SHERRY R. FALLON, Magistrate Judge.
This Report and Recommendation is limited to seven pending motions for summary judgment in this asbestos-related personal injury action. The motions were filed by Defendants Air & Liquid Systems Corporation)
Harold and Judy Haynes ("Plaintiffs") filed this asbestos related personal injury action in the Delaware Superior Court against multiple defendants on June 3, 2016, asserting claims arising from Mr. Haynes' alleged harmful exposure to asbestos. (D.I. 1 at 1) Defendant Crane Co. removed the action to this court on July 15, 2016. (D.I. 1) Defendants Aurora, Warren Pumps, Pfizer, FMC, Honeywell, BorgWarner, and Air & Liquid filed motions for summary judgment on March 24, 2017. (D.I. 88, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, and 107) Plaintiffs did not respond to these motions. On May 2, 2017, counsel for Warren Pumps sent a letter to the court seeking dismissal due to Plaintiffs' lack of opposition to its summary judgment motion. (D.I. 113) Counsel for Aurora filed a similar letter on May 30, 2017, requesting dismissal of all claims against it.
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Haynes developed lung cancer as a result of exposure to asbestos-containing products during the course of his service as a boiler tender with the U.S. Navy from 1959 to 1963. (D.I. 1, Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 15) In addition, Mr. Haynes alleges he was exposed to asbestos from 1963 to 2015 as a result of his employment as a fireman, mechanic, laborer, and janitor. (D.I. 1, Ex. 1 at ¶ 3(b)-(1)) Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Haynes was injured due to exposure to asbestos-containing products that Defendants manufactured, sold, distributed, licensed, or installed. (D.I. 1, Ex. 1 at ¶ 4) Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert negligence, strict liability, punitive damages, and loss of consortium claims. (Id., Ex. 1)
Mr. Haynes was deposed on December 6 and 7, 2016.
After leaving the Navy, Mr. Haynes believes he was exposed to asbestos-containing products through his employment as an engine fireman for the Union Pacific Railroad from 1963 to 1964 (D.I. 95 at 3); an auto mechanic for Modern Motors Volkswagen Dealership from 1964 to 1966 (D.I. 99 at 2); a laborer for Steelman Duff Railroad Construction Company in 1967 (Id.); an auto mechanic for Pete Loverly Volkswagen Dealership in 1968 (Id.); an auto mechanic for Humphrey Volkswagen Dealership from 1972 to 1973 (Id.); a mechanic for Pacific Alaska Airline from 1973 to 1979 (Id.); an auto mechanic for Mid Oregon Motors Volkswagen Dealership from 1979 to 1980 (Id.); a mechanic for Butler Aircraft from 1982 to 2003 (Id.); and a janitor for Redmond High School District from 2004 to 2015. (Id.) Mr. Haynes also believes he was exposed to asbestos-containing products while performing automotive repair work for his friends and family from 1981 to 2014. (D.I. 99 at 2)
Mr. Haynes identified Buffalo Pumps as the manufacturer of pumps that he worked on while serving in the Navy as a boiler tender from 1959 to 1963. (D.I. 108 at 2) Mr. Haynes testified that he worked on pumps manufactured by Buffalo Pumps twenty to thirty times while he was aboard the USS Powell. (12/6/16 Tr. at 158:17-25) Mr. Haynes could not remember the specific kind of work he performed on Buffalo Pumps' products while aboard the USS Powell. (Id. at 159:6-10) Additionally, Mr. Haynes could not recall how many times he worked on pumps manufactured by Buffalo Pumps during his six months aboard the USS Buckley in 1963. (Id. at 159:1-5) Mr. Haynes stated that he did not have knowledge of when the pumps were installed on either the US S Powell or the USS Buckley. (Id. at 159:14-160:8) Furthermore, Mr. Haynes testified that he did not know the maintenance history of any of the pumps manufactured by Buffalo Pumps on either ship. (Id. at 160:4-8) He did not know whether the packing or gasket material used on the pumps, on either ship, contained asbestos. (Id. at 160:25-161:9)
Mr. Haynes did not identify any products manufactured by Aurora. (See D.I. 89)
Mr. Haynes identified BorgWarner as the manufacturer of clutches used at various Volkswagen dealerships where he was employed from 1964 to 1973. (D.I. 101 at 2) Mr. Haynes testified that he removed Volkswagen clutch disks. (12/6/16 Video Tr. at 106:4-8) However, Mr. Haynes could not remember removing, installing, or working on a BorgWarner clutch. (Id. at 105:25-106:2; 356:4-6; 12/7/2016 Tr. at 355:24-356:1) Mr. Haynes did not assert that the clutches or clutch discs manufactured by BorgWarner contained any asbestos. (D.I. 101)
Mr. Haynes did not identify any products manufactured by FMC. (See D.I. 97)
Mr. Haynes identified Bendix as a manufacturer of automotive brakes that he installed as a mechanic and car owner after he moved to Redmond, Oregon in 1981. (D.I. 99 at 3) Mr. Haynes testified that he could not recall the last time he worked on a Bendix brake. (12/6/16 Tr. at 360:1-3) He estimated that he installed Bendix brakes ten to fifteen times. (12/6/16 Video Tr. at 93:20-23) Mr. Haynes testified that he did not know whether the Bendix brakes he used contained asbestos and did not recall seeing warnings on the Bendix brake boxes. (Id. at 362:1-9)
Mr. Haynes did not identify any product manufactured by Pfizer. (See D.I. 95)
