MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT E. WIER, Magistrate Judge.

Brookstone Development, Ltd., Inc.; Brookstone Development Pty., Ltd.;1 Great Lakes Geophysical, LLLP; and Riverside Equities, LLC (collectively, Movants) request quashal of three issued subpoenas. DE #2623 (Motion to Quash).2 Plaintiffs West Hills Farms, LLC; MacDonald Stables, LLC; Arbor Farms, LLC; Jaswinder Grover; and Monica Grover (collectively, Plaintiffs) responded in opposition. DE #2624 (Response). Movants replied. DE #2625 (Reply). The matter is fully briefed and ripe for consideration.3 The subpoenas demand compliance in Louisville, Kentucky, and Mount Pleasant, Michigan. See DE ##2620-1, 2621-1, 2622-1. A motion to quash is properly directed, at least initially, to the "court for the district where compliance is required[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3); see also, e.g., Green v. Cosby, 314 F.R.D. 164, 167 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (holding motion to quash was "properly filed" in E.D. Pa. although a Massachusetts court issued the subpoena).4 The Eastern District of Kentucky is not the district where compliance is required concerning these three subpoenas.5 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Movants' quashal effort for want of jurisdiction but nevertheless provides the following guidance on the substantive issues.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The involved parties here present a post-judgment discovery dispute to the Court. See DE ##2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2351 (Judgments); see also In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litig., 823 F.Supp.2d 599 (E.D. Ky. 2011), aff'd, 727 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2013). Broadly speaking, this multi-district litigation matter, which has required Court attention for more than a decade, resolved Plaintiffs' RICO-centered claims against ClassicStar and other defendants concerning various mare lease agreements, resulting in a weighty (approximately $65 million) damage total. The Court references the cited opinions for a more thorough discussion of the underlying facts. The involved parties are now engaged in asset discovery and collection; the judgment debtors face a multimillion-dollar liability.

As relevant here, certain non-party Movants ask the Court to quash three subpoenas the listed Plaintiffs issued to various banks. The Plaintiffs seek from the named banks a broad swath of documents that "identify or describe financial accounts or transactions owned, controlled, or conducted by" a variety of "individuals, entities or names since January 1, 2009[.]" See DE ##2620-1, 2621-1, 2622-1. These Plaintiffs oppose the motion to quash. The quashal effort pertains to only a few of the 19 subpoena categories.

The Court notes, as a commentary to its processing of the motion, that the parties' briefing ignores large areas of potential consequence and interest to the Court (including the decisional jurisdictional issue). Nevertheless, in an attempt to efficiently give guidance on the merits and enable post-judgment discovery to proceed as appropriate in this long-pending (and long-closed) case, the Court addresses the issues the parties have presented.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor . . . may obtain discovery from any person . . . as provided in [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or by the procedure of the state where the court is located." Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2). Here, certain judgment creditors seek to obtain discovery via subpoena. See id. 45.

"On timely motion," the court, as possibly relevant here, "must quash or modify a subpoena that: . . . (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). Further, "[a]s provided in Rule 45, a nonparty may be compelled to produce documents[.]" Id. 34(c). Courts "have held that the scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery under Rule 26." Hendricks v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 275 F.R.D. 251, 253 (S.D. Ohio 2011); see also Transcor, Inc. v. Furney Charters, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 588, 591 (D. Kan. 2003) ("It is well settled . . . that the scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) and Rule 34." (footnotes omitted)). Under Rule 26:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).6 The amended Rule "codified a proportionality requirement, . . . exhort[ing] judges to exercise their preexisting control over discovery more exactingly." Robertson v. People Magazine, No. 14 Civ 6759 (PAC), 2015 WL 9077111, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2015). "Restoring proportionality is the touchstone of revised Rule 26(b)(1)'s scope of discovery provisions." Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., No. 2:14cv-1131, 2015 WL 8259548, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015); Albritton v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 13-CV-218-GNS-LLK, 2016 WL 3580790, at *3-*4 (W.D. Ky. June 28, 2016) (same); Gallagher v. Anthony, No. 16-CV-284, 2016 WL 2997599, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 24, 2016) (same); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. Overall, even post-amendments, the general "scope of discovery is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Coleman v. Am. Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007).

