NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EPSTEIN, P. J.

Appellant Michael Juwan Ammino appeals from a jury verdict convicting him of one count of petty theft with a prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 666).1 He contends the court erroneously discharged a sitting juror and substituted an alternate in his place, and that the court improperly restricted the scope of discovery to which appellant was entitled under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We find no error and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The evidence established that on January 19, 2010, Michael Alonzo, a loss prevention officer at a Rite-Aid store in Azusa, California, observed appellant enter the store and place several handfuls of makeup into his jacket pocket. Alonzo called the Azusa police department and waited outside to confront appellant.

When appellant exited, Alonzo identified himself and asked appellant to wait for police officers to arrive. Appellant denied taking any items from the store and offered to be searched. Alonzo declined to search him so appellant walked away. Alonzo followed appellant and called the police department again to update them on appellant's location.

Alonzo followed appellant on foot until police officers arrived. Officers Jarrett and Bires detained appellant and searched him but found no makeup in his possession. Officer Jarrett and Alonzo eventually found eight items of makeup belonging to Rite-Aid underneath a bush along the path appellant had walked.

Appellant denied stealing the makeup. He admitted that he had looked at it in the store but said he placed it on another aisle before exiting the store.

Appellant was charged with one count of petty theft with a prior conviction (§ 666). It was alleged that appellant had suffered one prior conviction under sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i), and 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(d), and that he had served two prior prison terms under section 667.5, subdivision (b). Appellant pleaded not guilty.

The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court found true the allegation that appellant had suffered a prior conviction. The court sentenced appellant to six years in state prison. Sentencing enhancements for the prior prison terms were subsequently stricken by the court. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I

Defendant claims the court abused its discretion in discharging a seated juror and substituting an alternate in his place. A juror may be discharged at any time upon good cause shown that the juror is unable to perform his or her duty. (§ 1089; People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052 (Barnwell).) We review a court's decision to discharge a juror for abuse of discretion, and will uphold it if the record supports the juror's disqualification as a "`demonstrable reality.'" (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 821; Barnwell, at pp. 1052-1053.) This test requires a showing that the court as a trier of fact relied on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that good cause was established. (Barnwell, at pp. 1052-1053.)

Good cause exists to excuse a juror when he or she cannot perform the duties of a juror, loses the ability to render a fair and unbiased verdict, and states doubts as to his or her ability to justly perform the duties of a juror. (People v. Warren (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 324, 327.)

The decision whether to investigate the possibility of good cause, as well as the ultimate decision whether to retain or discharge a juror, rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1351.) We consider the evidence as well as the court's stated reasons for discharging the juror. (Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) We defer to the trial court to the extent the trial judge's first hand observations of the juror and assessment of the juror's credibility enter into the decision to discharge the juror. (See People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 832; Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1052-1053.) We keep in mind that the decision to discharge is based largely on these observations, which the court is best positioned to interpret. (See People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1267.) This is particularly true where the juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987 [we "`"accept[] as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when [he or she] has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous"'"].)

During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the prospective jurors whether they had any religious or moral concerns about serving as a juror. None of the prospective jurors gave an affirmative answer. Shortly after the jury was impaneled, one of the jurors approached the court clerk and said he was concerned about his ability to reach a judgment in the case. The court also learned that this juror had been observed speaking to appellant's cousin.

The court decided to hold an informal hearing. (See People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 941 [when court is on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist, it must make a reasonable inquiry].) At the hearing the juror said that he had moral and religious objections to sitting in judgment of another person. These beliefs made him uncomfortable about performing his duties as a juror because he felt it was for God to make judgments about the appellant's guilt. The juror said he would be able to follow the court's instructions and that he understood the difference between making a moral decision and a factual decision. When the court asked whether the juror would be able to put aside his religious concerns and decide the case on the evidence presented, he responded that he would do his best.

Upon further questioning, the juror said he understood the duties of a juror. He said that if the prosecutor proved the facts "I believe I would be able to say, you know, okay, I think he's guilty." The prosecutor asked whether he was certain that he could put aside his beliefs to reach a verdict, to which the juror responded that he thought he could. The court expressed doubts about the juror's ability to perform the duties of a juror based on his equivocal statements and discharged him.

