GINA M. GROH, District Judge.
The Plaintiff, NY @ Route 9 Limited Partnership, seeks to enforce the terms of an easement agreement, the purpose of which was to allow the Defendant, Essroc Cement Corporation, to improve a roadway adjacent to the Plaintiff's property. In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant continues to occupy and possess the easement area and a portion of the adjacent roadway in violation of the Plaintiff's ownership rights. The Defendant moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon consideration, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has pleaded insufficient facts and has failed to state a claim for breach of contract and for declaratory judgment. Furthermore, the Plaintiff's formulaic recitations of the elements of trespass and ejectment, without any factual support, are insufficient and cannot survive the Defendant's motion. Accordingly, the Court
This civil action was initiated on March 3, 2016, when the Plaintiff filed its complaint in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. Shortly thereafter, the complaint was served on the Defendant, who timely removed this case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Immediately after removing this case to federal court, the Defendant filed a Motion to Transfer Venue [ECF No. 4], asserting that the Northern District of West Virginia was the proper venue for the Plaintiff's claims. Soon after filing that motion, the Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 8]. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was originally styled as a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) and Rule 12(b)(3) (improper venue). On May 13, 2016, the Honorable Leonie M. Brinkema, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, issued an order granting the Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue and denying as moot the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 18]. Three days later, Judge Brinkema issued a second order [ECF No. 21], clarifying that her order denying as moot the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss did not resolve the Rule 12(b)(6) portion of the Defendant's motion. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) is now pending before this Court.
The Plaintiff, NY @ Route 9 Limited Partnership, is a partnership operating out of Falls Church, Virginia. At all times relevant to the instant dispute, the Plaintiff was the owner of a piece of real property located near the intersection of West Virginia Route 9 ("Route 9") and New York Avenue in Martinsburg, West Virginia. The Defendant, Essroc Cement Corporation, as successor by merger to Capitol Cement Corporation, was and is the owner of a piece of real property in the same area of Martinsburg. Route 9 is a heavilytrafficked road that runs through the Martinsburg area. New York Avenue intersects Route 9 and provides access to both parties' properties. The Defendant operates a cement manufacturing plant on its property.
Pertinent to the instant dispute, there is currently an entrance to the Defendant's plant located at the end of New York Avenue, adjacent to the tract of land owned by the Plaintiff. This was, apparently, not always the case. Historically, the Defendant and its predecessor utilized a different road as the primary method of accessing the subject property. On June 30, 2008, the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into an agreement under which the Defendant, in exchange for valuable consideration, was permitted to use a portion of the Plaintiff's property in order to "excavate, grade and construct and improve New York Avenue" and the berm areas of the roadway on the Plaintiff's property. The explicit purpose of the easement, as memorialized in a Deed of Easement signed by the parties' representatives, was to "provide access to/from State Route 9 to [the Defendant's] property." The Deed of Easement was filed as an exhibit to the Plaintiff's complaint.
A map, labeled as Exhibit A and attached to the Deed of Easement, illustrates the easement's boundaries. The easement ran parallel to New York Avenue, on the side of New York Avenue where the Plaintiff's property is located. The Deed of Easement provided that "[t]he term for the aforesaid easement shall be for a period of nine months from the execution hereof, or until such grading and construction has been complete [sic], whichever occurs first." The Defendant argues that the nine-month easement expired, at the latest, in early 2009. The Deed of Easement and the allegations in the Plaintiff's complaint support the Defendant's timeline.
On March 3, 2016, the Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against the Defendant. In its complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that in the years since the easement expired the Defendant has failed to fulfill several affirmative duties allegedly established by the deed of easement, amounting to a breach of contract. The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant "converted New York Avenue to be the primary point of access" from Route 9 to the Defendant's property. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's "use, occupancy and/or possession" of New York Avenue and the former easement area amounts to an unauthorized trespass.
According to the Plaintiff, New York Avenue is a private road. Under the Plaintiff's interpretation of the law, this makes the Plaintiff the owner of the portion of New York Avenue that abuts its property, out to the middle of the road.
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses."
A complaint that offers "labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."
Although the term of the easement expired more than seven years ago, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant breached the easement contract when the Defendant failed to perform several continuing duties. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant's responsibility to perform those duties extended beyond the nine-month term of the easement. Specifically, the Plaintiff's complaint contains allegations that the Defendant "ignored (and ha[s] refused to acknowledge the existence of) the obligation to maintain and not adversely impact New York Avenue or the Easement area on an ongoing basis," and that the Defendant "failed to execute a release of [its] rights to the Easement and further failed to file such release in the Berkeley County Clerk's Office." In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that it "made numerous efforts to locate evidence that [the Defendant] applied for and obtained the necessary governmental approvals for the Road Improvements along New York Avenue, to no avail." In count one of its complaint, the Plaintiff incorporates these allegations by reference and states that the "Defendant's conduct, as aforesaid, constitutes a material breach of the Deed of Easement." The Plaintiff states that it "has been damaged as a direct and proximate result of the breach," and it requests $250,000 in monetary damages.
