DEBORAH. A. ROBINSON, United States Magistrate Judge.
By an order filed on September 4, 2013, the Court (Roberts, C.J.) allowed "limited supplemental expert discovery by an industrial psychologist expert due to the death of Defendant's previous such expert[.]" Order (Document No. 752) at 1.
Defendant served the report of Rick Jacobs, designated by Defendant as the "replacement" witness, on the date prescribed by the Court; however, Plaintiffs submit that the report "both vastly exceeds the scope of the [report of the previous expert] and materially alters its substance." Motion to Strike at 2. More specifically, Plaintiffs submit that Dr. Jacobs "sets forth
Defendant opposes the motion, and characterizes it as "baseless." Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Strike Dr. Rick Jacobs' Expert Report (Document No. 764) ("Defendant's Opposition") at 1. Defendant submits that the report of Dr. Jacobs "fully complies with this Court's Order[,]" and that Dr. Jacobs "neither contradicts what is in the report of [the previous expert], nor substantively changes [the previous expert's] conclusions[.]" Id. at 2. Defendant proffers that the "ultimate conclusions" reached by Dr. Jacobs are "identical" to those delineated in the report of Defendant's first expert. Id. at 9.
Plaintiffs, in their reply, dismiss Defendant's argument as a "caricature[,]" and maintain that Defendant — rather than merely substituting one industrial psychologist for another — has instead "attempt[ed]... to backfill the record with brand-new expert opinions in violation of this Court's Order." Reply in Support of Motion to Strike Dr. Rick Jacobs' Expert Report (Document No. 765) ("Plaintiffs' Reply") at 1.
The hearing on the motion conducted by the undersigned spanned nearly three hours on the record, and at least one hour during which counsel conferred off the record. Counsel for Plaintiffs, relying on dozens of citations to the record, identified corresponding instances of (1) opinions stated by Dr. Jacobs which were not stated by the industrial psychologist first offered by Defendant as an expert; (2) opinions stated by Dr. Jacobs articulated in greater detail than those offered by his predecessor; and (3) reliance by Dr. Jacobs on entirely different sources than those on which his predecessor relied.
The undersigned, upon consideration of the proffers and arguments of counsel in the context of the entire record herein, will grant Plaintiffs' motion. The undersigned observes that the Court, in affording Defendant the opportunity to designate a successor industrial psychologist, made the parameters of that opportunity plain: in granting Defendant's request to designate another expert, the Court noted that
Status Hr'g Tr. 13-14. Accordingly, the opportunity afforded Defendant was the opportunity to have a witness available at trial. See id. 14 ("I think it's good cause to want to replace[] ... an expert to have a live witness at the trial."). Defendant, by acknowledging that the "concepts" articulated by Dr. Jacobs were the same as those articulated by his predecessor, and only "the wording" of the opinions differed, concedes that Defendant exceeded the Court's parameters.
Defendant's proposal to excise from the report the objectionable "sentences" is unworkable. As Plaintiffs demonstrated, the additional opinions, the opinions articulated in greater detail, and the variations in the authorities on which Dr. Jacobs relied, all permeate Dr. Jacobs' report. The undersigned thus finds that it is not possible to "excise" objectionable "sentences"; indeed, any effort to do so would effectively eviscerate the report.
Defendant also suggests that the opportunity for Plaintiffs to take further discovery precludes a finding that Plaintiffs could be prejudiced by any variations between the reports of the two industrial psychologists. However, the undersigned finds that the order permitting "limited supplemental expert discovery,["] see Order (Document No. 752) at 1, presupposed that Defendant would not, though a successor industrial psychologist, seek to rely on additional opinions, opinions more thoroughly explained, and opinions based on additional authorities. Thus, the "limited supplemental expert discovery" for which the Court provided would be wholly inadequate in this circumstance.
Finally, the undersigned finds that the published opinions on which Defendant relies, see Defendant's Opposition at 8-9, are entirely inapplicable. None of the four is an opinion of a judge of this District. To the extent any of the opinions could even remotely be considered binding on this Court, it could only be with respect to the issue the Court determined in July 2013, i.e., that the Court had discretion to permit
In sum, the issue before the undersigned is not — as Defendant suggests — whether "[i]t is unreasonable to expect two different experts to either share the exact same opinions about the same data or to express those opinions in the exact same way." See Defendant's Opposition at 2. Rather, the issue before the undersigned is whether or not Defendant complied with the Court's order precluding the successor industrial psychologist from "expand[ing] beyond what the [first] expert said[.]" Status Hr'g Tr. 14. As to that issue, the undersigned finds that Defendant indeed failed to comply.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is, this 19th day of September, 2014,