RICHARD G. ANDREWS, District Judge.
Petitioner is an inmate in custody at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware. Petitioner filed an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (D.I. 1) The State filed a Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Dismiss the Petition as Time-Barred (D.I. 19), which the Court granted. (D.I. 22) For the reasons discussed, the Court will grant the State's Motion to Dismiss (D.I. 24) and will deny the Petition as barred by the limitations period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
As set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in Petitioner's direct appeal:
Washington v. State, 62 A.3d 1224 (Table), 2013 WL 961561, at *1 (Del. 2013). Petitioner was indicted on four counts of first degree assault, two counts of second degree assault, six counts of first degree reckless endangering, and thirteen counts of PFDCF. (D.I. 24 at 2) The State nolle prossed one of the firearm charges, and a Delaware Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty of the remaining twenty-four charges. On June 8, 2012, the Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to a total of ninety-four years at Level V incarceration, suspended after fifty-six years, followed by probation. (D.I. 24 at 2) Petitioner appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on March 12, 2013. See Washington, 62 A.3d 1224 (Table), 2013 WL 961561, at *3.
On March 12, 2014, while represented by counsel, Petitioner filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion"). (D.I. 20-7 at 2) The Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion on August 29, 2014 (D.I. 19-2 at 18 Entry No. 60), and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision on November 13, 2014. See Washington v. State, 2015 WL 789794, at *4 (Del. Feb. 24, 2015). The Delaware Supreme Court issued its mandate on March 28, 2013. (D.I. 24 at 2)
Petitioner filed the instant Petition in February 2016, asserting the following grounds for relief: (1) the trial court erred by admitting the § 3507 statement of JoeQwell Coverdale; (2) the indictment was multiplicitous; (3) Petitioner was denied his right to a public trial; (4) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (5) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by presenting perjured testimony. (D.I. 1) In response, the State filed a Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Dismiss the Petition (D.I. 19), which the Court granted. (D.I. 22) The Motion to Dismiss was docketed separately. (D.I. 24) Although provided with an opportunity to file an Answer to the State's Motion to Dismiss (D.I. 25), Petitioner did not do so.
AEDPA prescribes a one-year period of limitations for the filing of habeas petitions by state prisoners, which begins to run from the latest of:
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA's limitations period is subject to statutory and equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (statutory tolling).
Petitioner does not assert, and the Court cannot discern, any facts triggering the application of § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), or (D). Consequently, the Court concludes that the one-year period of limitations began to run when Petitioner's conviction became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A), if a state prisoner appeals a state court judgment but does not seek certiorari review, the judgment of conviction becomes final, and the statute of limitations begins to run, upon expiration of the ninety-day time period allowed for seeking certiorari review. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575, 578 (3d Cir. 1999); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences on March 12, 2013, and he did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. As a result, Petitioner's convictions became final on June 10, 2013.
Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), a properly filed state post-conviction motion tolls AEDPA's limitations period during the time the motion is pending in the state courts, including any post-conviction appeals, provided that the motion was filed and pending before the expiration of AEDPA's limitations period. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 420-24 (3d Cir. 2000). The limitations period is also tolled for the time during which an appeal from a post-conviction decision could be filed even if the appeal is not eventually filed. Id. at 424. However, the limitations period is not tolled during the ninety days a petitioner has to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court regarding a judgment denying a state post-conviction motion. See Stokes v. Dist. Attorney of Philadelphia, 247 F.3d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 2001).
Here, when Petitioner filed his Rule 61 motion on March 12, 2014, 274 days of AEDPA's limitations period had already expired. The Rule 61 motion tolled the limitations period through February 24, 2015, the day on which the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of the motion. The limitations clock started to run on February 25, 2015, and the remaining 91 days ran without interruption until the limitations period expired on May 27, 2015. Thus, even after application of the applicable statutory tolling, the Petition is time-barred, unless equitable tolling applies.
The one-year limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons in rare circumstances when the petitioner demonstrates "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Holland, 560 U.S. at 649-50. With respect to the diligence inquiry, equitable tolling is not available where the late filing is due to the petitioner's excusable neglect. Id. at 651-52. As for the extraordinary circumstance requirement, "the relevant inquiry is not whether the circumstance alleged to be extraordinary is unique to the petitioner, but how severe an obstacle it creates with respect to meeting AEDPA's one-year deadline." Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 401 (3d Cir. 2011). Notably, an extraordinary circumstance will only warrant equitable tolling if there is "a causal connection, or nexus, between the extraordinary circumstance [] and the petitioner's failure to file a timely federal petition." Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 803 (3d Cir. 2013).
Petitioner does not assert, and the Court does not discern, that any extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his Petition in a timely manner. To the extent Petitioner's late filing was due to a mistake or miscalculation of the one-year filing period, such a mistake does not warrant equitably tolling the limitations period. See Taylor v. Carroll, 2004 WL 1151552, at *5-6 (D. Del. May 14, 2004). Accordingly, the Court will grant the State's motion to dismiss the instant Petition as time-barred.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (D.I. 28) Given the Court's conclusion that the Petition must be denied as time-barred, the Court will dismiss the Motion as moot.
A district court issuing a final order denying a § 2254 petition must also decide whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claims, the court is not required to issue a certificate of appealability unless the petitioner demonstrates that jurists of reason would find it debatable: (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the court was correct in its procedural ruling. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The Court concludes that the instant Petition is time-barred, and reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion to be debatable. Accordingly, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability.
For the reasons discussed, the Court will grant the State's Motion to Dismiss the Petition as time-barred (D.I. 24) without holding an evidentiary hearing. An appropriate Order will be entered.
