GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor.
This matter involves access over and maintenance of roads and use of a parking area in The Plantations. The Plantations is an attractive and well-maintained condominium and housing development, located just south of the community of Belltown, Delaware, a few miles west of Lewes.
In creating the Recreation Area, however, Crown Estates failed to reserve an express easement to the public road. Thus, when the owners of the Recreation Area and customers of the health facility access the property, they must do so over lands owned by Defendants The Plantations Owners Association, Inc. (the "Owners Association"), and The Plantation Condominium Association, Inc. (the "Condominium Association," and together with the Owners Association, the "Associations"). The Associations own and maintain the common areas of The Plantations, including the roads and parking areas. Most of the customers of the health facility are not owners of property in The Plantations.
The Recreation Area, which is still in use as a health facility, has been sold and is now owned by the Plaintiff, Sandie, LLC ("Sandie"). In the past, the Associations and the owners of the Recreation Area have been able to come to terms on an agreement for access by the owners and their customers to facilities constructed on the Recreation Area as well as to an adjacent parking lot and storage shed on the property. Sandie and the Associations have been unable to reach such an agreement, however. Sandie brought this action, seeking to establish that an easement exists in its favor over the roads of the Associations and for use of a parking lot adjacent to the Recreation Area. Sandie also asserts that it is under no obligation to contribute to the upkeep of the property over which it claims an easement. In support of its claim, Sandie relies heavily on a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for The Plantations (the "Declaration"), which Crown Estates filed contemporaneously with the initial plots that subdivided The Plantations. The Declaration is, in parts, poorly drafted and unclear. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, which have been briefed and argued. This is my decision on those motions.
The Defendants, the Owners Association and the Condominium Association, are not-for-profit Delaware corporations that manage and administer the homeowners and condominium associations, and their respective properties, within The Plantations.
The Plantations also includes a parcel of property known as the "Recreation Area," which is owned by the Plaintiff, Sandie. The parties' property was part of a larger tract of land purchased by Crown Estates, the original developer, in July 1984 (the "Property"). Through a series of transactions following the subdivision of the Property, the Plaintiff came to own the Recreation Area, which now offers such recreational activities as tennis, fitness, swimming, and yoga.
When Crown Estates divided the Property, it retained ownership of the Recreation Area. Thus, rather than making the Recreation Area a common element to be controlled and operated by the Associations, Crown Estates chose to establish it as a standalone commercial enterprise. When it subdivided the Property, Crown Estates failed to reserve for the owner of the Recreation Area an easement for access to a public road. Presently, the only means of such access is Plantations Boulevard, a private road owned by the Associations.
Adjacent to the Recreation Area are additional lanes and a parking lot over which the Plaintiff claims an easement. One lane runs along the north side of the Recreation Area and connects Plantations Boulevard, which terminates in a circle in front of the Recreation Area, with a parking lot on the rear portion of the Recreation Area (the "North Lane"). The North Lane is currently the only means by which vehicles can access the rear parking lot of the Recreation Area (the "Rear Lot"). Though a row of parking spaces abuts the front of the Recreation Area clubhouse, the Rear Lot contains the bulk of the parking spaces on the Plaintiff's property. East of and adjacent to the Plaintiff's property lies a larger parking lot owned by the Associations (the "Front Lot"). From the south end of the Front Lot runs a short paved road (the "Storage Lane") that leads to the main doors of a storage building located in the Recreation Area (the "Storage Shed"). The Storage Lane lies entirely on the Defendants' property, but appears to serve no purpose other than to provide vehicular access to the Storage Shed, which is located entirely on the Plaintiff's property. The Recreation Area's northern property line, by contrast, runs more or less directly down the center of the North Lane, rendering that lane practically unusable absent easement rights or agreement between the Associations and the owner of the Recreation Area.
