STIPULATION AND ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between plaintiff United States of America, on the one hand, and defendant Manuel Perez-Arreola, on the other hand, through their respective attorneys, that: (1) the presently set May 1, 2014, status conference hearing shall be continued to June 19, 2014, at 9:30 a.m.; and (2) time from the date of the parties' stipulation, April 29, 2014, through, and including, June 19, 2014, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T4, to permit continuity of defense counsel and additional time for defense counsel to prepare his client's defense.

I, Attorney Carlos Fuentes, represents that I desire additional time to: (1) discuss and explain a verbal counteroffer that the United States has made to me in response to a recent settlement offer that I made to the United States; (2) discuss and explain any written plea agreements that may be forthcoming in the event that the parties reach a tentative agreement to settle this case; and (3) research and prepare a motion to suppress evidence and other pretrial motions in the event that the parties are unable to settle this case. In addition, I am currently unavailable to attend the presently set May 1, 2014, status conference due to a personal medical appointment.

Accordingly, the parties stipulate and agree that the Court shall find that: (1) the failure to grant the requested continuance in this case would deny defendant continuity of counsel and deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence; and (2) the ends of justice served by the granting of such a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. Based on the representation of defense counsel and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court hereby finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defendant continuity of counsel and deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. It is ordered that time beginning from the parties' stipulation on April 29, 2014, up to and including the June 19, 2014 status conference shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T 4, to allow defendant continuity of counsel and defense counsel reasonable time to prepare.