More particularly, discovery under Rule 69(a) must be calculated to assist in judgment collection. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 293 F.R.D. 595, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Despite this constraint, the "scope of post-judgment discovery is broad." Libraire v. Kaplan, 760 F.Supp.2d 288, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This District has succinctly explained the contours of discovery in this setting:

GATX Corp. v. Appalachian Fuels, LLC, No. 09-41-DLB, 2011 WL 4015573, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 9, 2011). The undersigned, in this very case, has previously approved a fairly expansive scope of permissible post-judgment discovery, see, e.g., DE #2591 (Order),7 including tailored "access to legitimate asset discovery, even [from] a non-party." See DE #2590 (Order), at 6-7 (explaining: "Rule [69(a)] generally does not encompass discovery of the assets of a true non-party. Magnaleasing, 76 F.R.D. at 562 (citations omitted). Courts should not apply the limit `mechanically,' however, and `[d]iscovery has been permitted against a non-party where the relationship between the judgment debtor and the non-party is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the bona fides of the transfer of assets between them.' Id. (citations omitted)." (citation shortened)).

A party asserting that subpoena compliance will subject it to undue burden "must show that disclosure will cause it a clearly defined and serious injury." State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Warren Chiropractic & Rehab. Clinic, P.C., 315 F.R.D. 220, 224 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (internal quotation marks removed); see also Buchanan v. Am. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1983) (affirming quashal on the ground that the subpoena was "unreasonably burdensome"). Finally, "[t]he party seeking to quash a subpoena bears the ultimate burden of proof. If the discovery sought appears relevant on its face, the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance[,] but when relevancy is not apparent on the face of the request, the party seeking the discovery has the burden to show the relevancy of the request." Hendricks, 275 F.R.D., at 253 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Movants8 generally argue that the subpoenas demand production of irrelevant information—that they evince "a fishing expedition" seeking "a blanket production of any and all financial records for nineteen different entities spanning a period of seven years without any limitation." DE #2623-1, at 3. Movants summarize that the subpoenas are "unduly broad," lack facial relevance, and "seek confidential information of thirdparties." Id. at 4.

Plaintiffs counter, in largely general terms, that Movants set forth only "conclusory assertions in protesting [the] subpoenas." DE #2624, at 3. Plaintiffs claim that "post-judgment discovery in this action has identified each of the three [movants] as an affiliate of the defendant-debtors; an entity used to convey assets away from the defendant-debtors; or an entity which took assets of the defendant-debtors for no significant consideration." Id.

In this context, and against the particular backdrop and history9 of this case, the Court considers the challenged subpoena content regarding each movant:

Brookstone—The evidence submitted, DE ##2624-2 through -5,10 demonstrates that the information sought as to the Brookstone entities is properly discoverable. For example, Jen Moeller, a GeoStar11 employee, emailed Shane Peters, an accountant, stating that, inter alia, Brookstone is an "affiliated compan[y] of Geostar Corporation." DE #2624-2, at 2. GeoStar also emailed Thom Robinson12 "current Brookstone activity reports" and "balance information." See DE #2624-3. Some of the Brookstone account activity reflects transfers and wire transactions to "TE Robinson," "GLG," other Robinson individuals, GeoStar entities, and other Brookstone entities. See id. The records show control or influence by Robinson over Brookstone. Other spreadsheets suggest financial connections, including wires, between GeoStar, Robinson, and Brookstone— e.g., "Assign payable to Brookstone — No detail as part of GEO consolidation of THOM accounts." DE #2624-4; see generally DE #2624-5. "The interconnectedness of" the involved players (as to all Movants), to the Court, "is, on this record, enough to allow some discovery[.]" See DE #2590 (Order), at 7.

