NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MOSK, J.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Bankers Insurance Company (Bankers) posted bond for Arturo Lopez in a criminal case. Upon Lopez's failure to appear in court, the trial court in Lopez's criminal case ordered Lopez's bond forfeited. Prior to the expiration of the 185 day forfeiture period, Bankers filed a motion to extend the time for entry of summary judgment on the bond forfeiture. The trial court denied the motion and Bankers appeals. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On December 26, 2008, Bankers posted a $95,000 bond for Lopez in his criminal case. On July 17, 2009, Lopez failed to appear in court without a sufficient excuse, and the trial court ordered Lopez's bail forfeited. The trial court issued a bench warrant for Lopez. Notice of the bail forfeiture was mailed to Bankers.

On January 19, 2010, Bankers timely filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1305.41 to extend by 180 days the time for entry of summary judgment on the bail forfeiture. In its motion, Bankers stated that "the bail agency, its agents and employees have expended considerable time and effort in developing solid leads as the whereabouts of the defendant. These leads have now paid off. The bail agent's efforts have been ongoing from the outset of the notice of the bail bond forfeiture. Through their efforts the bail now has a concrete lead as to the whereabouts of [Lopez]. The bail believes that [Lopez] will be returned to the jurisdiction of the Court if an extension of 180 days is granted." In support of the motion, Bankers submitted a declaration from bail bond agent Sheri D'Angelo.

In her declaration, D'Angelo set forth her efforts to locate Lopez which efforts consisted primarily of telephone contact with, or telephone messages left for, the co-signers on Lopez's bond, his friends, his former wife, his landlord, and persons with whom he conducted business. D'Angelo also left a number of telephone messages for Lopez that were not returned and conducted a computer search for leads to Lopez's location. According to D'Angelo, her agents were "putting together" a website that was designed to attract a response from Lopez for business purposes.

At the February 9, 2010, hearing on Bankers's motion, the trial court stated that D'Angelo's declaration demonstrated "diligent attempts" to locate Lopez, but did not "really support[]" the representation in the motion that there was a "solid lead" as to Lopez's whereabouts. The trial court asked counsel for Bankers to indentify the "solid leads" suggested in the motion. Bankers's counsel stated his conclusion from D'Angelo's declaration that Lopez had "remained current," that Lopez had had several contacts with family members indicating that he had not vanished, and that Lopez was continuing to operate his business locally. Bankers's counsel stated, "They are setting up what looks like a ruse to get him to respond to possible work through that."

The trial court stated that it was not convinced that Lopez would be located within 180 days. Based on its reading of D'Angelo's declaration, the trial court found that Lopez was attempting to avoid apprehension. The trial court found that Lopez's family was assisting Lopez and "not offering much assistance" in locating him. The trial court stated, "Your motion to extend time is respectfully denied. Summary judgment issued on March 15th."

Bankers's counsel then modified his request, asking for a 30-day extension. Defense counsel stated his belief that such an extension would benefit the prosecution by increasing the likelihood that Lopez would be apprehended. The trial court responded, "I understand. Roughly you have approximately 30 days from today in order to find Mr. Lopez and not forfeit the bond. I will not hesitate in setting aside the [sic] for forfeiture if he's brought before the court before March 15th. The motion is denied. It will remain set for summary judgment to issue on March 15, 2010."

Bankers's counsel stated he was a little confused by the wording of the trial court's ruling. The trial court responded, "Well, the motion is denied—I don't think I can make it much clearer than that—to extend time." Bankers's counsel stated, "You said if he's brought in by the 15th." The trial court responded, "I'll set aside the forfeiture. If Mr. Lopez is taken into custody, I will set aside the forfeiture if it's done before March 15, 2010."

On February 23, 2010, summary judgment was entered. On February 25, 2010, the court clerk mail notice of entry of judgment to Bankers.

