MEMORANDUM OPINION

M. HANNAH LAUCK, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on five motions:

This matter is ripe for disposition. The Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before it adequately present the facts and legal contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.7 For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Motion to Compel Arbitration and dismiss this action without prejudice. The Court will deny Harris's Motion to Remand and Harris's Letter Motion. The Court will also deny as moot Harris's Motion to Dismiss and Mariner's Motion to Strike.

I. Factual and Procedural History

A. General Allegations and Procedural History8

In August 2013, Harris, a Virginia resident, served as a co-signor for a vehicle purchased at a Virginia car dealership, Auto By Design, LLC. (Am. Compl. ¶ 4; Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel 1, ECF No. 4.) As part of the vehicle purchase, Harris and the buyer entered into a Retail Installment Sale Contract (the "Loan Contract"), which allegedly contained an addendum entitled "Notice of Arbitration Agreement"9 (the "Arbitration Agreement").10 (Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel 1.)

On the same day that Harris and the buyer purchased the car, Auto By Design, LLC assigned the car loan to Mariner, a Maryland limited liability corporation. (Id.) Specifically, the Loan Contract stated "Seller[11] assigns its interest in this contract to Mariner Finance." (Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel Ex. A "Loan Contract" 4, ECF No. 4-1.)

Harris alleges that the vehicle purchased through the Loan Contract "was repossessed and resold in 2015." (Harris's Mot. Dismiss 1-2, ECF No. 11.)

Harris's four claims arise out of Mariner's alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the "FCRA") when Mariner, among other things, furnished information about a debt Harris allegedly owed after he submitted "proof ... to the contrary, as well as written notification from all 3 credit bureaus." (Am. Comp. ¶ 11.) Harris also states that Mariner violated the FCRA when it "failed to respond to ... disputes," "illegally pulled his credit report without his permission," and "pulled" his "credit report without his permission, in addition to obtaining information under false pretenses." (Id. ¶¶ 14, 19, 26.)

Harris originally filed his Amended Complaint in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond (the "Richmond Circuit Court"). (Not. Removal 1.) Mariner properly removed the action to this Court invoking the Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Harris's Amended Complaint seeks relief solely under the FCRA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

After removing the case to this Court, Mariner filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration. Harris's Motion to Remand, Letter Motion, and his Motion to Dismiss followed. In response to Harris's Motion to Dismiss, Mariner filed the Motion to Strike.

B. Allegations Related to the Arbitration Agreement

Mariner attached the executed Loan Contract and Arbitration Agreement as exhibits to its Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Compel Arbitration. (See ECF No. 4-1.) Mariner also attached a sworn declaration (the "Declaration") from a Branch Manager attesting, under penalty of perjury, that the documents constituted "a true and authentic copy of the at-issue Retail Installment Sale Contract and its Addendum,[12] both executed by Lamont Harris on August 17, 2013." (Decl. 1, ECF No. 4-2.) The Declaration states that the Loan Contract and the Arbitration Agreement "comprise the entire agreement between Lamont Harris and the assignee, Mariner Finance, LLC." (Id. 2.)

The Arbitration Agreement specifies that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (the "FAA"), governs the Arbitration Agreement and that it broadly applies to

(Arbitration Agreement 1, ECF No. 4-1.) The Arbitration Agreement excludes certain claims from the scope of this broad application, stating:

(Id.) Although the Arbitration Agreement states that "[y]ou may reject this arbitration agreement ... by sending a rejection notice ... within 60 days after the date of this contract" to a specified address, nothing in the record indicates that Harris ever rejected the Arbitration Agreement. (Id.)

Rather, Harris maintains throughout his numerous filings that he never signed the Arbitration Agreement. (See, e.g., Resp. Mot. Compel 1, ECF No. 7.) Harris also states that "he has never seen these statements, contacts [sic], agreements, nor even had any prior conversations with the defendants pertaining to any arbitration agreements." (Id. 2.) He avers that at the time he acted as a cosigner on the loan he "was actually working as a car salesman at a car dealership & are [sic] familiar and trained on handling arbitration agreements, contract agreements, etc." (Harris's Mot. Dismiss 3.) Although Harris maintains that his purported signature on the Arbitration Agreement constitutes a forgery, he provides nothing beyond his own assertions to support his forgery contention.

