stolen and were using it to store two stolen 2003 SV 650 motorcycles and a stolen 2003 GSXR 1000 motorcycle. We both knew the motorcycles were obtained by theft and stored the three motorcycles and altered their VIN numbers with intent to sell them.
In light of Steven's confession presented at trial, we cannot say that "upon no hypothesis whatever" was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The state also presented evidence that numerous motorcycle parts and several motorcycles with altered identification numbers were found at the El Mirage residence; the testimony showed that there is no legitimate reason to alter a vehicle identification number and that it is in fact a crime to do so. Accordingly, we cannot set aside the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of operating a chop shop.
CONCLUSION
¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and the imposition of probation.
PETER B. SWANN, Judge, JOHN C. GEMMILL, Judge, concurring.
