NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

Mary Jones (Jones) sued respondents Susan Winter (Winter) and Howard Industries, Inc. (Howard) and sought millions of dollars in damages for personal injury arising out of a motor vehicle accident. Though Jones prevailed at trial, the jury awarded her only $7,595.36. She appeals and requests that we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial in a new venue due to myriad errors. She also challenges an order that she pay $495 in sanctions for failing to attend an independent medical examination. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS

Jones tripped and fell at work on January 21, 2005. As a result, she lost substantial use of her left arm and hand and suffered a variety of problems, including pain, memory loss and disorientation. From that point on, Jones never went back to work. Dr. Philip Sobol was the primary treating physician for her work related injuries.1 An MRI of her neck on March 7, 2005, revealed disk bulges, bone spurs, areas of narrowing on the spinal canal, and a small degree of compression of the spinal cord. On September 4, 2005, Winter rear-ended a car being driven by Jones. Dr. Sujal Mandavia examined Jones and concluded that she suffered a cervical strain, which is a soft tissue injury. Soon after the accident, Jones began treating with Dr. Jon Greenfield. She had an MRI on October 14, 2005. It showed the same abnormalities as the March 7, 2005, MRI. Dr. Sobol saw Jones and reviewed her records. He issued a report in 2007 and opined that the motor vehicle accident had not caused any increase in her disability for purposes of her workers' compensation claim.

Jones sued Winter and her employer, Howard, for negligence and claimed that the motor vehicle accident exacerbated injuries from her trip and fall and caused new injuries. In her statement of damages, Jones sought over $40 million. When she refused to appear for an independent medical examination, Winter and Howard filed a motion to compel. The trial court granted the motion and sanctioned Jones $495.

Prior to trial, Jones requested the use of a jury questionnaire. Her request was denied.

The defense conceded negligence, so the trial focused on issues of causation and damages. Dr. Tony Feuerman was called as the defense expert. He compared the MRIs from March 7, 2005, and October 14, 2005, and concluded that both indicated the same degenerative abnormalities.2 In his opinion, all Jones suffered in the motor vehicle accident was a soft tissue injury. Such an injury normally gets better with time, physical therapy and medication. Her overall condition and disability would not be any different absent the rear-end collision. When Jones called her expert, Dr. Greenfield, and referred to the two MRIs, counsel for Winter and Howard objected. The trial court precluded Dr. Greenfield from comparing the two MRIs on the grounds that he specifically testified in his deposition that he had not done a comparison and therefore could not determine whether Jones's trauma was caused by the slip and fall or the motor vehicle accident. On cross-examination, Dr. Greenfield admitted that if the two MRIs revealed the same injuries, then he could only conclude that those injuries were caused by a trauma preceding the motor vehicle accident.

During a break in Dr. Greenfield's testimony, juror No. 12 sent a note to the trial court and stated her belief that Dr. Greenfield had been involved in a medical malpractice action filed by her husband. She said she could remember very little but thought she should alert the trial court. Jones moved to strike juror No. 12 for cause on the grounds that she could not remain unbiased. The trial court questioned juror No. 12 and concluded that there was no reason to believe that juror No. 12 was biased and should not continue to serve on the case.

Dr. Mandavia testified that he diagnosed Jones with a soft tissue injury after the motor vehicle accident. Dr. Sobol testified that the motor vehicle accident caused Jones to suffer a soft tissue injury, which made her neck stiff. He believed that she fully recovered from that stiffness. The March 7, 2005, MRI report was entered into evidence during Dr. Sobol's testimony. No attempt was made to enter the actual film into evidence.

The parties stipulated to admit into evidence all medical records about which doctors had testified.

Jones proposed a jury instruction reciting the Civil Code section 33333 standard for damages. She also proposed a modified version of CACI No. 3905A that contained a laundry list of 12 different types of damages Jones claimed to have suffered. The trial court refused the proposed instructions. It opted instead to instruct the jury pursuant to CACI No. 3901.

During closing argument, Jones read from reports of the two MRIs and urged the jury to compare them and conclude that they proved that the motor vehicle accident caused injuries that were more severe and different from her trip and fall injuries. Pursuant to a special verdict, the jury awarded Jones $6,000 in medical expenses, $595.36 for other past economic loss, and $1,000 for physical pain and mental suffering.