II. Analysis

The Court Will Grant the Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss this Case to Allow Harris and Mariner to Arbitrate Harris's FCRA Claims13

A. The Federal Arbitration Act

Congress passed the FAA "`to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements ... and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.'" Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (alteration in original)). The FAA provides that a written agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 limits the scope of the FAA to written contracts involving commerce. Id. "The effect of th[is] section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

Once a court determines that the parties entered into a written agreement to arbitrate the underlying dispute, Section 4 directs courts to compel arbitration if necessary. 9 U.S.C. § 4. The FAA gives district courts no discretion to do otherwise:

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4) (emphasis in original); see Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 2001); Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 252 F.3d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 2001).

B. The Court Will Grant the Motion to Compel Arbitration

To compel arbitration under the FAA, Mariner must demonstrate:

Galloway v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 819 F.3d 79, 84 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Rota-McLarty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 700 F.3d 690, 696 n.6 (4th Cir. 2012)). Harris's sole contention opposing the Motion to Compel Arbitration is that he did not sign the Arbitration Agreement, which implicates only the second prong of the test.

Courts apply these preliminary precepts when evaluating a motion to compel arbitration:

Craddock v. LeClairRyan, P.C., No. 3:16cv11, 2016 WL 1464562, at *3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2016) (omissions and second alteration in original) (quoting Lorenzo v. Prime Commc'ns, L.P., 806 F.3d 777, 781 (4th Cir. 2015)). Therefore, the Court turns to Virginia contract law to determine whether the Arbitration Agreement applies to Harris's FCRA claims.

1. A Valid Written Agreement Exists Between Harris and Mariner Because Harris Signed the Arbitration Agreement

To determine whether a "written agreement that includes an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute" exists between Harris and Mariner, the Court must first determine whether Harris entered into an agreement with Mariner to arbitrate claims arising from the contract at issue. Galloway, 819 F.3d at 84. The Fourth Circuit has stated that "if the dispute is over the very existence of the agreement to arbitrate, a district court, and not the arbitrator, must decide if the arbitration clause (indeed, the entire agreement) is enforceable against the parties." Gregory v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 188 F.3d 501, at *7 (4th Cir. 1999) (table opinion) (citing Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., Inc., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1992); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4). Where a party to a contract "reasonably" claims that his or her signature on the contract constitutes a forgery, the Court, not the arbitrator must decide whether the contract may be enforced against that party because "the dispute over the forgery is not a dispute over the arbitrability of a merits-based issue, rather it is a dispute over an issue which itself goes to arbitrability." See id. at *7, *9. For this reason, "the district court must first pass on the question of whether" the party "is bound by the" Arbitration Agreement. Id. at *9. "If the district court makes this finding in the affirmative, then, and only then ... the FAA require[s] the district court to send [the] ... complaint to arbitration." Id.

Because the Court liberally reads Harris's claims as "reasonably" asserting that he did not sign the Arbitration Agreement, it must determine whether the terms of the Arbitration Agreement bind Harris. See id. at *7, *9. Throughout his many filings, Harris contends that he cannot be subject to arbitration because he did not sign the Arbitration Agreement. Harris repeatedly accuses Mariner of submitting forged documents, stating that any document Mariner submitted that contains Harris's signature "should be carefully examined for forgery."17 (Resp. Mot. Compel Arbitration 3.)

Despite Harris's persistent assertions that he did not sign the Arbitration Agreement, he provides no competent evidence to support his contention that he did not sign the Arbitration Agreement.18 Although Harris maintains that he makes these contentions "under oath," he offered nothing to support this contention that the Court may consider. The two notarized documents he submitted, which do not include the "under oath" language, do not aid his contention. Specifically, the documents

Tharrington v. Dir., Va. Dep't. of Corrs., No. 3:14cv720, 2015 WL 4606174, at *16 n.7 (E.D. Va. 2015) (citing Strong, 495 F.3d at 140; Goode v. Gray, No. 3:07cv189, 2009 WL 255829, at *2 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2009)). Because Harris did not swear to the contents of these documents, they "fail[] to constitute admissible evidence." Id. at *7.

Mariner, however, submitted the Arbitration Agreement along with the Declaration, made under penalty of perjury,20 stating that the Loan Contract and the Arbitration Agreement constitute a "true and authentic copy of the at-issue" Loan Contract and Arbitration Agreement, "both executed by Lamont Harris."21 (Decl. 1.) Because Harris has not submitted any admissible evidence to support his contention that he did not sign the Arbitration Agreement submitted by Mariner and Mariner has provided evidence that he did so, the Court will conclude that Harris signed the Arbitration Agreement. See Roach v. Navient Sols., Inc., 165 F.Supp.3d 343, 349 (D. Md. 2015) (granting a motion to compel arbitration after the plaintiff claimed that she had not signed the agreement containing the arbitration notice and denying discovery on the issue because the plaintiff had not "presented an affidavit, a declaration, or some other admissible evidence unequivocally showing that she disputes the existence or validity of her ... debt.") Given its own observation about the signatures before it, the Court experiences little reluctance in so finding. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Arbitration Agreement creates a valid written agreement as contemplated by the FAA.

