STIPULATION AND ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDING TIME

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant BROOK BRUNING, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1) By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 6, 2014 at 9:00 a.m.

2) By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 13, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude time between February 6, 2014, and March 13, 2014, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3) The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The Government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes, to date, 524 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his respective client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, and to review discovery for this matter.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The Government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 24, 2013, and December 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4) Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.