On July 20, 1984, Crown Estates acquired the Property, approximately 154.59 acres along County Road No. 275 in Lewes & Rehoboth Hundred, Sussex County, Delaware. On April 24, 1986, Sussex County approved a site plan for the Property, and on December 12, 1986, Crown Estates recorded plots with the Sussex County Recorder of Deeds (the "Initial Plots"). The Initial Plots divided the Property into six areas: Phase 1, Phase 2,
On the same day that it recorded the Initial Plots and subjected Phase 1 to condominium ownership, Crown Estates recorded the Declaration. The Declaration sets forth restrictive covenants and conditions intended to govern the relationship between the developer of The Plantations and the Associations. The Plaintiff argues that the Declaration demonstrates Crown Estates' intent with respect to the easement right of the owner of the Recreation Area over Plantations Boulevard.
The preamble to the Declaration suggests a development plan that never came to pass. It provides that Crown Estates "will retain fee simple interest in . . . [the Recreation Area], which it desires to develop for recreational purposes for the benefit of the Property
The preamble is inconsistent with the ownership scheme ultimately realized.
Despite the preamble's suggestion that a relationship more substantial than one of adjacency would exist going forward between the Owners Association and the Recreation Area owner, several provisions in the remainder of the Declaration contradict that suggestion. For instance, Article III, Section 2(A) states that Crown Estates "intends to convey the legal title to the [Recreation Area] to RECREATION INTERNATIONAL, INC. . . . which will be the operating entity of the recreational facilities," while the preamble indicates that the to-be-created Owners Association would "maintain[ ] and administer[ ]" the Recreation Area.
Article III establishes the Homeowners' "Property Rights" in the Recreation Area. Section 1, purporting to establish "Owners' Easements of Enjoyment," provides that, "[s]ubject to the provisions of Section 3 of this Article III, every [Homeowner] upon payment of fees established by [Crown Estates] shall have a right of enjoyment in and to the [Recreation Area] and the recreational facilities thereon, and such easement shall be appurtenant to and shall pass with the title to every condominium unit, lot or improvement thereon."
Article IV establishes the Associations' rights to levy and collect assessments from the Homeowners. Article IV, Section 2 sets forth the purpose of these assessments:
Section 1 of Article IV makes clear that it is the Homeowners who are obligated by the Declaration to pay the assessments.
Neither, however, does the Declaration expressly grant the owner of the Recreation Area an easement over the roads or other property of The Plantations.
The parties agree that the Plaintiff is not a unit or lot owner and is not a member of the Associations under the terms of the Declaration, and that therefore the language in Article V, Section 2, does not expressly grant the Plaintiff easement rights.
Article VII provides that "[t]he Restrictions, Covenants and Conditions of [the] Declaration run with and bind the Property and shall inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by the Association, or the owner of any unit or parcel subject to [the] Declaration . . . ."
The parties agree that under the terms of the Declaration, Sandie, as owner of the Recreation Area, is neither the holder of an express easement over the private roads of The Plantations (as are the Homeowners) nor subject to the annual and special assessments by the Associations (as are the Homeowners).
The history of the transfers of the common areas, the Recreation Area, and the undeveloped portions of The Plantations, to the best of my ability to decipher an unclear record, is as follows. On August 14, 1987, Crown Estates deeded the Recreation Area to Recreation International, Inc. ("Recreation International"), a Delaware corporation it owned. The survey calls in the deed describe the property line of the Recreation Area running "to the center of a road."
On September 21, 1989, Crown Estates conveyed the undeveloped portions of Phases 1 and 2 to The 1600 Limited Partnership ("1600 LP"), an entity unaffiliated with Crown Estates. Simultaneous with that conveyance, Recreation International and the Associations conveyed the Recreation Area to YMG Recreation Corporation ("YMG"), an entity affiliated with 1600 LP.
At this time, the administration and management of the Owners' Association worked to fulfill the objectives of the Declaration by managing both the Recreation Area and the common elements of The Plantations. This was feasible because, just as was the case under the tenure of Crown Estates, the entities that owned the Recreation Area and the common elements—YMG and 1600 LP, respectively— had a common owner. Nonetheless, the residents of The Plantations were not represented on the board of the Owners Association. In 1991, the residents of The Plantations organized the Plantations Civic Association, seeking a unified means of communicating with 1600 LP, the entity responsible for assessing fees under the Declaration. In January 1999, the residents assumed control of the Defendant Owners Association and Condominium Association, owners of the common areas including the private roads of The Plantations.