This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Jones seeks reversal because juror No. 12 was guilty of misconduct; the misconduct would have been prevented if the trial court had allowed the jury questionnaire; the trial court should have admitted the two MRIs into evidence; the case proceeded as a workers' compensation trial; the court clerk failed to give the jury both MRIs; the verdict was not supported by the evidence; the trial court unfairly precluded certain evidence of damages; the trial court denied a proposed jury instruction based on Civil Code section 3333; the trial court denied the jury instruction Jones proposed pursuant to CACI No. 3905A; the trial court rushed the jurors; Jones was denied the right to examine Dr. Feuerman regarding his past; the trial court should have allowed Dr. Greenfield to offer an opinion about the two MRIs and the cause of Jones's injuries; the trial court ordered sanctions which do not exist; and irregularities in the case made a just verdict impossible.

We turn to these issues below.

I. Juror misconduct; the jury questionnaire.

Jones argues that her motion to strike juror No. 12 should have been granted based on People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1 (Rodriguez). But Rodriguez is silent on the issue of juror misconduct and provides no guidance. Thus, Jones did not cite relevant case law in her opening brief. We note that "`every brief should contain a legal argument with citation to authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.' [Citation.] [¶] It is the duty of [the appellant], not of the courts, `by argument and the citation of authorities to show that the claimed error exists.' [Citation.]" (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1050.)

Next, Jones contends that if the trial court had used the jury questionnaire she submitted, it would have prevented juror misconduct. She does not, however, claim that the trial court erred. The issue is moot.

II. The evidentiary rulings.

Jones contends that the trial court erred when it refused to admit the two MRIs into evidence or allow Dr. Greenfield to compare the two MRIs and provide an opinion on causation. She also contends that the trial court erred when it precluded her from offering certain evidence of her damages and from cross-examining Dr. Feuerman to elicit evidence to impeach his opinion such as his medical malpractice record and what Jones considers "bad outcomes."

To prevail, Jones must establish error as well as demonstrate that she suffered prejudice. Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution provides: "No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground . . . of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, . . . unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." "[A] `miscarriage of justice' should be declared only when the court, `after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' is of the `opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

The record establishes that the March 7, 2005, MRI report was received into evidence during Dr. Sobol's testimony and the parties stipulated to the admissibility of all documents referred to by doctors at trial. Dr. Feuerman discussed the two MRIs, so they fell within the stipulation. In her discussion of the issue, Jones failed to provide a cite establishing that the trial court excluded the two MRIs.4 Her claim that they were not admitted is unsupported by her briefs. Even if they were excluded, Jones did not establish that it was reasonably probable that the jury would have otherwise rendered a more favorable verdict. To prove that all her injuries were caused or exacerbated by the motor vehicle accident—meaning that the motor vehicle accident caused more than just soft tissue injury—Jones was "required to rely on the opinions of medical experts." (Bolton v. Trope (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1024; Sparks v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 461, 476 ["In a personal injury action, causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based on expert testimony; a mere possibility is insufficient"].) Because Jones's expert, Dr. Greenfield, did not contradict the testimony of the defense expert, Dr. Feuerman, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the motor vehicle accident caused more than soft tissue injury. The MRI films and reports were legally insufficient to prove otherwise. Accordingly, if they were excluded, it did not change the outcome.

As for the restrictions on Dr. Greenfield's testimony, Jones does not dispute that Dr. Greenfield never compared the two MRIs or provided an opinion regarding the cause of her injuries at his deposition. Case law establishes that "a party's expert may not offer testimony at trial that exceeds the scope of his deposition testimony if the opposing party has no notice or expectation that the expert will offer the new testimony, or if notice of the new testimony comes at a time when deposing the expert is unreasonably difficult." (Easterby v. Clark (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 772, 781 (Easterby ).) Jones does not argue that the trial court's ruling was inconsistent with Easterby. Rather, she cites DePalma v. Westland Software House (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1534, 1538, a case that discusses the admissibility of evidence in general. It does not discuss the particulars of the allowable scope of a medical expert's opinion. We are left with only one conclusion, which is that Jones failed to demonstrate error.

Moving on to the excluded evidence of damages, Jones complains that the trial court improperly excluded copies of information cards of three other vehicles involved in the motor vehicle accident; a picture of a piece of driftwood representing the pain she felt; medical records from a Dr. Melvin Goodman; evidence of letters from bill collectors; evidence of past and future lost income; evidence of future medical care; evidence of the cost of housekeeping; evidence of the cost of personal care services and daily living assistance; evidence of the cost of damage to Jones's vehicle; information about the weight of Winter's vehicle; and a workers' compensation evaluation of the two MRIs. The problem for Jones is that she did not analyze whether any of this evidence was admissible. Nor did she analyze whether she was prejudiced by the trial court's rulings in light of the opinion of the medical experts that the motor vehicle accident did not cause the bulk of the injuries that prompted Jones to sue Winters and Howard for negligence.