Mr. Haynes initially identified "Warner" as a manufacturer of pumps that he worked on while aboard the USS Powell from 1960 to 1963. (12/6/16 Video Tr. at 33:6-13) Later, Mr. Haynes stated that he actually worked on "Warren" pumps. (Id. at 49:9-15) Mr. Haynes stated that the type of pump that he worked on was a feed pump. (12/6/16 Tr. at 169:20-24) On at least one occasion, Mr. Haynes recalled replacing the packing on the feed pump. (Id. at 168:22-170:8) He estimated that he worked on the pumps ten to twenty times. (D.I. 93 at 7) Mr. Haynes stated that he was unaware of the maintenance history of the pumps located on the USS Powell. (12/6/16 Tr. at 168:22-170:8) He also testified that he did not know whether the packing used in pumps aboard the USS Powell contained asbestos. (Id. at 109:12-16)
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that could affect the outcome of the proceeding, and "a dispute about a material fact is `genuine' if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuinely disputed material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321. The burden then shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial, and the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The non-movant must support its contention by citing to particular documents in the record, by showing that the cited materials do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or by showing that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P.56(c)(1)(A)-(B). The existence of some alleged factual dispute may not be sufficient to deny a motion for summary judgment; rather, there must be enough evidence to enable a jury to reasonably find for the nonmoving party on the issue. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-49. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Clark v. Welch, Civ. NO.14-029-SLR, 2016 WL 859259, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 3, 2016). If the non-movant fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of proof, then the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
If a party fails to address another party's assertion of fact, the court may consider the fact undisputed, or grant summary judgment if the facts show that the movant is entitled to it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)-(3).
The parties have agreed that Oregon law applies to all land-based claims. (D.I. 97) Under Oregon law, a plaintiff must establish that a particular defendant's product was a "substantial factor" in causing the plaintiff's injury. McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 543 (Or. 1974). "[A] plaintiff must be able to identify a specific type of product . . . that the defendant manufactured or supplied and to which the plaintiff was exposed." Greer v. Ace Hardware Corp., 300 P.3d 202, 206 (Or. App. 2013). Furthermore, a plaintiff must present evidence that the "defendant's asbestos was present in the workplace." Ingram v. ACandS, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1344 (9th Cir. 1992).
The parties do not dispute that maritime law applies to all Naval/sea-based claims.
"In establishing causation, a plaintiff may rely upon direct evidence (such as testimony of the plaintiff or decedent who experienced the exposure, co-worker testimony, or eye-witness testimony) or circumstantial evidence that will support an inference that there was exposure to the defendant's product for some length of time."
On the other hand, "`[m]inimal exposure' to a defendant's product is insufficient to establish causation. Likewise, a mere showing that defendant's product-was present somewhere at plaintiff's place of work is insufficient." Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492 (quoting Stark, 21 F. Appx. at 376). "Rather, the plaintiff must show `a high enough level of exposure that an inference that the asbestos was a substantial factor in the injury is more than conjectural.'" Abbay, 2012 WL 975837, at *1 n.1 (quoting Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492). "Total failure to show that the defect caused or contributed to the accident will foreclose as a matter of law a finding of strict product[] liability." Stark, 21 F. Appx. at 376 (citations omitted).
The court recommends granting Air & Liquid's motion for summary judgment. Although Mr. Haynes testified that he worked on pumps manufactured by Buffalo Pumps from 1960 to 1963 while aboard the USS Powell and USS Buckley, there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether Mr. Haynes was exposed to an asbestos-containing product made by Buffalo Pumps. (12/6/16 Tr. at 155:16-157:25) Mr. Haynes stated that he performed work on Buffalo Pumps' products located in the fire rooms of the USS Powell and USS Buckley. (Id. at 155:20-156:4) However, according to a machinery synopsis for a Gearing class destroyer similar to the USS Powell and USS Buckley, Buffalo Pumps' products were only located in the engine rooms. (D.I. 108, Ex. B at 5-10) Moreover, Mr. Haynes did not know the maintenance history of the pumps or whether the pumps contained original packing or gaskets. (Id. at 160:16-24) Mr. Haynes also did not know the manufacturer of the gaskets used with the pumps. (Id. at 161:10-13)
The deposition testimony of Mr. Haynes fails to create a material issue of fact as to whether Buffalo Pumps' products were a substantial contributing factor to Mr. Haynes' injury under maritime law. See Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492. Therefore, the court recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Air & Liquid.
The court recommends granting Aurora's motion for summary judgment, because there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether Mr. Haynes was exposed to an asbestos-containing product made by Aurora. Plaintiffs fail to meet the "substantial factor" test, because Plaintiffs did not produce any evidence establishing exposure to an Aurora product.