YMG conveyed the Recreation Area to the Plaintiff on December 19, 2007. In August 2008, the parties reached an initial agreement whereby Sandie would pay the Associations a monthly fee of $1200 for use of the roads of The Plantations and the Front Lot. This fee covered general road maintenance and groundskeeping on land owned by the Associations. In 2009, the parties renegotiated their agreement and entered a new one-year agreement raising the monthly contribution to $1650. In 2010, however, the parties' attempts to reach a new agreement failed. Sandie refused to pay any amount for general groundskeeping or road maintenance and balked at the Associations' attempt to allocate to Sandie 36% of these annual expenses. Sandie also objected to the Associations' seeking a permanent easement agreement. Sandie sent a check for $300 to the Associations, purportedly offering that amount as a monthly payment for use of the Front Lot. The Associations refused to negotiate an agreement related only to use of the Front Lot, however, and returned the check. When the parties' negotiations regarding Sandie's contribution obligations fell through, the Associations barricaded the Front Lot.
In response to the barricading of the Front Lot, Sandie filed its Verified Complaint ("Complaint") in this action, seeking (1) a preliminary injunction ordering the removal of the barricade; (2) enforcement of the Plaintiff's rights under the Declaration; (3) enforcement of an implied easement, as an alternative to Count II; (4) damages for intentional interference with business relations;
The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment on three issues: (1) whether the Plaintiff is obligated to contribute to the maintenance of Plantations Boulevard, over which it has an implied easement; (2) whether the Plaintiff has easement rights over the Front Lot, North Lane, or Storage Lane; (3) whether the Plaintiff and its customers have an easement right to use the Front Lot for parking purposes; and (4) whether the Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees.
This Court will grant a party's motion for summary judgment where the record reflects that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Here, the parties submit that no genuine issue of fact exists that is material to the disposition of their cross motions for summary judgment. Moreover, the parties have represented to the Court that further opportunity to develop the facts of this case beyond the extant record would be fruitless. The parties nonetheless agree that, should I find an obligation on the part of the Plaintiff to contribute to the maintenance of any property burdened by an easement, the extent of that obligation is a factual issue requiring further proceedings or agreement between the parties.
The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the Plaintiff has easement rights over the roadways providing access to the Rear Lot and the Storage Shed (i.e., the North Lane, the Front Lot, and the Storage Lane). As to Plantations Boulevard, the parties do not dispute that the Plaintiff has an implied easement of access, be it one of necessity or through a quasi-easement or otherwise, over that road. Rather, they dispute whether the implied terms of the easement obligate the Plaintiff to contribute to the maintenance of Plantations Boulevard. The Plaintiff has additionally moved for summary judgment on the issue of attorneys' fees. I address these issues below.
The Recreation Area is occupied by structures in such a way that the Storage Shed and the Rear Lot can be accessed by vehicles only over the private roads of The Plantations. The roads in question lie adjacent to and in some areas partly upon the Recreation Area property. They include the North Lane, the Storage Lane, and a lane running across the Front Lot.
The parties have argued whether an implied easement, by way of a quasi-easement, exists over the private roads within The Plantations providing access to these portions of the Recreation Area. A quasi-easement exists when a single owner uses one of his properties to benefit another, and is a "quasi" easement in the sense that because easements merge with title, a common owner cannot own an actual easement in his own property.
An easement can generally be created by express grant or reservation, by implication, or by prescription.
The parties agree that the Defendant has an implied easement over Plantations Boulevard. The remaining issue is to what extent the Plaintiff and its customers may use the other private roads adjacent to and in some areas lying upon the Recreation Area that provide the only practical access to the Rear Lot and the Storage Shed. The answer to that question, as with any implied easement, involves an ascertainment of intent.
