NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

YEGAN, J.

K.B. appeals from a July 7, 2011 jurisdiction/disposition order declaring her 12-year-old son, Christopher C., a dependent of the juvenile court after the trial court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g) petition.1 Appellant contends that the order is not supported by the evidence and that respondent Ventura County Public Social Services Agency (PSSA) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

On May 4, 2011, PSSA placed 12 year old Christopher in protective custody after appellant was arrested for battery and possession of stolen property. Christopher said they were homeless and, for the past four days, stayed with an elderly woman until appellant was evicted and arrested. Christopher's father died before Christopher was born and Christopher has no family in California.

Appellant told the social worker that "all of [my] family lives out of state." Appellant provided names of relatives but did not have current phone numbers or addresses.

A juvenile dependency petition was filed for failure to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)) and failure to provide for Christopher's support (§ 300, subd. (g)). The petition alleged that appellant was currently incarcerated, that Christopher had been exposed to violent criminal behavior, and that appellant had a history of criminal behavior impacting her ability to provide for Christopher's care and support.

Before the detention hearing, appellant signed an Indian Child Inquiry Attachment (ICWA-010(A) form) stating that Christopher may be a member or eligible for membership in the Cherokee Indian tribe. The form stated that Christopher's mother, maternal grandparents, or maternal great grandparents were members of the Cherokee tribe and that Christopher may be an Indian child because "father was part-[I]ndian."

On May 26, 2011, PSSA served an ICWA-030 notice on appellant, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the U.S. Department of Interior.

PSSA filed a jurisdiction and disposition report stating: "The Indian Child Welfare Act does or may apply." It also filed a memorandum and police reports concerning appellant's prior violation of a restraining order and theft activities. The memorandum stated that appellant was in custody awaiting trial for forgery, unauthorized entry of a dwelling, first degree residential burglary, and felony grand theft.

All of the reports and memorandum were received into evidence at a July 7, 2011 contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The trial court found that proper notice was given, sustained the petition, removed Christopher from appellant's care and custody, and ordered services and visitation.

ICWA Inquiry

Appellant asserts that PSSA failed to make an adequate inquiry to determine whether Christopher is or may be an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA. (§ 224.3, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court., rule 5.481, subd. (a); In re Alice M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1200.) We reject the argument because PSSA did inquire and, based on the information provided, gave ICWA notice to the Cherokee tribes.

ICWA Notice

Appellant argues that the ICWA notice is inadequate because some of the boxes on the ICWA-030 notice form say "unknown" and "not applicable." The notice states that the biological father's current address is "unknown" (father died more than 12 years ago) and lists the current address of the child's maternal grandparents (also deceased) as "unknown."

The burden was on PSSA to obtain all possible information about Christopher's potential Indian background and provide the information to the tribes. (In re Louis S. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 622, 630.) PSSA, however, did not have much to work with because appellant was uncooperative and had no current addresses or phone numbers for extended family members. The duty of inquiry ends when a social worker attempts to gain further information about a child's family but is prevented from doing so because the parent is hostile or uncooperative. (In re K.M. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 115, 119.) "ICWA does not require further inquiry based on mere supposition. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)

PSAA mailed the ICWA notice to the Cherokee tribes and BIA on May 26, 2011. The trial court was not required to delay the jurisdiction/disposition hearing until the tribes' responses were filed with the court. (Cal. Rules of Court., rule 5.482(d)(2); In re N.M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 253, 266.) At the conclusion of the July 7, 2011 hearing, the trial court calendared the matter for an August 30, 2011 review hearing and ordered PSSA to file a memorandum re "update on . . . mother's custody status and ICWA."

Appellant's challenge to the adequacy of the ICQA notice is moot because all the tribes submitted responses confirming that Christopher is not a member or eligible to be a member of a Cherokee tribe. "`A tribe's determination that the child is or is not a member of or eligible for membership in the tribe is conclusive.' [Citation.]" (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 865; § 224.3, subd. (e)(1).)

We have taken judicial notice of the tribes' responses which were mailed in June 2011 and filed August 26, 2011. (Evid. Code, §§ 452; 459, subd. (b); see e.g., In re E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 403, fn. 2; Alicia B. v. Superior Court, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 866-867.) Alleged deficiencies in the ICWA notice are harmless where the tribe has received the notice and declares the child is not registered or eligible to register as a member of the tribe. (In re E.W., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 402-403.)

Substantial Evidence

Appellant argues that the evidence does not support the finding that appellant exposed Christopher to violent criminal behavior or that Christopher is at substantial risk of suffering serious harm. (§ 300, subd. (b).) In order to sustain the dependency petition the trial court had to find by a preponderance of the evidence (1) neglectful conduct by the parent, (2) causation, and (3) substantial risk of harm to the minor. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) A parent's criminal conduct may establish dependency jurisdiction even if the criminal conduct did not result in a conviction. (See e.g., In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 599-600.)

The jurisdiction/disposition report and police reports state that Christopher was present when appellant was arrested for battery and receiving stolen property on May 5, 2011. Earlier that day, appellant was evicted from an elderly woman's house. Appellant attempted to force her way back inside the house and pushed and hit someone who was trying to keep appellant out.

Oxnard Police responded to the elder abuse call and ordered appellant to get out of her car but appellant refused to do so. The officer told appellant that he would break the car window and extract appellant if necessary. Appellant yelled at the officer but eventually exited the car and was arrested after backup officers arrived. During this time, Christopher was in the passenger seat and observed the entire incident.

Prior to the arrest, appellant was hired to care for an elderly woman (Gloria P.) who was confined to a wheelchair and unable to speak. Witnesses told the police that appellant and Christopher yelled at the woman, scaring her. Appellant was evicted and engaged in violent behavior with the woman's family, with the police, and with the social worker. At the Oxnard Police Station, appellant screamed at officers and refused to get off the ground or leave her cell. The violent outbursts continued the next day at the Ventura County Jail. The police reports state that appellant has a history of violent behavior dating back to 2008 when appellant threatened to hit her sister with a tire iron, violated a restraining order, and attempted to burglarize the sister's residence.

"`[E]vidence of past [criminal] conduct may be probative of current conditions,' and . . . in some cases [the] risk to a child's physical safety and health is inherent in the absence of adequate supervision and care. [Citation.]" (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1650.) Appellant is in custody, is unable to provide for Christopher's care and support, and is awaiting trial for forgery, unauthorized entry of a dwelling house, first degree residential burglary, and grand theft. Substantial evidence supports the finding that appellant has engaged in a pattern of criminal behavior that is harmful to Christopher. Based on appellant's May 5, 2011 arrest, appellant's extensive criminal history, and the pending criminal charges, the trial court did not err in finding that appellant engaged in violent criminal behavior that impacted her ability to care for Christopher and exposed the minor to a substantial risk of harm. (§ 300, subd. (b); In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 820; In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194.)

Appellant's remaining arguments have been considered and merit no further discussion.

The judgment is affirmed.

GILBERT, P.J. and COFFEE, J., concurs.