GARY S. AUSTIN, Magistrate Judge.
Leonard Ransom, Jr. ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on March 8, 2010. (Doc. 1.) This case now proceeds on the First Amended Complaint, filed on June 29, 2012, against defendants Correctional Officer (C/O) M. Amador, C/O Daniel Nava, C/O R. Marquez, and C/O Ralph Nunez for use of excessive force; and against defendants C/O Daniel Nava, C/O R. Marquez, Sergeant J. Ybarra, and Lieutenant Carlos Sandoval for failure to protect Plaintiff.
On January 7, 2014, the Court issued a Scheduling Order establishing a deadline of September 7, 2014 for completion of discovery, including the filing of motions to compel. (Doc. 60.) The discovery deadline has now expired.
On June 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Admissions by defendant Marquez and further Responses to Interrogatories/Requests for Production of Documents by defendants Amador and Sandoval, and for sanctions. (Doc. 72.) On June 26, 2014, Defendants Nunez, Ybarra, Marquez, Amador, Nava, and Sandoval ("Defendants") filed an opposition to the motion. (Doc. 73.) On July 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a reply. (Doc. 78.)
Plaintiff's motion to compel and for sanctions is now before the court.
During the time of the events at issue, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) in Delano, California. Plaintiff's factual allegations follow.
The incident at issue in this lawsuit occurred on May 22, 2007, at KVSP. Plaintiff and his cellmate were released for their showers (the facility was on modified program). They were released by C/O Gonzalez [not a defendant], the unit control booth officer. Plaintiff's cellmate entered the lower tier shower. While Plaintiff was waiting, he filled up containers with hot water in order to make coffee when he returned to his cell. Another inmate asked Plaintiff to get some hot water for him. Plaintiff did so, and took it to that inmate's cell. While standing at the cell door, Plaintiff asked C/O Gonzalez whether he could come out later. Gonzalez stated, "No! take your shower!" First Amended Complaint (FAC), Doc. 13 at 5 ¶4. Plaintiff told the other inmate that Gonzalez "got his idiot hat on today."
Ochoa and Gina Marquez entered the unit, approached Plaintiff, and ordered him to place his hands behind his back and "cuff up."
Plaintiff ran past Ochoa out into the building rotunda, and was pursued by Ochoa and Gina Marquez. Once Plaintiff reached the C-section door, he turned around and lay prone. Officer Gina Marquez handcuffed Plaintiff, "causing great pain and further injury to my left shoulder."
Plaintiff alleges, that while he was prone and handcuffed, he was "picked up, flipped heels over head, slammed back to the ground, arms bent (grotesquely) back (in a military stress position), by Officers Nava and Nunez, while Gina Marquez jumped up, in the air, and came down, with her knees to my lower back."
Sgt. Ybarra ordered the officers to get Plaintiff up and escort him out of the building. In response, Nava and Nunez "picked me up. . . and walked me (approx. 20'), at which time I was thrown to the ground, and again, kicked in the face, by R. Marquez (in full view of Sgt. Ybarra, who had been there the entire time I was being beaten by his subordinates), at which time my lower lip was busted on the lower left side [and] Nava and/or Nunez started grinding my face on the cinder-block wall, which caused severe facial scraping, coupled with damage to my left shoulder, prior to being escorted out of the building."
Plaintiff alleges that, as he was being escorted out of the building, Nava and Nunez lifted Plaintiff up by his handcuffs "in the military stress position," where Plaintiff "had to walk doubled over, and was escorted out of the building, while being punched, continuously, by M. Amador and R. Marquez."
Plaintiff was taken to the Facility A medical clinic and placed in a holding cell. Plaintiff remained in the holding cell for three hours. Plaintiff also remained in leg shackles and was not allowed to decontaminate or rinse off the pepper spray that had been applied. After approximately thirty minutes, Plaintiff was examined. All of Plaintiff's clothing with the exception of his boxer shorts was removed. Plaintiff was then escorted to Administrative Segregation. Plaintiff alleges that the escort required him to walk approximately 175 yards along a gravel roadway, causing his feet to bleed.
Plaintiff alleges that at no time during this series of events was he allowed to decontaminate or have access to his inhaler. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the use of force, he suffered "severe injuries," including the following: knocked out lower right tooth; lacerated lower left side of lip; contusion on the upper left back and shoulder area; shoulder bone injury; left and right knee injuries; severe abrasions; severe facial abrasions; burning from pepper spray; and ongoing physical and psychological trauma.
Plaintiff requests monetary damages and declaratory relief.
The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Prison officials are required "to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse."
