Filed: Sep. 16, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: 11-1206 (L) Sylaj v. Holder BIA Abrams, IJ A088 533 483/84 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH
Summary: 11-1206 (L) Sylaj v. Holder BIA Abrams, IJ A088 533 483/84 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH T..
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11-1206 (L)
Sylaj v. Holder
BIA
Abrams, IJ
A088 533 483/84
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 16th day of September, two thousand thirteen.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
SHKELZEN SYLAJ, ARIANA SYLAJ,
Petitioners,
v. 11-1206 (L),
11-4879 (Con)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES NAC
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS: Michael P. DiRaimondo (Marialaina L.
Masi, Stacy A. Huber, on the brief),
DiRaimondo & Masi, LLP, Melville,
NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Leslie McKay,
Assistant Director; Christopher
Buchanan, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of these consolidated petitions
for review of two decisions of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”), it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that the petitions for review are DENIED.
Petitioners Shkelzen Sylaj (“Shkelzen”) and Ariana
Sylaj, natives and citizens of Albania, seek review of a
February 25, 2011, order of the BIA affirming the May 13,
2009, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Steven R. Abrams,
denying their application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Shkelzen Sylaj, Ariana Sylaj, Nos. A088 533
483/84 (B.I.A. Feb. 25, 2011), aff’g Nos. A088 533 483/84
(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 13, 2009). Petitioners
additionally seek review of an October 31, 2011 order of the
BIA denying their motion to reopen the immigration
proceedings. In re Shkelzen Sylaj, Ariana Sylaj, Nos. A088
533 483/84 (B.I.A. Oct. 31, 2011). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
of the case.
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Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. See Zaman v. Mukasey,
514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The
applicable standards of review are well-established. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
562 F.3d
510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
The agency’s determination that Petitioners have not
demonstrated past persecution on account of their family
membership is supported by substantial evidence. Shkelzen’s
uncle committed the crime that started the “blood feud,” and
Shkelzen was only lightly wounded when his uncle was
murdered, which suggest that Shkelzen was not a target of
his uncle’s murderers. Furthermore, neither Shkelzen nor
any member of his family in Albania has been harmed since
his uncle’s death in 1995. The agency’s determination that
Petitioners do not have a well-founded fear of persecution
is also supported by substantial evidence. Shkelzen was not
a target of his uncle’s murderers. Neither Shkelzen nor any
member of his family in Albania has been harmed since the
uncle’s death in 1995. The Albanian government has recently
increased the penalties for committing murder in furtherance
of a blood feud, and has criminalized mere participation in
3
a blood feud. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng,
562 F.3d at 513.
In its February 2011 decision, the BIA did not abuse
its discretion by denying Petitioners’ request for remand to
the IJ for consideration of additional evidence, because
the BIA considered the additional evidence, and it did not
negate the substantial evidence supporting the agency’s
factual determinations that Petitioners had not established
past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. See
Sanusi v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam).
Since the agency did not err in finding that
Petitioners failed to demonstrate either past persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution, it reasonably denied
them withholding of removal and CAT relief, as those claims
were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v.
Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
Similarly, the evidence that Petitioners submitted with
their motion to reopen, taken together with previously
submitted evidence, did not establish a prima facie case for
the relief sought, since it also did not negate the
substantial evidence supporting the agency’s factual
4
determinations that Petitioners had not established past
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. See INS
v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988). Therefore, the BIA did
not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen.
Kaur v. BIA,
413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Moreover, contrary to Petitioners’ contention, the BIA’s
October 2011 decision reflects that the BIA considered the
entire record in deciding the motion to reopen. See Ke Zhen
Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
265 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir.
2001) (“[W]hen faced with a motion to reopen, the Board has
an obligation to consider the record as a whole.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are
DENIED and the pending motion for a stay of removal in these
petitions is DISMISSED as moot. The pending request for
oral argument in these petitions is DENIED in accordance
with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and
Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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