The court recommends granting BorgWarner's motion for summary judgment, because Plaintiffs have failed to show that a material issue of fact exists as to whether BorgWarner's product was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Haynes' injuries under Oregon law. See McEwen, 528 P.2d at 543. Although Mr. Haynes identified clutches made by BorgWarner, there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether Mr. Haynes was exposed to an asbestos-containing product made by BorgWarner. (D.I. 101 at 2) From 1964 to 1973, Mr. Haynes alleged that he worked on Borg Warner clutches while employed as an auto mechanic at Modern Motors Volkswagen Dealership, Pete Lovely Volkswagen Dealership, Evald Leif Volkswagen Dealership, and Humphrey Volkswagen Dealership. (D.I. 99 at 2) However, Mr. Haynes testified that he did not remember removing or installing a BorgWarner clutch during his employment at the Volkswagen dealerships. (12/7/16 Video Tr. at 105:23-106:8; 356:4-6) He did not testify that he was exposed to asbestos in the course of working on clutches made by BorgWarner. (D.I. 101)
The deposition testimony of Mr. Haynes fails to create a material issue of fact as to whether BorgWarner's products were a substantial contributing factor to Mr. Haynes' injury. See McEwen, 528 P.2d at 543. Therefore, the court recommends granting summary judgment in favor of BorgWarner.
The court recommends granting FMC's motion for summary judgment, because there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether Mr. Haynes was exposed to an asbestos-containing product made by Northern Pump Company, Chicago Pump Company, or Peerless Pump Company. Plaintiffs fail to meet the "substantial factor" test, because Plaintiffs did not produce any evidence of exposure to a Northern Pump Company, Chicago Pump Company, or Peerless Pump Company product.
The court recommends granting Honeywell's motion for summary judgment, because Plaintiffs have failed to show that a material issue of fact exists as to whether Honeywell's product was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Haynes' injuries under Oregon law. See McEwen, 528 P.2d at 543. Although Mr. Haynes testified that he worked on Bendix brakes, there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether Mr. Haynes was exposed to an asbestos-containing product made by Bendix. (12/7/16 Video Tr. at 84:17-21) Mr. Haynes testified that he started working on Bendix brakes while employed as a mechanic in Redmond, Oregon after 1981. (Id. at 359:18-21) Mr. Haynes testified that he did not know whether the Bendix brakes he used contained asbestos, and Mr. Haynes did not recall seeing warnings on the Bendix brake boxes. (Id. at 362:1-9)
The deposition testimony of Mr. Haynes fails to create a material issue of fact as to whether Bendix's products were a substantial contributing factor to Mr. Haynes' injury. See McEwen, 528 P.2d at 543. Therefore, the court recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Honeywell.
The court recommends granting Pfizer's motion for summary judgment, because there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether Mr. Haynes was exposed to an asbestos-containing product made by Pfizer. Plaintiffs fail to meet the "substantial factor" test, because Plaintiffs did not produce any evidence of exposure to a Pfizer product.
The court recommends granting Warren Pumps' motion for summary judgment. Although Mr. Haynes testified that he worked on pumps manufactured by Warren Pumps, there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether Mr. Haynes was exposed to an asbestos-containing product made by Warren Pumps. (12/6/16 Tr. at 162:19-22) Mr. Haynes testified that he removed and replaced the packing on pumps manufactured by Warren Pumps while aboard the USS Powell. (Id. at 171:4-6) Mr. Haynes remembered one specific occasion when he worked on a pump manufactured by Warren Pumps. (Id. at 168:22-170:8) Mr. Haynes stated that he was unaware of the maintenance history of the pumps that were on the USS Powell. (Id. at 170:9-15) He also testified that he did not know whether the packing used aboard the USS Powell contained asbestos. (Id. at 109:12-16)
The deposition testimony of Mr. Haynes fails to create a material issue of fact as to whether Warren Pumps' products were a substantial contributing factor to Mr. Haynes' injury under maritime law. See Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492. Therefore, the court recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Warren Pumps.
For the foregoing reasons, and as addressed in the chart infra, the court recommends granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
This Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1), and D. Del. LR 72.1. The parties may serve and file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objection and responses to the objections are limited to ten (10) pages each. The failure of a party to object to legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de novo review in the District Court. See Sincavage v. Barnhart, 171 F. App'x 924, 925 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006); Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1987).
The parties are directed to the court's Standing Order For Objections Filed Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, dated October 9, 2013, a copy of which is available on the court's website, http://www.ded.uscourts.gov.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note. Before the amendment, the Third Circuit would have denied summary judgment if the averments were "well-pleaded," and not conclusory. Id. However, the Advisory Committee noted that summary judgment is meant to pierce the pleadings and to assess proof to see whether there is a genuine need for trial. Id. Accordingly, the pre-amendment Third Circuit precedent was incompatible with the basic purpose of the rule. Id. The amendment recognizes that, "despite the best efforts of counsel to make his pleadings accurate, they may be overwhelmingly contradicted by the proof available to his adversary." Id. The amendment, however, was not designed to affect the ordinary standard applicable to summary judgment. Id.
513 U.S. at 534 (internal citations omitted).