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se, and is challenging his conditions of confinement. As a result, the parties were relieved of some of the requirements which would otherwise apply, including initial disclosure and the need to meet and confer in good faith prior to involving the Court in a discovery dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); Local Rules 240, 251; Doc. 60, Discovery and Scheduling Order, ¶5.
However, this is a civil action to which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. The discovery process is subject to the overriding limitation of good faith, and callous disregard of discovery responsibilities cannot be condoned.
Pursuant to Rule 37(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party propounding discovery may seek an order compelling disclosure when an opposing party has failed to respond or has provided evasive or incomplete responses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). "[A]n evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating "actual and substantial prejudice" from the denial of discovery.
Generally, if the responding party objects to a discovery request, the party moving to compel bears the burden of demonstrating why the objections are not justified.
Rule 36 provides for requests for admissions as follows: "A party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of the pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to (A) facts, the application of law to fact, or the opinions about either; and (B) the genuineness of any described documents." Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). "A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney." Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). "If a matter is not admitted, the answer must specifically deny it or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4).
The requesting party may move to determine the sufficiency of an answer or objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6). Unless the court finds an objection justified, it must order that an answer be served.
Pursuant to Rule 33(a), an interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and an interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2) (quotation marks omitted). Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath, Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3), and the grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity, Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4);
Pursuant to Rule 34(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "any party may serve on any other party a request to produce and permit the party making the request . . . to inspect and copy any designated documents . . . which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served." Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). "[A] party need not have actual possession of documents to be deemed in control of them."
Plaintiff requests the court to compel additional responses to his Request for Admissions propounded to defendant R. Marquez, and his Interrogatories/Requests for Production of Documents propounded to defendants Amador and Sandoval. Plaintiff also opposes Defendants' blanket objection to Plaintiff's discovery requests based on the official information privilege. Plaintiff asserts that on April 20, 2014, after he had received all of the discovery responses, he wrote a letter to defense counsel indicating that they needed to "talk about how we can get discovery on the right track" and offering to come to the table and talk about compensation. (Ransom Decl., Doc. 72 at 7:14-15.)
Defendants argue in opposition that Plaintiff's motion to compel should be denied because the motion is not in the form required in Civil Local Rule 37-2 for motions to compel, and Defendants properly responded to Plaintiff's discovery requests. Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 37-2 because Plaintiff did not detail the basis for his contention that he is entitled to further discovery. Defendants argue that Plaintiff made a conclusory statement that the responses were evasive, incomplete, and failed to give complete answers, or failed to produce the correct documents requested, and did not respond to Defendants' various objections.
On February 4, 2014, Plaintiff served a Request for Admissions containing seventeen Requests upon defendant R. Marquez, and Plaintiff received responses on or about March 25, 2014. (Ransom Decl., Doc. 72 at 4:4-8 & Exh. C.) Plaintiff argues that defendant R. Marquez failed to respond to Request No. 3 and evaded Requests Nos. 3-17, "on grounds which were evasive, [in]complete, or and (sic) without just cause for the failure, which prejudices my ability to prosecute the action." (
Defendants argue that defendant R. Marquez properly responded to Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions, even though many of them were vague, assumed facts not in evidence, and were not proper Requests for Admissions. With respect to Plaintiff's Requests for R. Marquez to admit that his family members are or were employed by CDCR, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to indicate how this information is relevant to his excessive force claim. Further, Defendants argue that the disclosure of personal information about correctional officers and their families has the potential to endanger the safety and security of CDCR staff.
On February 11, 2014, Plaintiff served fifteen combined Interrogatories/Requests for Production of Documents upon defendant Amador, and Plaintiff received responses on or about April 16, 2014. (Ransom Decl. at 5:2-5 & Exh. D.) Plaintiff asserts that all of defendant Amador's responses were false or evasive, and that defendant Amador failed to provide the documents requested. Plaintiff argues that his Interrogatories were all calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence challenging C/O Amador's and other officers' credibility, "which is of paramount import to the prosecution of this action." (
On February 19, 2014, Plaintiff served thirteen Interrogatories/Requests for Production of Documents upon defendant Sandoval, and Plaintiff received responses on or about April 18, 2014. (Ransom Decl. at 5:16-19 & Exh. E.) Plaintiff asserts that defendant Sandoval failed to answer or provide the correct documents for Interrogatories/Requests Nos. 1-12, and that Sandoval's answers were "contrived, fabricated, evasive, and incomplete, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4)." (
On or about April 18, 2014, Plaintiff received the Declaration of W. Adams, Litigation Coordinator at KVSP, in support of the official information privilege. (
Defendants argue that defendant Amador's response to Interrogatory No. 1 was sufficient. Amador provided Plaintiff with a job description for the position she held on the date of the incident and informed Plaintiff of when she began working at KVSP. Defendants argue that Amador did not provide her full name, because providing inmates with personal information raises safety issues, and Plaintiff does not explain why disclosure of Amador's full name is necessary. However, Amador informed Plaintiff in her response that her full name would be provided if the matter proceeds to trial. Defendants assert that Plaintiff does not state any specific objections to Amador's other responses but generally argues they are insufficient. Defendants assert that Plaintiff does not specifically explain his claim that each request is relevant to Amador's credibility.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's motion to compel makes conclusory claims regarding the insufficiency of defendant Sandoval's responses to Interrogatories without providing any specifics that would allow the court to overrule Sandoval's objections. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's requests are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and much of the information Plaintiff seeks is protected by the official-information privilege.
