MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING THE CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) the Chief Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed December 31, 2015 ("PFRD"); and (ii) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed on January 12, 2016 ("Objections"), which the Court will construe as Objections filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court referred this matter to the Honorable Karen B. Molzen, Chief Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) on December 28, 2016. On December 31, 2015, three days later, Chief Judge Molzen issued her PFRD, recommending that the Court deny the Plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order. See PFRD at 1.

The PFRD explains that pro se Plaintiffs, the Dibbles, filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and for Restitution on December 28, 2015 ("Complaint"). The Dibbles sought a temporary restraining order with a hearing to be set by January 4, 2016. Chief Judge Molzen took judicial notice of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court's records in the underlying foreclosure action, case number D-1314-CV-2011-1059, which the undersigned has done. See St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979)(reasoning that federal courts may take notice of proceedings in other courts when they have a direct relation to the matters before the court).

In their Objections to the PFRD, the Dibbles insist that the Court has misapprehended their Complaint. They explain that instead of seeking rescission under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A §1635(e)("TILA"), they "seek declaratory judgment as to the terminations created under operation of law by a TILA rescission which has already occurred by notice." Objections at 12. As the Court understands the Dibbles' argument, they maintain that their mortgage loan was rescinded upon written notice to Wells Fargo, even without the filing of the present lawsuit. See Objections at 9. The Dibbles contend that, through the "non-judicial process of TILA rescission," their "debt was terminated, the note which represents the debt was terminated, and the mortgage which secures the debt was terminated under operation of law." See Objections at 9. As best the Court can surmise, the Dibbles' position is as follows: because they already rescinded their loan pursuant to TILA, Wells Fargo could not foreclose on the subject property under New Mexico law, rendering the state court's judgment against them void. See Objections at 9-10. Even with the clarifications the Dibbles provided about their position, the Court is not persuaded that the Dibbles are likely to succeed on the merits. The Dibbles do not address the apparent untimeliness of their purported rescission. As Chief Judge Molzen noted in her PFRD, TILA § 1635(f) provides that "[a]n obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction." 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); see Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411-12 (1998)(holding that § 1635(f) completely extinguishes the right of rescission at the end of the three-year period). Although Wells Fargo has not yet answered the Dibbles' Complaint, having sought and received an extension for doing so, it takes the position in its Unopposed Motion for Extension to Respond to Complaint that the Plaintiffs' claims are time barred. See Unopposed Motion for Extension to Respond to Complaint ¶ 5, at 2, filed on January 19, 2016, (Doc. 9). The Dibbles contend that they gave notice of rescission eight years after loan's consummation. See Complaint ¶ 5-6, at 2. Accordingly, based on the Complaint's allegations, the Plaintiffs' attempted rescission runs afoul of § 1635(f) and fails to effect the "terminations" to which they refer.

Chief Magistrate Judge Molzen also explained that, given the related foreclosure action in state court, the Dibbles' claims in this case implicate two doctrines of federal court abstention: Younger1 and Rooker-Feldman.2 See PFRD at 4-5. Wells Fargo, again in its Unopposed Motion for Extension to Response to Complaint, takes a similar position, arguing that the Dibbles' claims are either res judicata barred or they are subject to abstention, depending on the status of the state court action. See PFRD at 5-6. In response, the Dibbles argue that "[t]his Court's proposed concern, then, over Rooker-Feldman doctrine violation is without issue, for Federal collateral attacks on state-court judgments are totally available when a state-court judgment is void." Opposition at 11. In the Court's view, however, the Dibbles will not be able to establish that the state court's judgment is void, particularly where the attempted rescission does not comport with TILA § 1635(f).3

Nor have the Dibbles established that irreparable harm or injury may result from the Court's denial of their request for a temporary restraining order. The Dibbles argue that the "exercise of the State Court writ now constitutes irreparable injury to Plaintiff by trespassers that will surely result." Objections at 12. The docket sheet for the state court foreclosure action shows that the state court issued a Writ of Assistance on January 5, 2016. The Court is not persuaded, however, that the harm alleged by the Dibbles should be characterized as irreparable. Instead, the relief that the Dibbles sought, including the Note's monetary value and twice that amount, see Complaint ¶34 at 6-7, and/or statutory damages, see Objections at 13, are compensable with monetary damages.

Under these circumstances, the Court will not issue a temporary restraining order that, in effect, would interfere with state court foreclosure proceedings without a sound and compelling basis for bringing a TRO. The parties will have an opportunity to develop their arguments and address the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims in the ordinary course of litigation.

Having conducted a de novo review of the Dibbles' Complaint and request for temporary restraining order, as well as the Dibbles' Objections, the Court adopts Chief Magistrate Judge Molzen's findings and conclusions, and overrules the Dibbles' Objections.

IT IS ORDERED that: (i) the Chief Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed December 31, 2015, is adopted in part and the Chief Magistrate Judge's findings regarding the implication of Rooker-Feldman federal abstention to the Dibbles' claim is not adopted; and (ii) Plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order is denied.