The Court perceives, considering all the briefing and exhibits, and the applicable legal standard, that the information sought as to Brookstone—"all documents which identify or describe financial accounts or transactions owned, controlled, or conducted by" Brookstone entities "since January 1, 2009"—is within the proper scope of postjudgment discovery in this case. Identifying account signatories and actors, auditing transactions, and tracing funds in any way connected to the Judgment (i.e., the debtors) is a legitimate part of collection in this expansive fraud case. The Court finds the subpoena's date cutoff (as to all Movants) to be a proper temporal scope, given the history of the case and the particulars of the financial evidence presented.13

Movants protest that simply because "an accountant in Australia sent an e-mail to an accountant at GeoStar referring to Brookstone as an affiliated company does not mean that it is." DE #2625, at 4. Perhaps so, but that proof certainly thrusts, as the Court has found, the desired Brookstone information past the low relevancy threshold for discovery purposes. Indeed, Movants fully admit the existence of a financial relationship between Brookstone and GeoStar. See id.; see also DE #2625-1 (Robinson Declaration). The judgment creditors here are entitled to fairly explore this information, as part of post-judgment discovery, within the confines of the law and the Rules, to attempt to collect on their Judgment.14 GATX Corp., 2011 WL 4015573, at *3 (countenancing using discovery "to find out about assets on which execution can issue or about assets that have been fraudulently transferred or are otherwise beyond the reach of execution").15 The judgment creditors should be able to understand the history of transactions and asset flow; these documents will, at the least, aid them to do so.16

Riverside Equities—The briefing parties foundationally dispute Riverside Equities' connection to the case—particularly Thom Robinson's role in the entity. Compare DE #2624, at 4 ("Thom Robinson exercised control over Riverside Equities."), with DE #2625, at 5 (e.g., "Robinson himself has no ownership interest in Riverside."). The actual evidence on this point is slim. Penny Robinson, on personal knowledge, declared that Robinson "has no ownership interest in Riverside and is not a beneficiary of the trusts that own Riverside." DE #2625-1, at ¶ 2.

However, even if this is true, Plaintiffs' papers, DE ##2624-6 through -11, make clear that Robinson (and/or other case actors) was/were involved, to some degree, in Riverside financial decision-making. There are references to "shares associated with Robinson/Riverside," "money that is going between Geostar and Riverside" (even though, as Movant points out, there may be a "difference between Geostar and Riverside"), the "issuance of the majority of shares to Riverside signed by Thom," large transactions "deposited by Riverside . . . swept each day into an investment account" and ultimately "transfer[red] to Geostar," "Thom's associated entities . . . supporting VCR through Geostar/Riverside during 2006 and early 2007," and funds "remitted to Geostar" (including "funds Riverside remitted to VCR"). See DE #2624-6. Spreadsheets suggest the same level of connectedness and indeed specifically list line items referencing "Thom" or associated companies. DE ##2624-7; 2624-8. Robinson's emails likewise strongly suggest obvious and intimate involvement by him. DE ##2624-10; 2624-11.

The Court perceives, as above, that the information sought as to Riverside—"all documents which identify or describe financial accounts or transactions owned, controlled, or conducted by" Riverside "since January 1, 2009"—is within the proper scope of post-judgment discovery in this case.

As above, the judgment creditors are entitled to fairly explore this information, targeted at entities reasonably believed to be involved in temporally and historically relevant financial transactions/transfers, in an effort to properly collect the judgment amount. See, e.g., Falicia v. Advanced Tenant Servs., Inc., 235 F.R.D. 5, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2006) ("While judgment creditors cannot typically compel disclosure of assets of nonparties, discovery is permissible when the parties are closely related and reasonable doubts have been raised concerning the good faith of the transfer of assets between the two." (internal citations and quotation marks removed)).

Great Lakes Geophysical—Adding another verse to the common refrain, the briefing parties next debate the precise relationship between Great Lakes Geophysical, LLLP, (Great Lakes Partnership) and the judgment debtors in this case. Plaintiffs seek to characterize Great Lakes Partnership as a dubitable shell or holding company for Great Lakes Geophysical, Inc., assets, as evidenced by the allegedly suspicious circumstances of its formation, while Movant frames Great Lakes Partnership's creation as a fully transparent action of which Plaintiffs and counsel were fully aware. Compare DE #2624, at 5-6, with DE #2625, at 2-4.