As we have stated, good cause exists to excuse a juror when this juror cannot perform the duties as juror, loses the ability to render a fair and unbiased verdict, and states doubts about the ability to perform that function. (People v. Warren, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 327.) Here, the juror approached the clerk and expressed his doubts as to his ability to perform his duty. While the juror indicated that he would try to decide the case on the basis of the facts, his responses to questions from the court and the attorneys were equivocal and inconsistent.

We conclude the court's decision to discharge the juror is supported by the juror's religious belief that God, rather than a juror, should determine a defendant's guilt, and his inconsistent answers about his ability to perform the duties of a juror. (See People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 987-988; cf. People v. Pearson (Jan. 9, 2012, S120750) 53 Cal.4th ___ [2012 Cal. Lexis 2] [in capital case, prospective juror's consistent and unequivocal statements about ability to vote for death penalty in factually appropriate case did not support trial court's conclusions she was equivocal].) The court made a thorough inquiry into the juror's beliefs, and the court relied on the juror's own statements that he doubted his ability to perform the functions of a juror. The court was in the best position to interpret these statements, and its decision rested upon its determination of the juror's demeanor and credibility. We do not substitute our view of the juror's credibility for that of the trial court. (See People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989.) We find no error in the court's exercise of its discretion to discharge the juror and substitute him with an alternate juror.

II

Appellant contends the court was too restrictive in its review of the arresting officers' personnel files after appellant's Pitchess motion. We review a trial court's ruling on a Pitchess motion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1286.)

Pitchess is codified in Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045. This discovery scheme carefully balances two conflicting interests: a peace officer's claim to confidentiality and a criminal defendant's interest in all information relevant to his or her defense. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 53.)

To initiate discovery, the defendant must file a motion supported by affidavits showing "good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought," setting forth its materiality to the litigation, and stating on reasonable belief that the identified agency possesses it. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) To show good cause, the affidavit must "propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges." (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1024.) It requires a "`specific factual scenario' which establishes a `plausible factual foundation' for the allegations of officer misconduct committed in connection with the defendant." (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1020.) "Depending on the circumstances of the case, the scenario may be a simple denial of accusations in the police report or an alternative version of what might have occurred." (Garcia v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 72.) The affidavit may be made by counsel. (See People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.)

If the trial court finds good cause for the discovery, it reviews the pertinent documents in camera and discloses the information that falls within the statutorily defined standards of relevance. (Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019.) Only evidence which is similar to the alleged misconduct is discoverable. (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020.)

Here, appellant's attorney filed a Pitchess motion with a supporting declaration contending that the officers falsified their police report by stating appellant made a spontaneous statement denying the theft and telling the officers where he left the makeup in the store. Counsel also alleged the officers continued to question appellant after he invoked his Miranda rights, though the declaration did not claim that the appellant made any statements in response. Despite this specific factual scenario, the motion sought nearly every possible type of complaint against the officers, the vast majority of which appear to be irrelevant to appellant's claim of officer misconduct.2

In the hearing on the motion, the court found good cause to conduct an in camera review of the officers' personnel files. However, the court stated its tentative decision to limit its review to "complaints involving the attributing of a false statement to a detainee or suspect."

The trial court reviewed in camera the records produced by the custodian of records for the Azusa Police Department. That review was transcribed by the court reporter, and the transcript was sealed. After review, the court announced that it found no relevant discoverable complaints.

Appellant claims the court improperly limited its scope of in camera review. We have reviewed the transcript of the in camera hearing and conclude there was no error. Appellant also requests that we review the sealed transcript to determine whether the custodian of records complied with the Pitchess motion, and respondent agrees. We have done so. (See People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1228-1229.) We conclude the custodian of the records of the Azusa Police Department complied with the scope of the Pitchess motion, and the record supports the court's conclusion that there were no discoverable complaints.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WILLHITE, J. and MANELLA, J., concurs.