LYNN J. BUSH, Senior Judge.
The court has before it plaintiffs' pro se complaint filed December 28, 2015. Because this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims, their suit must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). The reasons for this sua sponte dismissal are set forth below.
The complaint filed by Mr. Brown and Mr. Lipscomb is not easy to decipher. Although the general introduction to the complaint succinctly states that plaintiffs seek redress for "violation of [their] constitutional rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution," Compl. at 1, the remainder of the complaint presents an expansive set of factual allegations, seven separate counts, a request for several types of relief, and eight attachments.
Mr. Brown and Mr. Lipscomb are brothers, and Mr. Brown is the legal guardian of Mr. Lipscomb due to the latter's mental retardation. Compl. at 9. Difficulties in their living situation appear to be related to unemployment, loss of housing and the denial of various federal benefits. See id. at 1 ("This action seeks just compensation from the United States for property ([] Jobs, Housing and Social Security Benefits SSI/SSDI) taken from the Plaintiff. . . ."). There are also numerous references to the negative outcomes of previous litigation before federal courts. Because plaintiffs in this lawsuit may seek to collaterally attack the judgments of other federal courts, the court briefly reviews some of the litigation referenced in the complaint.
In early 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected an appeal brought by Mr. Brown regarding the "dismissal of his federal civil-rights lawsuit." Brown v. Charles T. Ryan, Ltd., 596 F. App'x 504, 504 (7th Cir. 2015). One of the defendants named in the suit was the "`Federal Reserve System.'" Id. The lawsuit brought by Mr. Brown alleged various constitutional rights violations and ADA violations related to a bankruptcy proceeding and the brothers' eviction from a condominium.
The March 12, 2015 decision of the Seventh Circuit is attached to plaintiffs' complaint. Compl. Att. A-1. Bankruptcy proceedings are discussed at length in the complaint.
The complaint also contains a lengthy discussion of criminal proceedings. Compl. at 5-6. The underlying charge against Mr. Brown was "making false statements under penalty of perjury in a bankruptcy case." United States v. Brown, No. 14-2524, 2015 WL 7292770, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 19, 2015). Mr. Brown pled guilty but later asserted that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Id. The Seventh Circuit disagreed and dismissed his appeal. Id. at *3.
The November 19, 2015 decision of the Seventh Circuit is attached to plaintiffs' complaint. Compl. Att. C-1 at 5-9. Mr. Brown's right to a speedy trial, and allegations of misconduct by the United States Department of Justice, are referenced in plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at 5-6. Thus, another set of plaintiffs' claims are focused on violations of Mr. Brown's rights in criminal proceedings.
Finally, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently dismissed Mr. Brown's suit against the director of the Social Security Administration (SSA). Brown v. Colvin, No. 15-C-1313 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2015) (unpublished order). The court noted that the SSA had denied Mr. Brown disability insurance benefits (SSDI) and supplemental security income (SSI). Id. at 1. Mr. Brown apparently failed to file a timely appeal of the final decision of an administrative law judge who considered Mr. Brown's application for SSA-administered benefits. Id. at 1-2. The district court therefore dismissed Mr. Brown's suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and also denied his motion for reconsideration of that dismissal. Id.
The December 3, 2015 decision of the district court is attached to the complaint. Compl. Att. D-2. That decision, and Mr. Brown's efforts to obtain judicial review of the actions of the Social Security Administration, are discussed in the complaint. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiffs have also attached a number of documents which illustrate Mr. Brown's interactions with the SSA. Compl. Att. A Group. It is clear from these documents that Mr. Brown has long contended that his constitutional rights were violated when the SSA denied him SSDI and SSI benefits. Id. Thus, the complaint appears to include claims that plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated by the SSA.
The court acknowledges that Mr. Brown and Mr. Lipscomb are proceeding pro se and are "not expected
In order to determine its jurisdiction over plaintiffs' suit, this court must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988). However, plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)), and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence, Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 748 (citations omitted). If subject matter jurisdiction is found to be lacking, this court must dismiss the action. RCFC 12(h)(3).
The Tucker Act delineates this court's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012), That statute "confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal Claims over the specified categories of actions brought against the United States." Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). These include money damages claims against the federal government founded upon the Constitution, an act of Congress, a regulation promulgated
The Tucker Act concurrently "waives the Government's sovereign immunity for those actions." Id. The statute does not, however, create a substantive cause of action or right to recover money damages in the Court of Federal Claims. Id. "[T]o come within the jurisdictional reach and the waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages." Id.
