MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

NOEL L. HILLMAN, District Judge.

Presently before the Court are the motions of defendants Venne Faber, Yeemi Awodiya, Richard Gaudet, and Robert Stern for summary judgment and to quash certain subpoenas, as well as the motion of plaintiff, Monir George, to compel defendants' compliance with those subpoenas; and

This case concerning defendants' alleged violation of plaintiff's due process rights and his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") while he was a pre-trail detainee at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution ("HRYCI");1 and

Plaintiff claiming that defendants violated his rights when he was housed in the HRYCI infirmary and placed under psychiatric close observation ("PCO") after returning to HRYCI after a stay at the Delaware Psychiatric Center; and

Plaintiff claiming, among other things, that (1) he improperly remained in PCO for twenty-one days when the usual PCO stay is three to seven days, and (2) his time in PCO was extended as punishment for praying in his cell;2 and

Defendant Faber moving for summary judgment in her favor, explaining that (1) whenever an inmate returns from a hospital, such as the Delaware Psychiatric Center, that inmate is automatically placed under PCO until he can be evaluated by a licensed psychologist, psychiatrist, or psychiatric nurse, and that only a licensed psychologist, psychiatrist, or psychiatric nurse can downgrade an inmate's PCO status or discharge the inmate from PCO, and (2) she is the Treatment Services Administrator for the DOC's Bureau of Correctional Healthcare Services and a licensed professional counselor, and therefore does not have the authority to discharge an inmate from PCO, or extend his stay in PCO; and

Defendants Awodiya, a health services administrator, Gaudet, a licensed psychologist, and Stern, a licenced physician,3 also moving for summary judgment in their favor, pointing out that plaintiff has not provided any evidence to support his claims that they violated his due process rights4 or his rights under RLUIPA5; and

Plaintiff responding to both motions, arguing that they should be denied because he requires documents and other discovery from the defendants in order to support his claims, and that defendants have not responded to his subpoenas demanding those documents; and

The Court noting that pursuant to the scheduling order entered on February 14, 2011, fact discovery concluded on August 31, 2011, dispositive motions were due by November 10, 2011, and plaintiff's subpoenas were not executed until December 2011;6 and

The Court further noting that defendants have moved to quash plaintiff's subpoenas, arguing that (1) they were improperly served, (2) they were directed to the incorrect parties, (3) they are requesting medical records that defendants have already produced, (4) they are requesting defendants' employment information and log books, which are privileged by Delaware statue;7 (5) they are requesting another inmate's medical records and disclosure of other inmates' medical records, and such requests are prohibited by HIPAA; and (6) they are generally overbroad and requesting irrelevant information; and

The Court finding that plaintiff has not provided a sufficient basis to compel defendants to respond to plaintiff's subpoenas: plaintiff did not properly participate in the discovery period, which lasted over nine months; the subpoenas are untimely; the subpoenas seek information that plaintiff cannot have; the subpoenas seek information that is not relevant; and plaintiff has all of the medical records that the DOC possesses on him;8 and

The Court further finding that plaintiff has not properly supported his due process claims to withstand defendants' motions for summary judgment:9 plaintiff claims that his stay in PCO was fourteen days too long, but he has provided no evidence to show that his stay in PCO was not "reasonably related to a legitimate goal" or was "excessive in relation to that goal," see Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 157-58, 164 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979) ("[T]he fact that detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into punishment."); and

The Court also finding that plaintiff has not properly supported his RLUIPA claim to withstand defendants' motions for summary judgment because he has not shown that HRYCI's policy or official practice substantially burdened the practice of plaintiff's religion, Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2007), and because plaintiff cannot maintain a RLUIPA claim against state actors in their individual capacities, Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 2012); and

Consequently,

IT IS HEREBY on this 27th day of June, 2012

ORDERED that defendants' motions to quash the subpoenas executed by plaintiff [58, 70] are GRANTED, and plaintiff's motion to compel [67] is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants' motions for summary judgment [50, 52] are GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the claims against Corrections Officer Bragg are DISMISSED; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is to mark this matter as CLOSED.