Delaware courts have long recognized that circumstances may imply an easement over the private roads in a development, in favor of property sold by the developer bounded by those roads, despite the lack of an express easement. In Betley v. Gordy Construction Co.,
Similarly, in Tindall v. Corbi,
The rationale of Tindall is applicable here. The parties agree that an easement over the roadways of The Plantations exists, at least sufficient to give Sandie and its employees and customers access between the public road and the Recreation Area. The deed refers to "a road" as a boundary, and the evidence makes it clear that that road is Plantations Boulevard. In fact, the fee of the Recreation Area includes a portion of Plantations Boulevard. From the time the Recreation Area was built out by the common owner, when conveyed to Sandie, and at present, the only access to the Rear Lot and the Storage Shed was over the private roadways of The Plantations, by traversing the North Lane and the Front Lot and Storage Lane, respectively. It is apparent that the locations of these roads, in consideration of the layout of the existing structures on the Recreation Area, were intended to provide the owner of the Recreation Area with a means of vehicular access to the portions of the Recreation Area to which these roadways run, namely, the Rear Lot and the Storage Shed.
What remains is what contribution, if any, the Plaintiff must make to the maintenance of the roadways. I find nothing in the Declaration that addresses this question. The Plaintiff points to language in the Declaration that confers on the Associations the right to extract dues from Homeowners, and that requires that those levies be used "exclusively" for purposes that include maintenance of the common areas, including the private roads burdened by the easement in favor of the Recreation Area, as described above. The Plaintiff argues that this language places the burden of maintenance on the Associations "exclusively." The Plaintiff simply misreads the document: the Associations must use funds levied "exclusively" for maintenance—that is, they cannot use the funds for other purposes—but nothing in the language says that the levies must be the exclusive source of funds to be used for maintenance. The documents in evidence are silent as to this issue.
In equity, those entitled to use land subject to an easement jointly have obligations for maintenance proportional to their use.
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that it has a right for its customers to park, while using Plaintiff's facility, not just in the Rear Lot located in the Recreation Area but in the Front Lot, which is located entirely on land belonging to the Defendants. The Plaintiff points to a photograph showing that the Recreation Area was constructed, along with the Front Lot, at a time when the adjacent residential areas were incomplete. The Plaintiff attempts to deduce the year this photograph was taken by reference to numerous deeds, satellite images, and plot plans, which, when reviewed together, purportedly establish the Plaintiff's right arising in quasi-easement to use the lot. But the circumstances here do not lend themselves to establishment of rights in quasi-easement. As described above, a quasi-easement arises when a single owner uses one part of his property to the benefit of another part. That quasi-easement is converted to an implied easement when the original owner divides the property into separate parcels in such a way that it is clear on inspection of the land that one parcel is impressed with indicia of use in favor of the other, as when a driveway passes over one parcel to a house on the second. In such a case, an implied easement burdens the first parcel, despite the fact that no express easement was reserved.
In the instant case, in contrast, a developer reserved one portion of the development, the Recreation Area, for a commercial purpose; built infrastructure that served the development, including the Recreation Area, in an order determined, presumably, by reasons and purposes of the developer's own, and at any rate for purposes that the record does not disclose; transferred the Recreation Area to entities he controlled, and ultimately to the Plaintiff; and eventually transferred the common areas to the Defendant homeowners associations. The Defendants did not "purchase" the Front Lot subject to an apparent easement in favor of the Recreational Area, and the theory of quasi-easement is simply inapplicable. In any event, the Front Lot is as likely to have been created for the benefit of The Plantations' homeowners as for the general public wishing to use the Recreation Area. The developer could have reserved the fee of the Front Lot to the Recreation Area, just as he did the area occupied by the Rear Lot. Far from demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that an implied easement exists, the record is devoid of evidence establishing an easement for the Plaintiff's employees and customers to park in the Front Lot. Of course, the Defendants are free to grant a license to the Plaintiff for the use of the lot, as part of a settlement of the remaining issues in this litigation.
Under the American Rule, each party must bear its own litigation costs, regardless of who prevails.
The Plaintiff has established an easement to use the private roadways of The Plantations in connection with its business. It has failed to demonstrate an easement for parking purposes in the Front Lot. The question of the extent of the Plaintiff's maintenance obligations in connection with the easement awaits further factual development or settlement. For the reasons above, each party's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. The parties should submit a document to be recorded with the Sussex County Recorder of Deeds describing the easement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Shpak v. Oletsky, 373 A.2d 1234, 1240 (Md. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, 3 THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 781 (3d ed. 1939)).