In other words, the source underlying the cause of action must be money-mandating, in that it "`can fairly
Plaintiffs allege that their loss of income and housing, the violation of Mr. Brown's right to a speedy trial, and the denial of Mr. Brown's application for SSDI and SSI benefits were the result of discrimination on the part of various federal agencies. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 18-19, 24, 27, 33-34, 36-37, 46, 62, 68-69, 73. The primary types of discrimination alleged in the complaint are racial discrimination and discrimination against persons with disabilities. Id. However, it is well established that this court cannot entertain claims for civil rights violations under various federal statutes such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 (2012). E.g., Jefferson v. United States, 104 Fed. CI. 81, 89 (2012) (citing cases). Nor can this court review allegations of discrimination against persons with disabilities under the authority of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 704-794e (2012). Searles v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 801, 805 (2009). Because this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs' discrimination claims, those claims must be dismissed.
The complaint identifies a number of federal agencies, as well as the "Federal Reserve System," and accuses these agencies of wrongful conduct. See Compl. at 1 (alleging that federal agencies such as the "United States [Bankruptcy] Trustee Program," the "Federal Reserve System[]," the "United States Social Security Administration," and the "United States Department of Justice" are responsible for harming plaintiffs); ¶ 9 (alleging that a bankruptcy trustee "failed to adhere to [his] statutory . . . duties"); ¶ 17 (alleging that the Federal Reserve System "failed to adhere to [its] statutory . . . duties"); ¶ 21 (alleging that the Department of Justice "failed to adhere to [its] statutory . . . duties"); ¶ 23 (alleging that the United States Public Defender Office was negligent); ¶ 64 (alleging generally that the United States is liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress upon plaintiffs). These allegations of wrongdoing and negligence are examples of tort claims. This court, however, cannot consider tort claims against federal agencies. E.g., Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). For this reason, plaintiffs' tort claims against federal agencies must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs cite to numerous federal statutes in addition to the ones discussed supra. The subject matter of these statutes varies and includes age discrimination, bankruptcy, access to credit, civil rights, homelessness, fair housing, subsidized housing, and the right to a speedy trial. Compl. ¶¶ 7-15, 21, 23, 30, 33-36, 40, 46, 62, 69, 71, 75-79. None of these statutes is money-mandating so as to support a claim within this court's jurisdiction. As discussed previously, the court cannot entertain such claims where no jurisdictional basis lies for the action. The court therefore must dismiss any and all claims based on the numerous federal statutes cited in plaintiffs' complaint.
The court also considers whether the complaint contains a takings claim. The general introduction to the complaint contains language that seemingly attempts to invoke the constitutional basis for a takings claim:
Compl. at 1. The court cannot construe the factual allegations of the complaint, however, to present a non-frivolous allegation of a taking of property for the use of the government. Cf. Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (to present a takings claim, the complaint must contain "a nonfrivolous allegation that [the plaintiff] is within the class of plaintiffs entitled to recover [from the United States] under [a] money-mandating source" of law).
Instead, plaintiffs allege, repeatedly, that federal agencies have acted arbitrarily and capriciously toward them in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Compl. ¶¶ 7-8, 12, 14-15, 17, 25. Plaintiffs cannot convert an APA claim into a takings claim by characterizing these administrative actions as the taking of plaintiffs' property. See Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Regardless of the characterization of the case ascribed by [a plaintiff] in its complaint, we look to the true nature of the action in determining the existence or not of jurisdiction.") (citations omitted). Here, plaintiffs have not identified a specific property right that was taken from them by the United States for public use.
Plaintiffs' complaint nowhere specifically states that Mr. Brown and Mr. Lipscomb seek review of the decisions of the Seventh Circuit or of the district court. To the extent, however, that the complaint implies that these federal courts erred in denying plaintiffs relief, this court is powerless to reverse or alter the outcome of those lawsuits. This court does not possess jurisdiction to review decisions of other federal courts. See, e.g., Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that "the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts"); Brown v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 795, 799 n.4 (2009) (stating that "this court is without authority to review decisions of other federal courts") (citations omitted). To the extent that plaintiffs' suit in this court attempts to collaterally attack other federal court decisions, any such claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, the court notes that plaintiffs seek injunctive relief from this court. Compl. at 15. This court does not possess equitable powers that could assist plaintiffs. E.g., Brown, 105 F.3d at 624 (citing United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1969)). For this reason, the court must also dismiss the request for injunctive relief presented in plaintiffs' complaint.
The court has considered all of the claims and sources of law cited in the complaint and construed them in a light most favorable to Mr. Brown and Mr. Lipscomb. This court lacks jurisdiction over all of plaintiffs' claims.
Accordingly, it is hereby
