ANN M. NEVINS, Bankruptcy Judge.
Before the court is the motion (the "Motion") filed by the defendant, Laurelhart Condominium Association, Inc. ("Laurelhart") seeking summary judgment as to Counts Three and Four of the amended complaint filed by the pro se plaintiff, Alyssa Peterson ("Ms. Peterson").
Familiarity with the parties' long and contentious history is assumed as set forth in the court's Ruling and Order After Evidentiary Hearing on Motion For Relief From Stay (the "2018 Relief Ruling") entered on March 2, 2018 in Ms. Peterson's main Chapter 13 case. See ECF No. 577. From the long history, the following is particularly relevant for the consideration of Laurelhart's Motion.
Ms. Peterson owns two condominium units referred to throughout this case as Unit B-3 and Unit G-7, located within the Laurelhart condominiums at 232 Farmington Avenue in Hartford, Connecticut. Prior to the filing of this Chapter 13 case, Laurelhart commenced two foreclosure actions against Ms. Peterson for alleged default in payment of common charges and late fees for Units B-3 and G-7. See Laurelhart Condominium Association, Inc. v. Alyssa Peterson, Docket Nos. HHD-CV09-5031917-S and HHD-CV09-5031918-S ("State Court Foreclosures").
On October 5, 2010, Ms. Peterson, proceeding pro se, commenced a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy case ("Petition Date"). Thereafter, on May 12, 2011, Laurelhart appeared through counsel, Howard S. Rosenberg, Esq. ("Attorney Rosenberg"), and filed a motion seeking relief from the automatic stay ("First Motion for Relief") to proceed with its State Court Foreclosures. ECF No. 108. The First Motion for Relief alleged that Ms. Peterson had failed to make post-petition payments. ECF No. 108. The hearing was marked "off" by the court on June 30, 2011, indicating it was no longer a pending motion having been withdrawn.
About six months later, in January of 2012, Laurelhart filed a second motion seeking relief from stay ("Second Motion for Relief") alleging that post-petition payments were not being made. ECF No. 147. Ms. Peterson objected to the Second Motion for Relief alleging that roof leaks caused by Laurelhart existed, and, as a result, she withheld the common charges due. ECF No. 152. Ms. Peterson also alleged that she made a payment of $1,624.00 to Laurelhart on January 8, 2012. ECF No. 152, P. 2. After a hearing, the court (Dabrowski, J.) granted the Second Motion for Relief by order dated March 20, 2012.
Almost one year later, on March 8, 2013, the court confirmed Ms. Peterson's Fifth Amended Chapter 13 Plan ("5
Prior to the confirmation of Ms. Peterson's 5
Approximately a year and a half after the April 4, 2013 hearing, Laurelhart requested a hearing regarding its Third Motion for Relief alleging that all repairs had been made to Unit G-7 and that no post-petition payments on either Unit had been made since the April 4th hearing. ECF No. 303. After a hearing on October 16, 2014, the court (Dabrowski, J.) granted Laurelhart's Third Motion for Relief as to both Units B-3 and G-7. ECF No. 306. The court notes there is no audio record of this hearing available. Ms. Peterson has maintained she had inadequate notice of the hearing and did not appear.
About three months after the court granted the Third Motion for Relief, on January 16, 2015, Ms. Peterson commenced this adversary proceeding against Laurelhart. AP-ECF No. 1. After the commencement of this adversary proceeding, on June 29, 2015, the court, issued an order in Ms. Peterson's Chapter 13 case re-imposing the automatic stay ("Order Reimposing Stay") as it applied to Laurelhart and the State Court Foreclosures. ECF No. 349. Approximately three months later, Ms. Peterson amended her complaint ("Complaint") in this adversary proceeding. AP-ECF No. 50. In considering the Complaint, the court notes that, it is well-established that "pro se complaints `must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants); Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005)("pro se litigants . . . cannot be expected to know all of the legal theories on which they might ultimately recover. It is enough that they allege that they were injured, and that their allegations can conceivably give rise to a viable claim.").
In Count One of her Complaint, Ms. Peterson requested the court enter an order determining Laurelhart's State Court Foreclosures moot due to payment by the Chapter 13 Trustee.
Only Counts Three and Four remain pending. Count Three seeks injunctive relief asserting Laurelhart has knowingly caused harm by failing to properly repair the leaking roof of Ms. Peterson's Unit G-7. AP-ECF No. 50. Count Four is not a model of clarity. Considering the complaint broadly as it must, the court interprets Court Four as asserting a claim for damages from an alleged violation of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) by Laurelhart. AP-ECF No. 50. Ms. Peterson alleges that Laurelhart provided false information to the Bankruptcy Court resulting in an order granting relief from the automatic stay entering that allowed Laurelhart to proceed with its State Court Foreclosures. AP-ECF No. 50, ¶¶ 55-58. Ms. Peterson alleges that it was improper for Laurelhart to obtain relief from the automatic stay and that proceeding with the State Court Foreclosures after the entry of the order constitutes a violation of the automatic stay. AP-ECF No. 50, ¶¶ 55-58.
On November 6, 2015, Laurelhart filed an answer denying the substantive aspects of Ms. Peterson's allegations and asserting six affirmative defenses. AP-ECF No. 51. Thereafter, on March 15, 2016, Laurelhart filed the instant Motion seeking summary judgment as to Counts Two, Three, and Four of the Complaint.