In support of its Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff cannot make out a claim for breach of the easement agreement because the easement agreement expired over seven years ago and because the Plaintiff does not allege that the Defendant breached any of its obligations during the term of the easement. In addition, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would establish a breach of any continuing duty under the easement contract, if any continuing duty existed.
Upon review of the Plaintiff's complaint and the Deed of Easement attached thereto, the Court finds that the allegations in the complaint cannot support a claim for breach of contract. Even if the Plaintiff's allegations were reconcilable with the fact that the term of the easement expired more than seven years ago, the Court would still be obligated to find that the Plaintiff has pleaded insufficient facts in support of its allegations of any alleged breach. As discussed above, the "facts" section of the Plaintiff's complaint references three potential breaches of the Defendant's continuing duties under the Deed of Easement.
Similarly deficient is the Plaintiff's allegation that the Defendant "failed to execute a release of [its] rights to the Easement and further failed to file such release in the Berkeley County Clerk's Office." The Defendant's alleged obligation to obtain a release of its rights allegedly stems from the following language found in the Deed of Easement: "Capitol shall execute such releases of its rights here under at the end of the construction period as may be appropriate for recording in the Berkeley County Clerk's Office." Again, the Plaintiff's position on this issue is confined to its one-sentence allegation, with no factual support. Importantly, the Plaintiff does not allege that any release was appropriate or necessary, only that the Defendant did not obtain one.
Finally, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant has "ignored (and ha[s] refused to acknowledge the existence of) the obligation to maintain and not adversely impact New York Avenue or the Easement area on an ongoing basis." As with the Plaintiff's other assertions, the complaint contains no relevant factual allegation that could support such a claim. For that matter, it is not clear which contractual obligation the Plaintiff meant to reference in this count of its complaint. Section 2(B) of the Deed of Easement provides that "[e]xisting storm water and natural drainage of surface water patterns for the easement premises and the residue of the Grantor's property shall be protected at all times both during and after construction." (emphasis added). The Plaintiff's complaint, however, makes no reference to any issues involving storm water or drainage. Indeed, the complaint does not reference any failure to maintain the easement. The Plaintiff does not allege any act or failure to act that could constitute a breach of the easement agreement. Accordingly, the Court must find that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on count one of the Plaintiff's complaint.
Counts two and three of the Plaintiff's complaint cannot survive under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Upon consideration, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has indeed failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for trespass under West Virginia law. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are insufficient under Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6).
"[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations."
Count three of the Plaintiff's complaint, alleging ejectment, fails for the same reasons as the Plaintiff's trespass claim. In West Virginia, "[e]jectment is an action for the protection of one with good legal title to the land who is entitled to immediate possession."
Of course, "
Count four of the complaint, as it was filed in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, sought a declaratory judgment under the Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-184. In support of its claim for a declaratory judgment, the Plaintiff asserts that the Court should "decide the question of whether ESSROC has the right to use New York Avenue and the Easement." The Plaintiff also requests an order concerning the Defendant's failure to obtain certain governmental approvals, as alleged in the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. In its reply brief in support of its Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim was resolved by the order transferring the instant case to this Court from the Eastern District of Virginia, because this Court cannot sit in the place of a Virginia circuit court for purposes of issuing a ruling under the Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act.
The Defendant misses the target with its argument that the Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim was resolved when this case was transferred to the Northern District of West Virginia. In the Fourth Circuit, when a state court declaratory judgment action is removed to federal court, the action is treated as invoking the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
That being said, the Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim is still deficient. Section 2201 provides that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction," a district court may, with limited exceptions, "declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201. A federal court's power to adjudicate declaratory judgment claims may be exercised in the court's discretion, but a court may decline jurisdiction only for an appropriate reason.
With these general principles as a guide, "[i]t follows that a declaratory judgment is `unavailable in situations where . . . claims and rights asserted have fully matured, and the alleged wrongs have already been suffered.'"
The Court also finds the remainder of the Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim inadequate. Critically, the Plaintiff has failed to allege facts from which this Court could determine that an actual controversy exists regarding the Defendant's use or prospective use of the Plaintiff's property. For one thing, the Plaintiff does not allege an ownership interest sufficient to exclude other individuals or businesses from New York Avenue. While the Plaintiff does assert an ownership interest in the easement area and in a portion of New York Avenue, the deficiencies identified above—including the fact that the complaint does not provide any factual allegation regarding the Defendant's use of the Plaintiff's property—are similarly fatal to the Plaintiff's attempt to secure a declaratory judgment. It is unclear what the Defendant has done or might do to offend the Plaintiff's property rights, and it is unclear how the Plaintiff has been or might be injured by the Defendant's use of New York Avenue as its primary point of access to its own property. As the facts are presented in the Plaintiff's complaint, the Court cannot find that an actual controversy exists in this case.
In count one of its complaint, the Plaintiff alleges breach of contract without pleading any facts that could show how the agreement in question was breached. In counts two and three, the Plaintiff merely recites the elements of trespass and ejectment without providing sufficient factual allegations for either claim. Count four is likewise deficient, and the Court must dismiss the Plaintiff's claim for a declaratory judgment. Accordingly, the Court
Finding no basis for an award of attorney's fees at this time, the Court
The Clerk is