MICHAEL H. WATSON, District Judge.
The United States of America ("Plaintiff") brings this action to collect from Launce B. Kramer ("Launce"),
The standard governing summary judgment is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), which provides: "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The Court must grant summary judgment if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 509 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2007).
When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, who must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial, and the Court must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dept. of Children and Family Serv., 640 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 2011). The Court disregards all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury would not be required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Banks, No. 2:08-cv-638, 2010 WL 3365922, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff submitted a declaration from IRS Revenue Officer Elizabeth Granados ("Granados"), Granados Decl., ECF No. 33-3, and various IRS transcripts for the pertinent tax periods, Trans., ECF Nos. 33-4-33-14. In her declaration, Granados states that she has reviewed the IRS's records of Defendants, that her statements are based on her review of the records, and that the filed transcripts reflect the assessments made against Defendants. Granados Decl. ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 33-3. She also certifies that the transcripts are true and correct copies of IRS's official records. Id. ¶ 2.
She further states that the records show that on the following dates, a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States made the following assessments against Launce for unpaid federal income taxes, penalties, and interest for the following taxable years, in the following amounts, with the following balances due (with accrual and costs), as of December 1, 2015:
Granados Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 33-3.
Additionally, Granados states that the records show that on the following dates, a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States made the following assessments against Launce and Carmen for unpaid federal income taxes, penalties, and interest for the following taxable years, in the following amounts, with the following balances due (with accrual and costs), as of December 1, 2015:
Id. ¶ 4.
With respect to the 26 U.S.C. § 6702 penalties, Granados states that a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States made the following assessments against Launce for the following taxable years, in the following amounts, with the following balances due (with accrual and costs) as of December 1, 2015:
Id. ¶ 5.
Granados also declares that the records reveal that a delegate of the Secretary of Treasury issued notices of the liabilities described above, and made demands for payment of the same, to Launce and Carmen, who have failed to fully pay the liabilities. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. Finally, she declares the records show that after the application of all abatements, payments, credits, accruals, and costs, Launce remains individually liable for a total of $182,605.80, plus interest from and after December 1, 2015, and Launce and Carmen remain jointly and severally liable for a total of $73,956.30, plus interest from and after December 1, 2015. Id.
Defendants, who appear to be part of the "sovereign citizen" movement, offer no evidence in response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Rather, Defendants argue this Court lacks jurisdiction over the case and that the Court should not grant summary judgment for Plaintiff based on the declaration and transcripts because Plaintiff has failed to file either Forms 23-C summary records or Forms 4340 Certificates of Assessments and Payments. Moreover, Defendants' "amended response" to Plaintiff's summary judgment motion, ECF No. 52, is untimely, and the Court does not consider it.
The Court rejects Defendants' jurisdictional challenge. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340, 1345 and 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402, 7403. Defendants argue that federal district courts such as this one have jurisdiction only over cases arising in territory that belongs to the United States (the District of Columbia) and that Washington County, Ohio, does not belong to the United States. That argument is based on Defendants' contention that this Court is an Article IV court, rather than an Article III court. Defendants' contention that this Court is not an Article III court is baseless, United States v. Cerna, Nos. 94-1433, 94-1437, 1994 WL 542757, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 4, 1994) ("Even though Congress created both the federal district and appellate courts through legislation, they are Article III courts under the Constitution because they were created under that article's mandate."), and Defendants' citation to Article IV, Section 3, clause 2 of the United States Constitution as the basis of this Court's jurisdiction is incorrect. Defendants need not reside in the District of Columbia in order for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over this case. Cf. United States v. Mundt, 29 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[D]efendant argues that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over him because he is solely a resident of the State of Michigan and not a resident of any `federal zone' and is therefore not subject to federal income tax laws. This argument is completely without merit and patently frivolous.").
Additionally, Defendants have not met their burden of refuting the validity of the assessment. Defendants contend that the Court cannot be sure that the assessment is valid because Plaintiff has failed to file either Forms 23-C summary records or Forms 4340 Certificates of Assessments and Payments.