2. The Arbitration Agreement Covers Harris's FCRA Claims

In order for the FAA to apply, the "written agreement" must not only exist, but it must "purport[] to cover the dispute." Galloway, 819 F.3d at 84. Here, the Arbitration Agreement broadly applies to

(Arbitration Agreement 1, ECF No. 4-1.) Although it exempts certain claims from its scope, none of the exclusions apply here because Harris seeks relief for Mariner's violations of the FCRA, which are not exempted. He also seeks damages in the amount of at least $250,000, (Am. Compl. 6), well over the $5,000 limit set in the Arbitration Agreement, (Arbitration Agreement 1). Further, Harris did not file his Amended Complaint in small claims court.

"[T]he Supreme Court has acknowledged a `liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.'"22 Craddock, 2016 WL 1464562 at *3 (quoting Lorenzo, 806 F.3d at 781). Further, the FAA "establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor arbitration." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. To determine whether Harris's FCRA claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement, the Court must apply Virginia contract law.

Under Virginia law, "[c]ontracts are construed as written, without adding terms that were not included by the parties." TM Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP of Va., L.L.C., 557 S.E.2d 199, 200 (Va. 2002) (citing Wilson v. Holyfield, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Va. 1984)). "Where the terms in a contract are clear and unambiguous the contract is construed according to its plain meaning." Id. (citing Bridgestone/Firestone v. Prince William Square Assocs., 463 S.E.2d 661, 664 (Va. 1995); Ross v. Craw, 343 S.E.2d 312, 316 (Va. 1986)). Virginia public policy also favors arbitration "and the validity of arbitration agreements." Id. at 202.

Here, the plain language of the Arbitration Agreement embodies application to a broad range of claims. Specifically, it applies to "any claim ... arising from or relating to: this contract ... or the relationships that result from this contract." (Arbitration Agreement 1.) Giving plain meaning to these terms, Harris's FCRA claims, which arise out of the relationship between him and Mariner as created by the Loan Contract and the Arbitration Agreement, fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. See Roach, 165 F.Supp.3d at 348 (stating that "the Court has little difficulty concluding that the[ plaintiff's FCRA claims] would be covered: the agreements are drafted to encompass any claim, dispute, or controversy arising from or relating to the notes, including statutory and regulatory claims.")

Because Harris's FCRA claims fall entirely within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement creates a valid "written agreement" as contemplated by the FAA, see Galloway, 819 F.3d at 84, the Court concludes that the second requirement to apply the FAA is satisfied. Therefore, the dispute between Harris and Mariner meets all the requirements to apply the FAA, see id., and the Court must require Harris and Mariner to arbitrate Harris's FCRA claims,23 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 218 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4) ("By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.")

C. The Court Will Exercise Its Discretion to Dismiss the Action

"A court may dismiss or stay a suit that is governed by the FAA." Chronister v. Marks & Harrison, P.C., No. 3:11cv688, 2012 WL 966916, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2012) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3; Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 2001)). When a party seeks enforcement of an arbitration agreement in district court, the party sufficiently "invoke[s] the full spectrum of remedies under the FAA, including a stay under [9 U.S.C.] § 3." Choice Hotels, 252 F.3d at 710. However, if a court determines "that all of the issues presented are arbitrable, then it may dismiss the case." Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Emp. Welfare Ben. Plan for Emps. of Hazelhurst Mgmt. Co., 628 F.App'x 842, 845-46 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Choice Hotels, 252 F.3d at 709-10). The law remains unsettled as to whether a court should stay or dismiss a case when all claims are subject to arbitration,24 but no question exists that the Court has the discretion to take either option. Choice Hotels, 252 F.3d at 709-10. Here, because the Court has found that all of Harris's claims are subject to arbitration, it will exercise its discretion to dismiss the case without prejudice.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Motion to Compel Arbitration and dismiss this action without prejudice. The Court will also deny the Motion to Remand and the Letter Motion. Finally, the Court will deny as moot Harris's Motion to Dismiss and Mariner's Motion to Strike.

An appropriate order shall issue.