DISCUSSION

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Bankers's Motion To Extend The Time For Entry Of Summary Judgment

Bankers contends that the trial court granted his motion to extend the time for entry of summary judgment and allowed him until March 15, 2010, to bring Lopez to court. Accordingly, Bankers contends, the trial court erred when it prematurely entered summary judgment on February 23, 2010. Alternatively, Bankers contends that if the trial court denied its motion to extend time, the trial court erred because Bankers demonstrated good cause to extend time. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's denial of a section 1305.4 motion to extend the 180-day forfeiture period in section 1305 for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Alistar Ins. Co. (2003) 115 Cal.App.4th 122, 127, citing People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 676, 679.) A trial court abuses its discretion "only where the court's decision `"exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered. [Citation.]"' [Citation.]" (People v. Ranger, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 679-680.)

B. Relevant Principles

A trial court must declare a forfeiture of bail if a defendant fails to appear without a sufficient excuse. (§ 1305, subd. (a).) If a defendant whose bail has been forfeited appears in court within 180 days of the date of forfeiture, the trial court must order the forfeiture vacated. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1).) The 180-day period is extended by five days if the clerk of the court is required to mail notice of the forfeiture (when the bond exceeds $400). (§ 1305, subd. (b).) Pursuant to section 1305.4, a surety may file a motion, based on good cause, for an order extending the 180-day period in section 1305. The reasons establishing good cause must be set forth in a declaration or affidavit. (§1305.4.) Upon a showing of good cause, a trial court may extend the 180-day period by up to an additional 180 days.2 (Ibid.) Upon expiration of the 180-day period in section 1305 without the forfeiture having been set aside, the trial court must enter summary judgment against the bondsmen named in the bond. (§ 1306.) Premature entry of summary judgment is voidable. (People v. Aegis Security Ins. Co. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1076.)

"`The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court. In matters of this kind there should be no element of revenue to the state nor punishment of the surety. [Citation.]' (People v. Wilcox (1960) 53 Cal.2d 651, 657 [2 Cal.Rptr. 754, 349 P.2d 522].) `Moreover, because the law disfavors forfeitures and statutes imposing them, sections 1305 and 1306 are strictly construed in favor of the surety to avoid harsh results. [Citations.]' (People v. American Surety Ins. Co. [(1999)] 75 Cal.App.4th [719,] 725.)" (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1234, disapproved on another ground in People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 663, fn. 7.)

"Given the underlying policy of avoiding forfeitures in favor of bringing defendants before the court, a trial court, faced with a section 1305.4 motion for extension, should draw all inferences in favor of the surety. ([People v.] Alistar, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) The good cause showing under section 1305.4 is a low threshold for the movant. If the surety demonstrates good cause by showing due diligence in the initial 180 days, a reasonable likelihood of success of capturing the defendant in a subsequent 180 days, and any other relevant circumstances, the court should grant the motion." (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1358.)

1. The trial court did not grant Bankers's motion to extend time for entry of summary judgment

Bankers contends that the trial court granted its motion to extend the time for entry of summary judgment on the bond forfeiture, granting an extension to March 15, 2010, to bring Lopez to court. Because summary judgment was entered on February 23, 2010, Bankers contends, summary judgment was entered prematurely.3 The record does not support Bankers's contentions.

At the conclusion of argument on Bankers's motion to extend by 180 days the time for entry of summary judgment, the trial court ruled, "Your motion to extend time is respectfully denied." After argument on Bankers's modified request to extend time by 30 days, the trial court ruled, "The motion is denied." When Bankers's counsel stated his confusion about the wording of the trial court's ruling that it would set aside the bond forfeiture if Lopez were brought to court prior to March 15, 2010—the date the trial court set for entry of summary judgment—the trial court said, "Well, the motion is denied—I don't think I can make it much clearer than that—to extend time."

Bankers asserts that the trial court granted his motion to extend time when it stated, "Roughly you have approximately 30 days from today in order to find Mr. Lopez and not forfeit the bond. I will not hesitate in setting aside the forfeiture if he's brought before the court before March 15th." The "very literal translation" of the trial court's words, Bankers contends, is "`Your motion to extend time to arrest Mr. Lopez is granted for approximately 30 days to March 15th.'" Bankers's quote is incomplete. Immediately after the quoted language and as part of the full quote, the trial court stated, "The motion is denied." The trial court's statement does not need "translation." The trial court denied Bankers's motion.