Defendants argue that defendants Amador and Sandoval have provided Plaintiff with the relevant documents in their possession that are not protected by the official-information privilege. In response to Plaintiff's request for production of documents, defendants Amador and Sandoval produced 83 pages of documents. (Seals Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3.) Defendants argue that they are not attempting to suppress discoverable documents, and the documents that Plaintiff seeks in his motion to compel are either (1) not relevant to the claims and defenses of this case, (2) overly broad, or (3) protected from disclosure by the official-information privilege or because of privacy reasons.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not explain why the responses provided are insufficient or how the requests are relevant to this lawsuit. Defendants assert that Plaintiff makes unsubstantiated statements that the requests are relevant to his case, but then fails to explain why such evidence is relevant or how the evidence would lead to other admissible evidence.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to show that the official-information privilege does not apply to his discovery requests. Defendants assert that Plaintiff argues that this privilege was denied in a prior state court criminal proceeding, but fails to cite any law suggesting that this makes the privilege inapplicable in an unrelated civil matter. Defendants assert that the documents cited by Plaintiff do not show that the privilege was rejected in the state criminal proceeding. The only information ordered to be provided to Plaintiff's attorney in that matter was the contact information for four complainants, and the specifics of the state court's protective order as to this information are not contained in Plaintiff's moving papers. (Kelly Decl., Doc. 72 at 57 (Exh. H) ¶5).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not shown that the benefit of receiving copies of the requested confidential documents outweighs the disadvantage of disclosing them. Defendants assert that Plaintiff seeks files containing confidential and private personal information about prison employees and officers, information that may have been provided to investigators on a confidential basis and internal investigative materials and reports that must remain confidential to maintain the integrity of the internal investigative process, and possibly other confidential information. Defendants argue that the disadvantage of disclosing the documents far outweighs the potential benefit to Plaintiff, and maintaining the documents as confidential discourages inmates from causing harm or thwarting means used to maintain the safety and control of the prison, inmates, and prison staff. Defendants request, if the court is not inclined to deny Plaintiff's motion to compel, that the court review the documents in camera.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 37-2, because Plaintiff did not detail the basis for his contention that he is entitled to further discovery. Defendants argue that Plaintiff made a conclusory statement that the responses were "evasive, incomplete, and failed to give complete answers, or failed to produce the correct documents requested, and did not respond to Defendants' various objections.
Plaintiff brings a motion to compel further responses to nearly all of the discovery requests in his Requests for Admissions, Set One, to defendant R. Marquez, and Interrogatories/Request for Production of Documents, Set One, to defendants Amador and Sandoval. Plaintiff has submitted a copy of all of the discovery requests and responses at issue (Doc. 72 at 29-52); however, Plaintiff specifically addresses only one of his discovery requests, the combined Interrogatory/Request for Production No. 1 to defendant Amador.
Plaintiff asserts that he sought, by this Interrogatory, to discover evidence that defendant Amador previously worked at Salinas Valley State Prison and participated in misconduct for which she was investigated. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant's response to the request for disclosure of her full name was evasive, without reason. Plaintiff argues that the information would be required at trial.
Defendant Amador argues that she did not provide her full name because providing inmates with personal information can compromise the safety of correctional officers. Defendant argues that evidence of her character is not admissible except as relevant to her credibility, and Plaintiff has not offered a specific explanation of such relevance. Defendant cites Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that evidence of a person's character is not admissible to prove that the person acted in accordance with that character.
Plaintiff argues that he "is not under any obligation to prove to defense counsel either (1) the relevance to the claims of the case, of the discovery sought, (2) whether the request is narrow enough for defense counsel, or (3) why plaintiff requests certain discovery." (Doc. 78 at 4:19-23.) Plaintiff argues that he does not need to prove relevance because "the specific requests are res ipsa loquitur, and given defense counsel's many, many years of defense of the very matters, plaintiff does not have to explain anything to defense counsel [and] needs only to set forth that `the evidence (or matter) sought, bears on, or reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on any issue that is or may be in the case.'" (
Plaintiff also argues that the disclosure of defendant Amador's full name is relevant because without it, Defendants could "claim that defendant M. Amador is the wrong M. Amador" who should answer to Plaintiff's complaint or who was involved in misconduct in the past. (
The court concurs that Plaintiff has inappropriately combined his Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. These are two distinctly different discovery tools, with distinctly different rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, 34. However, as Plaintiff is entitled to leniency as a pro se litigator, the Court endeavors, to the extent possible, to resolve his motion to compel on its merits. Hunt, 672 F.3d at 616.