As with the prior subpoena targets, the Court need not resolve the parties' contentions regarding the precise relationship between Great Lakes Partnership and other case actors. Instead, the Court merely addresses whether the information sought as to Great Lakes Partnership is properly discoverable in the specific legal and case context.

The Court has considered all evidence submitted. Plaintiffs' documents, DE ##2624-12 through -15, indicate an intimate financial relationship between Great Lakes Partnership and Great Lakes Geophysical, Inc. One email, in fact, has a subject line: "sale of assets by GLG, Inc. to GLG LLLP." DE #2624-15, at 1. The attachment to that email is an "asset purchase agreement GLG Inc to GLG LLLP." Id. The sale occurred deep into case pendency; indeed, the tendered Tony Ferguson17 email is from three days before Judge Hood issued the 99-page summary judgment Memorandum Opinion. Compare id. (9/27/11 email), with DE #2314 (issued 9/30/11). This, in the Court's view, in the context of this case, reasonably colors the sale at issue. Ferguson's orchestrating role, and the timing, justify an evaluation of the entity's transactions whether disclosed at the time or not. The Court thus perceives, as with the other Movants, that the information sought as to Great Lakes Partnership is within the proper scope of post-judgment discovery in this case.

As above, given the intimate financial relationship between Great Lakes Partnership and case actors, the judgment creditors, attempting to properly collect on the Judgment, are entitled to fairly explore the requested information. See, e.g., Caisson Corp. v. Cnty. W. Bldg. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("All agree that the judgment creditor must be given the freedom to make a broad inquiry to discover hidden or concealed assets of the judgment debtor.").

Finally, the Court generally comments on proportionality. As to all claims Movants present, the Court perceives the information sought to fit within Rule 26(b)'s proportionality requirements. This is a case of uncommon complexity (2600+ docket entries, and a decade of pendency) and economic scope (tens of millions of dollars). Further, the particular context (judgment creditors attempting to properly collect what they are due in a fraud-centered case) counsels in favor of production on the scale ordered. There is undoubtedly a strong public (and private) interest in the Court's judgment being fully and properly executed, and the underlying issues in this case are weighty and significant (i.e., using Rule 26's phrasing, the issues at stake in this action are "important"). The particular context—attempting to "follow the money" in collecting a judgment through evaluating the interconnectivity of numerous related entities— indicates to the Court that the creditors here likely have relatively restrained access to the information sought, suggesting subpoenaed production is appropriate. The at-issue information appears central to resolving the pertinent judgment-collection questions. Finally, while the burden and expense of producing the information (not really an issue for the non-custodians) required may well be meaningful, the Court finds it would not outweigh the likely benefit of the information. In sum, the Court has fully considered the Rule 26(b) / Rule 45 proportionality principles, and, for the reasons discussed, finds the subpoena scope to be proportional to the needs of the case.

IV. CONCLUSION

As discussed, the Court DENIES DE #2623 in 5:07-CV-353-JMH and DE #894 in 5:06-CV-243-JMH for want of jurisdiction, but provides the foregoing merits analysis for the reasons stated.18

* * * * *

The Court issues this Opinion and Order resolving non-dispositive, post-judgment matters under the District Judge's referral, which the Court considers made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). The statute does not define the appeal standard or mechanics. Some courts invoke the de novo standard of Rule 72(b). United States v. Miller, 609 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1979); Matter of Application of United States of America for an Order of Nondisclosure Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(B) for Grand Jury Subpoena # GJ2014031422765, No. 14-296, 2014 WL 2000343, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2014) ("Existing precedent suggests that `additional duties' delegated to magistrate judges under subsection (b)(3) remain under the supervision and control of the district court and accordingly, review by district courts of matters referred to magistrate judges under section (b)(3) must be de novo." (citation omitted)). Other courts compare the particular duty to the dispositive/nondispositive dichotomy and apply the closest analog. N.L.R.B. v. Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 1992) (directing application of standard for duty "more akin" to typical (b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(B) duties).19 The matter is appealable to Judge Hood. A party objecting must file same within fourteen (14) days of Order entry. Failure to object waives a party's right to review.