Filed: Mar. 10, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 10, 2016
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , Chief District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through the defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea on March 10, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the change of plea hearing until March 17, 201
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , Chief District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through the defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea on March 10, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the change of plea hearing until March 17, 2016..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through the defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea on March 10, 2016.
2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the change of plea hearing until March 17, 2016, and to exclude time between March 10, 2016, and March 17, 2016, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) After briefing and argument, the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was denied on February 25, 2016. The matter has been set for change of plea.
b) Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to confer with his client and prepare for the change of plea.
c) Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, consideration of potential resolutions, and consultation with his client, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to and joins the request for the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 10, 2016 to March 17, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
