LEONARD P. STARK, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Monir A. George's ("Petitioner'') Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's refusal to issue a certificate of appealability with respect to its denial of Petitioner's § 2254 Petition. (D.I. 27) For the reasons discussed, the Court will deny Motion for Reconsideration.
On September 21, 2018, the Court declined to issue a certificate of appealability after denying in its entirety Petitioner's § 2254 Petition challenging Petitioner's 2009 convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, first degree reckless endangering, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. (D.I. 23 at 18; D.I. 24) Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (D.I. 25; D.I. 26) On October 19, 2018, Petitioner filed in this Court the pending Motion for Reconsideration. (D.I. 53) On January 31, 2019, the Third Circuit issued an Order staying Petitioner's appeal until the disposition of the Motion for Reconsideration. (D.I. 30)
A motion for reargument/reconsideration may be filed pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(6). Although motions under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(6) serve similar functions, each has a particular purpose. See United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003). For instance, Rule 59(e) is "a device . . . used to allege legal error,"
In contrast, "Rule 60(6) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005). A motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court guided by accepted legal principles applied in light of all relevant circumstances,
If a district court is presented with a Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration after it has denied the petitioner's federal habeas petition, the court must determine if the motion constitutes a second or successive application under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Under AEDPA, a prisoner cannot file a second or successive habeas petition without first obtaining approval from the court of appeals and, absent such authorization, a district court cannot consider the merits of a subsequent petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139-40 (3d Cir. 2002). A district court presented with an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition must either "dismiss the petition or transfer it to the court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631." Robinson, 313 F.3d at 139.
Notably, Third Circuit precedent requires a district court to view a timely Rule 59(e) motion as lying "outside the reach of the jurisdictional limitations that AEDPA imposes upon multiple collateral attacks." Blystone, 664 F.3d at 414. In other words, timely Rule 59(e) motions to amend or alter judgment are materially different from Rule 60(b) motions for reconsideration, such that a timely Rule 59(e) motion does not constitute a second or successive habeas petition even if it advances a habeas claim. See id. at 413.
Petitioner has not identified the authority under which he moves for reconsideration. Since the instant Motion for reconsideration was filed within 28 days
Here, Petitioner does not assert any intervening change in law, the availability of previously unavailable evidence, or a "clear error of law" of the sort that would compel reconsideration of the Court's denial of the § 2254 Petition or its refusal to issue a certificate of appealability. Instead, he re-asserts a previously-considered argument along with numerous previously-available exhibits. Accordingly, the Court will deny the instant Rule 59(e) Motion.
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court will deny the instant Rule 59(e) Motion. The Court also declines to issue a certificate of appealability, because Petitioner has failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 1997); 3d Cir. LAR 22.2 (2011).
A separate Order will be entered.