Following the entry of the Order Reimposing Stay, in November of 2015, Laurelhart filed a motion for relief from stay ("Fourth Motion for Relief") alleging that Ms. Peterson had failed to tender any payment since November 5, 2014. ECF No. 383. On March 2, 2018, after five days of oral argument and testimony, the court entered the 2018 Relief Ruling. ECF No. 577. The 2018 Relief Ruling determined that Ms. Peterson had cured Laurelhart's pre-petition claim in full but directed Ms. Peterson to pay Laurelhart a sum by a date certain, or the automatic stay would automatically terminate. ECF No. 577. On March 23, 2018, the court denied Ms. Peterson's motion for reconsideration of the 2018 Relief Ruling. See ECF Nos. 585, 590. Ms. Peterson did not appeal the 2018 Relief Ruling. On May 8, 2018, Laurelhart filed a notice indicating that the automatic stay terminated because Ms. Peterson failed to tender payment as directed by the 2018 Relief Ruling. ECF No. 617.
Recently, on June 6, 2018, the court issued an Order denying Ms. Peterson's motion entitled `Motion for Extension of Time for Discharge' noting the expiration of the sixty (60) month term of her 5
The principles governing the court's review of a motion for summary judgment are well established. Summary judgment may be granted only if, "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7056. The court's role at the summary judgment stage is to determine if there are material facts in dispute warranting a trial. In the absence of disputed material facts, the court must determine if a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Of course, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party who opposes the motion for summary judgment and then decide if those facts would be enough—if eventually proved at trial—to allow a factfinder to decide the case in favor of the opposing party. In essence, a "judge's function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Laurelhart asserts the court should deem all facts set forth in Laurelhart's 56(a)(1) Statement admitted because Ms. Peterson failed to comply with D.Conn.L.Civ.R. 56(a)(2).
Laurelhart complied by filing a 56(a)(1) Statement and sending the Notice to Pro Se Litigant, however Ms. Peterson failed to comply with these rules by neglecting to file a 56(a)(2) statement. Although Ms. Peterson's failure to comply with the Local Rules alone could form a basis to grant Laurelhart's motion, her memorandum in opposition will be considered.
In Count Three, Ms. Peterson seeks an injunction against Laurelhart pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541, prohibiting it from continuing with its State Court Foreclosures due to the alleged failure to repair a leaking roof in Unit G-7. AP-ECF No. 50. Injunctive Relief is unwarranted for several reasons. First, § 541 creates the bankruptcy estate and defines the scope of property included in the estate. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 541.01 (16th). Section 541 does not form a statutory basis for injunctive relief.
Additionally, injunctive relief is unwarranted because Ms. Peterson has not demonstrated immediate or irreparable harm.
Lastly, but most importantly, even if Ms. Peterson was able to satisfy the requirements for an injunction, that request is moot.
In Count Four, Ms. Peterson alleges that Laurelhart filed false or misleading information with the court to obtain relief from the automatic stay causing her harm. AP-ECF No. 50, ¶ 56. Additionally, Ms. Peterson alleges that Laurelhart violated the automatic stay by proceeding — after the entry of an Order granting relief from stay — with its State Court Foreclosures. AP-ECF No. 50, ¶ 57-59. This Count fails for several reasons. First, even if Laurelhart presented false information during the court's consideration of its Third Motion for Relief — as to which Ms. Peterson failed to submit admissible evidence of in her opposition to Laurelhart's summary judgment showing a genuine issue of material fact — Ms. Peterson's remedy for the submission of false information was not to commence an adversary proceeding against Laurelhart, but to challenge the court's Order granting relief. However, Ms. Peterson did not request reconsideration or an order vacating the Order granting Laurelhart's Third Motion for Relief.
To the extent that Ms. Peterson alleges that Laurelhart violated the automatic stay by proceeding with its State Court Foreclosures, that claim fails as a matter of law. It is undisputed that the court granted Laurelhart's Third Motion for Relief. Despite Ms. Peterson's claim that Laurelhart obtained the Order improperly, it was nonetheless an order of the court granting relief from the automatic stay. Hence, Laurelhart was allowed to proceed with its State Court Foreclosure and no violation of the automatic stay can result from Laurelhart's conduct. Again, Ms. Peterson's remedy for alleged improprieties in the issuance of the Order was to seek the court reconsider or vacate its Order, not to commence an action for an alleged violation of the automatic stay against Laurelhart.
Additionally, the court notes that after the entry of the Order granting the Third Motion for Relief, on June 29, 2015, the court, sua sponte, re-imposed the stay as to Laurelhart. See Order Reimposing Stay, ECF No. 349. No judgment of foreclosure had entered in Laurelhart's State Court Foreclosures prior to the re-imposition of the stay. Further, no judgment ever entered because in March of 2017, Laurelhart withdrew its State Court Foreclosures. Ms. Peterson's opposition to summary judgment fails to identify or provide any admissible evidence that Laurelhart provided false information to obtain relief from stay or that she suffered any harm from its actions. The court also notes that recently, in May of 2018, the stay terminated as to Laurelhart pursuant to the 2018 Relief Ruling. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact necessitating a trial, the court concludes that Count Four must fail and summary judgment shall enter in favor of Laurelhart.
The court has considered all other arguments presented by Ms. Peterson in opposition to Laurelhart's motion for summary judgment and finds them meritless. For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Laurelhart's motion for summary judgment, AP-ECF No. 58, regarding Counts Three and Four of Ms. Peterson's Complaint is GRANTED.
