PETER J. MESSITTE, District Judge.
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has filed a Motion for Clerk's Entry of Default against Defendants John Usher, Global Property Alliance Inc., Sittee River Wildlife Reserve, Buy Belize LLC, Buy International Inc., Foundation Development Management Inc., Eco Futures Development, Eco-Futures Belize Limited, Newport Land Group LLC, Power Haus Marketing, Prodigy Management Group LLC, Belize Real Estate Affiliates LLC, Exotic Investor LLC, Southern Belize Realty LLC, Sanctuary Belize Property Owners' Association, and The Estate of John Pukke. ECF No. 741. Pro se Defendants Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and Luke Chadwick have responded, suggesting that they in fact represent one or more of these entities.
For the following reasons, the Court
The law is clear: It "permits corporations ... and other artificial entities ... to appear in federal courts only through licensed counsel." Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 195 (1993); see also In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 290 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Rowland); see also Ashley-Cooper Sales Servs., Inc. v. Brentwood Mfg. Co., 168 F.Supp. 742, 745 (D. Md.1958) (stating "the Federal courts, including the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that a corporation cannot appear in court in proper person, but must appear by attorney authorized to practice before the court."). Though there is a right of individuals to appear pro se on behalf of themselves in civil cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and in criminal cases, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), "[t]he right to litigate for oneself, however, does not create a coordinate right to litigate for others," Myers v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005). The rationale is that this "protects the rights of those before the court ... and jealously guards the judiciary's authority to govern those who practice in its courtrooms." Id. To expand on the first point, allowing a pro se individual — a non-attorney no less — to appear for a corporate or other entity may seriously compromise the interests of the corporation or entity. See Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating "we consider the competence of a layman representing himself to be clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others"). The Local Rules of this Court hammer home this point, reaffirming that "Individuals who are parties in civil cases may only represent themselves." LAR 101.1(a).
Accordingly, pro se Defendants may not appear in this proceeding on behalf of the non-responding Corporate Defendants.
The law is somewhat less clear as to whether Pukke is authorized to represent the Estate of John Pukke as the Executor of the Estate. The Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue but other Circuits and District Courts within the Fourth Circuit have stated that an estate may be represented by a pro se individual who is the executor or personal representative of the estate if the individual is the sole beneficiary and the estate has no creditors. See Malone v. Nielson, 474 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2007); Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2003); Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2nd Cir. 1997); McAdoo v. United States, 2014 WL 359043, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 3, 2014). The Fourth Circuit has hinted that it agrees. See Witherspoon v. Jeffords Agency, Inc., 88 F. App'x 659 (4th Cir. 2004). Thus, if Pukke can show the Court he is the Executor of his father's Estate and the sole beneficiary of the Estate and that the Estate has no creditors, the Court will permit him to represent the Estate.
With respect to the non-responding Corporate Defendants and John Usher, the Court notes that these Defendants were duly served with process in this case and have not in any way participated in the proceedings. Since the pro se Defendants may not represent the non-responding Corporate Defendants, there is no reason why the Clerk should not enter Defaults against them.
Accordingly, the Court
A separate Order will
Chadwick argues that he, as an individual, should be able to represent certain corporate entities because the asset freeze has made it difficult for him to hire counsel for these entities. This request comes very late in the day, just a few short weeks before trial. Moreover, Chadwick has been represented by counsel during the better part of these proceedings. When he had counsel, neither he nor they ever attempted to file a motion on behalf of the entities he now seeks to represent to release funds on behalf of those entities so that they might engage counsel. Nor did they ever seek to file dispositive motions on behalf of the entities.
In his response, Pukke also asks that the Court reconsider its decision denying him access to Receivership funds, ECF No. 696. The Court