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U.S. v. Esquivel-Cornejo, 2:16-CR-206 MCE. (2017)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20170307801 Visitors: 5
Filed: Mar. 03, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO MAY 4, 2017 AT 10:00 A.M.(AMENDED) MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and Defendants Jesus Esquivel-Cornejo, by and through his Counsel of record, Dina Santos, and Defendant Oliver Lopez Alvarado, by and through his Counsel of Record, Sean Riordan, and Defendant Marco Esquivel-Cornejo, by and through h
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO MAY 4, 2017 AT 10:00 A.M.(AMENDED)

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and Defendants Jesus Esquivel-Cornejo, by and through his Counsel of record, Dina Santos, and Defendant Oliver Lopez Alvarado, by and through his Counsel of Record, Sean Riordan, and Defendant Marco Esquivel-Cornejo, by and through his Counsel of Record, Clemente Jimenez, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 2, 2017.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 4, 2017, and to exclude time between March 2, 2017, and May 4, 2017, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) Counsel for defendants require additional time to investigate the roles of each of the respective clients, conduct investigation, engage in negotiations with the Government in an effort to reach a plea agreement, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. b) The government does not object to the continuance. c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interests of the public and the defendants in a Speedy Trial. d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period. From the date of the parties, stipulation February 28, 2017, to May 4, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at Defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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