"[T]he summary record and certificate of assessments and payments prepared by the IRS are adequate to establish a nexus between the plaintiffs and the underlying assessments. . . ." Gentry v. United States, 962 F.2d 555, 558 (6th Cir. 1992). That they are adequate does not mean that they are necessary, however, and this Court has granted summary judgment to the United States in another case on the basis of the same type of evidence presented here. See United States v. Banks, 2:08-cv-638, 2010 WL 3365922, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2010). Other courts have also granted summary or default judgment to the government based on similar evidence. E.g, United States v. Novelli, Case No. SA CV 14-0018-DOC (AN), 2016 WL 6995356, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug 30, 2016) ("Plaintiff has provided account transcripts showing a series of tax assessments were made beginning January 5, 2004 and provided an affidavit from an internal revenue agent certifying the transcripts are correct. . . . These transcripts and declarations provide a sufficient evidentiary foundation."); United States v. Belzner, Civil No. WDQ-13-2414, 2014 WL 1344187, at *3 (D. Md. April 3, 2014) ("[t]he Government has supported its motion [for default judgment] . . . with the Strong declaration, Certificates of Official Record (Form 2866), and IRS Account Transcripts. Accordingly, the Government has supported its claim for unpaid federal income taxes, penalties, and statutory interest. . . ." (citations omitted)), R&R adopted by 2014 WL 2153938; United States v. Goodman, 527 F. App'x 697, 699 (10th Cir. 2013) (sworn declaration by IRS revenue officer and IRS Transcripts sufficient to establish Government's prima facie case); United States v. Bennett, No. 8:09-CV-1952-T-27-TGW, 2011 WL 7090744, at *2 (M.D. Fl. June 7, 2011) ("Transcripts of account that identify the taxpayer by name, address and social security number, specify that the tax liability pertains to federal income tax payments, identify each tax year for which a liability has been assessed, and provide the date and amount of each assessment, payment, credit, penalty and accrued interest satisfy the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 6203 and 26 C.F.R. § 301.6203-1. A transcript of account that is authenticated and signed by a IRS officer who certifies that the transcript is a `true literal Transcript of Account showing assessments and payments' for the taxpayer for each relevant tax year, it is evidence of the fact and amount of the assessment." (citations omitted)); United States v. Henry, No. 8:09-cv-1963-JDW-TBM, 2010 WL 299249, at *2 (M.D. Fl. Jan. 21, 2010) (accepting declaration of IRS officer and Account Transcripts as sufficient to prove Government's prima facie case that tax assessments were valid and enforceable); Shelter Mut. Ins. v. Gregory, 555 F.Supp.2d 922, 932 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) ("[C]ourts have routinely determined the validity of tax assessments based on certified transcripts reflecting the same assessments." (citations omitted)); United States v. Guerriero, No. Civ. A. 04-3958(MLC), 2006 WL 231599, at *2 (D. N.J. Jan. 30, 2006) ("The United States has submitted the declaration of . . . a Technical Services Advisor for the IRS, to attest to the assessments listed supra. Accompanying his declaration are copies of the "literal transcripts" itemizing the tax assessments for the various years. Thus, the United States has met its burden of demonstrating prima facie entitlement to summary judgment in its favor." (citations omitted)). This Court likewise finds that the evidence presented by Plaintiff is sufficient to establish its prima facie case, and Defendants offer no evidence to refute the validity of the assessments at issue.
Finally, Defendants contest the IRS's "assessment authority," arguing that 26 U.S.C. § 6201 authorizes the Secretary to assess only taxes that are "duly paid by stamp." This argument is not well taken. 26 U.S.C. § 6201 authorizes and requires the Secretary to "make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes . . . imposed by this title, or accruing under any former internal revenue law, which have not been duly paid by stamp at the time and in the manner provided by law." The assessment authority specifically extends to taxes determined on a tax return. 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a)(1). The plain language of the reference to taxes duly paid by stamp is an exception to the taxes that can be assessed — the Secretary cannot assess taxes which have been duly paid by stamp. Defendants' argument to the contrary has been rejected. See In re Myrland, 209 B.R. 524, 526 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1997) ("[T]he argument that 26 U.S.C. § 6201 allows assessment only of taxes payable by stamp is a strained construction of the statutory language, unsupported by authority. . . .").
Because the declaration and transcripts offered by Plaintiff are sufficient to establish its prima facie case, and because Defendants have not rebutted the validity of the assessment with any evidence, the Court
Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to enforce its liens against Defendants' property located at 1281 East Fork Road, Lower Salem, OH 45745 ("the Property"), described more fully in the Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit 14, through a judicial sale of the Property.
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." 26 U.S.C. § 6321.
Further,
26 U.S.C. § 7403. Once such a case has been filed, and any person who has a lien or claims an interest in the property is made a party thereto,
26 U.S.C. § 7403(c).
Pursuant to §§ 6321 and 7403, liens in the amounts and for the tax years described above have attached to Defendants' respective interests in the Property.
Defendants granted nominal defendant Triad Hunter, LLC a leasehold interest in the Property on February 5, 2014, which interest was recorded with the Recorder of Washington County on March 14, 2014. Ex. 20. Plaintiff represents that Triad Hunter, LLC does not oppose Plaintiff's motion. Mot., ECF No. 33. Moreover, Plaintiff represents that the State of Ohio Department of Taxation does not oppose Plaintiff's motion. Id. Washington County has not responded to the motion.
For the reasons addressed above, the Court finds Plaintiff's motion for judicial sale well taken and
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is
The Court