Plaintiff is entitled to discover general background information such as defendant Amador's name and employment history with the CDCR. Defendant Amador has not sufficiently explained how the disclosure of her full name to Plaintiff will compromise her safety, and she apparently has no such concerns about disclosing her full name at trial. Plaintiff's interest in correctly identifying Defendant by name outweighs the benefit to Defendant in maintaining the privacy of her name. As for defendant Amador's assertion that this interrogatory contains impermissible subparts, the court disagrees. A single question asking for several bits of information relating to the same topic counts as one interrogatory.
Plaintiff is also entitled to discover evidence of a defendant's misconduct which may be used to challenge credibility at trial. However, Plaintiff did not request evidence of misconduct in Interrogatory No. 1, and Plaintiff's request for "any documents" outlining defendant's service at "each location where you were assigned" is impermissibly overbroad. Therefore, Defendant shall not be required to provide further documents or any evidence of misconduct in response to this Interrogatory.
As for the requirement to meet and confer, Plaintiff takes issue with Defendants' failure to meet and confer with him about the discovery responses. Plaintiff is reminded that due to the nature of this case, the parties to this action were relieved of some of the requirements which would otherwise apply, including the need to meet and confer in good faith prior to involving the Court in a discovery dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); Local Rules 240, 251; Doc. 60, Discovery and Scheduling Order, ¶5. Therefore, Defendants were under no obligation to meet and confer with Plaintiff about the discovery responses.
Plaintiff's assertion that he "is not under any obligation to prove to defense counsel either (1) the relevance to the claims of the case, of the discovery sought, (2) whether the request is narrow enough for defense counsel, or (3) why plaintiff requests certain discovery" is incorrect. As discussed above at ¶III, Plaintiff is required to inform the court which discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel, and for each disputed response, why the information is relevant and why the responding party's objections are not meritorious. It is well established that the party bringing a motion to compel bears the burden of demonstrating "actual and substantial prejudice" from the denial of discovery, even if the prejudice appears obvious or the opposing party is experienced in law. See Hallett, 296 F.3d at 751.
Plaintiff's motion to compel consists mostly of general arguments and conclusory statements, such as, "Defendant Marquez responded, wherein his responses #3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 were evasive, incomplete, and failed to give complete answers, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4)," (Doc. 72 at 9:14-17); "[f]or sake of brevity, plaintiff avers that all information, and documents requested were relevant discovery that `appears to [be] reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence,'" (
Plaintiff requests the imposition of sanctions upon Defendants, as reimbursement to Plaintiff for his expenses in obtaining this order, on the grounds that Defendants failed to disclose, answer, or respond pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4). Plaintiff submits no evidence of the monetary amount he is reasonably entitled to for his expenses.
Rule 37(a)(5)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if a motion to compel is granted, "the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).
Here, Plaintiff's motion to compel shall be granted in part by this order; however, out of approximately forty-five discovery requests, the motion shall be granted as to only part of one Interrogatory. The remainder of Plaintiff's motion to compel shall be denied by this order, largely because Plaintiff failed to meet his burden, as the moving party, to inform the Court, for each disputed response, why the information sought is relevant and why Defendants' objections and responses were not meritorious. Plaintiff's largely general arguments and conclusory statements were insufficient to place Defendants on notice of the alleged deficiencies of each response or to enable the court to make reasoned rulings on individual responses. Under these circumstances, the court finds that an award of sanctions to reimburse Plaintiff for his expenses in bringing the motion would be unjust. Therefore, the motion for sanctions shall be denied.
The court notes that Plaintiff filed a second motion to compel in this case on September 8, 2014, which remains pending. (Doc. 86.) In light of the fact that the current deadline of March 17, 2015 for the parties to file dispositive motions may expire before Plaintiff's second motion to compel is resolved, the court finds good cause to extend the dispositive motions deadline for all parties to this action. Accordingly, the deadline shall be extended to July 31, 2015.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's motion to compel shall be granted in part and denied in part. Defendant Amador shall be required to provide a further response to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 1, Set One, as discussed above. However, Defendants are not required to make any other additional responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests at issue in this motion.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
IT IS SO ORDERED.
