JANIS L. SAMMARTINO, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Lloyd Lynton Adams' Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") ("Mot.," ECF No. 2). Plaintiff, proceeding through counsel, has submitted a complaint for judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). ECF No. 1.
All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
Here, Plaintiff states that he "live[s] at a shelter as part of a program called Connections Housing through the People Assisting the Homeless (PATH) organization," where he has lived since February 2013. Mot. at 2. He receives early retirement Social Security Administration benefits of $230.00 per month, General Relief of approximately $100.00 per month, and $192.00 per month in food stamps. Id. He has not been employed during the past twelve months and has no cash or bank account. Id. He does not own any real estate or other investments and does not own a vehicle. Id. He has no relatives to assist him. Id. Mr. Adams pre-pays $40.00 per month for a cell phone. Id. He has not purchased clothes for himself in over five years. Id. Taken at face value, Plaintiff's application demonstrates that he is unable to pay the requisite fees. Accordingly, the Court
Notwithstanding IFP status, the Court must subject every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to a mandatory screening.
Prior to the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (now § 1915(e)) "did not authorize district courts to dismiss, sua sponte, a complaint for failure to state a claim." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (emphasis added) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)). Now, however, a court shall dismiss a case sua sponte if it finds that "the allegation of poverty is untrue" or the action: (1) "is frivolous or malicious," (2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or (3) "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "not only permits but requires" the Court to dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
All complaints must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). "[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Andrews v. King, 393 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).").
In this case, Plaintiff appeals the Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff's claim for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI and Social Security Disability Insurance under Title II. ECF No. 1 ("Compl.") ¶ 1. The Court finds that Plaintiff's claim is sufficiently pleaded to survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See, e.g., Buttimer v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-856 JLS (BGS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51776, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2015) (citing Rhett v. Disman, 228 Fed. App'x 225, 227 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that "seeking review of the denial of supplemental social security disability benefits" will satisfy the requirements for a cognizable claim)). Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to U.S. Marshal Service on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) ("[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.").
For the reasons stated above, the Court:
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