Last, Jones cites Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th 1 in support of her argument that she should have been allowed to cross-examine Dr. Feuerman regarding his professional past for impeachment purposes. But Jones did not cite to any place in the record that the trial court precluded such inquiry. Moreover, Rodriguez is not on point. It did not involve cross-examination of a medical expert.

III. The jury instructions.

Even though the jury was instructed on damages pursuant to CACI No. 3901, Jones claims that she was prejudiced because the trial court did not instruct on damages the way she desired. She cited no law holding that a trial court commits error by giving CACI No. 3901 in a negligence trial, by not creating a special jury instruction to mirror Civil Code section 3333, or by disallowing a modified version of CACI No. 3905A that sets forth a list of personalized damages. Having failed to demonstrate error, Jones presents no grounds for reversal.

Even assuming error, "there is no rule of automatic reversal or `inherent' prejudice applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission. A judgment may not be reversed for instructional error in a civil case `unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' [Citation.]" (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 580.) Based on this rule, Jones was required to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome if the jury had been instructed as she wished. She failed to make the appropriate showing, so our analysis need not continue.

IV. Sufficiency of the evidence.

Jones argues that the verdict was not supported by the evidence. But Winter and Howard conceded negligence, and Jones does not argue that there was insufficient evidence of causation or damages. In our view, Jones is essentially arguing that the damages were inadequate. She did not cite any law pertinent to this issue, so we once again find waiver. Academically, we alert Jones to the following rule. "Failure to move for a new trial on the ground of excessive or inadequate damages precludes a challenge on appeal to the amount of damages if the challenge turns on the credibility of witnesses, conflicting evidence, or other factual questions. [Citations.]" (County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1121.) Because Jones did not move for a new trial based on inadequate damages, she is barred from raising this issue for the first time on appeal.

V. Various other objections.

Jones complains that the trial proceeded as a workers' compensation trial instead of a negligence trial. She does not contend that the trial court erred in any respect, nor does she point to grounds for reversal. Regardless, we reviewed the record. We are satisfied that it proceeded according to law.

Next, without any record citations, Jones tells us that the two MRIs were not in the jury room during deliberations and she was prejudiced. She waived this argument. (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115 [the failure to provide record citations results in waiver].) Despite this waiver, we take a brief moment to point out the legal flaw in Jones's theory. She contends that the jury could have compared the two MRIs and found that the motor vehicle accident caused spinal injury as well as soft tissue injury. She is wrong. As we previously explained, she was required to offer expert testimony on causation in order to prevail. Because she failed to do so, she could only recover for the soft tissue injury. Also, to state the obvious, the jurors were not qualified to read MRI films or reports.

In Jones's view, the trial court rushed the jury. Even if that is true, she cited no law making such conduct reversible. The issue is waived. Nonetheless, we took a look at the reporter's transcript and determined that the trial court never rushed the jury. Rather, it kept the jury apprised of anticipated scheduling. For example, at one point, the trial court stated to the jury: "I'm expecting that argument will happen Thursday morning and unless something unforeseen happens . . ., I expect you'll have argument Thursday. [¶] So expect to be here for deliberations on Thursday like we talked about. Maybe you won't be here Thursday and Friday. You'll be here at least Thursday afternoon and probably Friday or however much time you need [to] reach a verdict." We find nothing improper. As explained in People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 632, a "`trial judge should refrain from placing specific time pressure on a deliberating jury and should never imply that the case warrants only desultory deliberation. Such comments risk persuading legitimate dissidents, whatever their views, that the court considers their position unreasonable. . . .' [Citation.]" Nothing the trial court said falls within that proscription.

In closing, Jones contends that the irregularities of the case made a just verdict impossible. This argument suffers under the weight of a simple fact: Jones did not establish any irregularities. Beyond that, Jones did not cite any law relevant to the point of law she asserts. Waiver is the result.

VI. The $495 sanctions.

Jones asks us to reverse the sanctions order. She does so without discussing the relevant law. We need not consider the issue without her assistance. It is not our responsibility to develop her argument. (Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1206, fn. 11.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

Winter and Howard shall recover their costs on appeal.

We concur:

BOREN, P. J.

DOI TODD, J.