Bankers attempts to bolster its argument that the trial court granted its extension request by relying on the trial court's confirmation that "If Mr. Lopez is taken into custody, I will set aside the forfeiture if it's done before March 15, 2010." Of this confirmation Bankers concludes "There is no clearer way to grant an extension request than that." We disagree. There is a clearer way. The trial court could have stated, "I grant your extension request." Here again, it is plain that the trial court denied Bankers's extension request. Just prior to the trial court's quoted language and in response to Bankers's counsel's request of the trial court to clarify its ruling, the trial court stated, "Well, the motion is denied—I don't think I can make it much clearer than that—to extend time." The trial court's minutes for the February 9, 2010, hearing also demonstrate that the trial court denied Bankers's motion to extend time. The minutes for February 9, 2010, state, "motion to extend time for entry of summary judgment is denied." Because the trial court denied Bankers's motion to extend time on February 9, 2010, summary judgment was not entered prematurely on February 23, 2010.4

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Bankers did not establish good cause to extend the time for entry of summary judgment

Bankers contends that D'Angelo's declaration established good cause to extend the time for entry of summary judgment and the trial court erred in denying the motion. The trial court did not err.

The trial court denied Bankers's motion based on its finding that Bankers failed to show it had a solid lead as to Lopez's whereabouts. Bankers disagrees with the trial court's finding, contending that there was a "high likelihood" that Lopez could be returned to custody if the trial court had granted an extension of time because Lopez was confirmed to be in the area, he continued to operate his business, and a "ruse was being established that had a very high likelihood of effecting his capture." According to Bankers, D'Angelo's declaration showed that D'Angelo had a "relationship" with a person who was close to Lopez, had regular contact with Lopez, knew that Lopez remained in the area, and promised to help D'Angelo apprehend Lopez.

D'Angelo's detailed declaration demonstrated diligence in attempting to locate Lopez, but not a reasonable likelihood of success in returning Lopez to court if granted an additional 30 or 180 days. Contrary to Bankers's contention, D'Angelo's declaration did not demonstrate that Lopez was in the area after his failure to appear on July 17, 2009. D'Angelo's only contact with a person who admitted contact with Lopez was with Norma Chavez, a co-signer on Lopez's bail bond. D'Angelo spoke with Chavez on August 13, 2009, and August 24, 2009. In those conversations, Chavez stated that she recently had spoken with Lopez about his case and that Lopez was "handling everything as he promised." In an October 22, 2009, telephone conversation, Chavez told D'Angelo that although Lopez was still taking her telephone calls and had promised to "take care of his obligations," she had become "very worried" and was willing to assist in D'Angelo's investigation. On November 15, 2009, Chavez contacted D'Angelo and reported that Lopez was not returning her telephone calls. On December 5, 2009, Chavez contacted D'Angelo's office and reported that Lopez was still operating his entertainment promotions business and that it was a busy time of year for him. Chavez was certain that Lopez would be organizing a New Year's event and stated she would try to find out the event's location. In a December 10, 2009, telephone conversation Chavez told D'Angelo that she was having difficulty getting information from Lopez without "tipping him off." Chavez did not, in any of the reported contacts, state that she knew where Lopez was located. Chavez's statement that Lopez continued to operate his business and D'Angelo's statement that her agents were "putting together a website in Spanish intended to get Mr. Lopez to respond to it for business purposes" provided no concrete information to the trial court about Lopez's location or how Lopez's location would be determined. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Bankers did not establish good cause to extend the time for entry of summary judgment based on the trial court's finding that D'Angelo's declaration did not establish a reasonable likelihood of success in returning Lopez to court if the trial court granted Bankers's motion to extend time.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The County of Los Angeles is awarded its costs on appeal.

We concur:

ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J.

KUMAR, J.*