LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, District Judge.
Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the Tehama County Jail in June, 2011. He alleges that while he was being transferred from a dormitory to a single cell, defendant Officer Clayton DeLaughder broke his foot
Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants move for summary judgment. The motion will be granted.
1. Plaintiff Robert Heinke was arrested and incarcerated at the Tehama County Jail on June 10, 2011. Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts ("DSUF") (ECF No. 36-1, pp. 4-6) ¶ 1.
2. Plaintiff was initially housed in a single cell, but was re-housed into a dormitory on June 14, 2011. DSUF ¶ 2.
3. A short time after being housed in the dormitory, Plaintiff made a request to leave because he felt uncomfortable around the other inmates. This request was approved, and Plaintiff was re-housed into a single cell. DSUF ¶ 3.
4. Plaintiff has no memory of events that transpired after he left the dormitory, and up to the time he woke up in the single cell. DSUF ¶ 5.
5. On June 22, 2011, at the advice of jail medical staff, Plaintiff was transferred by jail staff to the hospital for examination of an injury to Plaintiff's foot. DSUF ¶ 4.
6. Plaintiff has no memory as to the cause of his injury. DSUF ¶ 6. However, plaintiff did not get his foot caught in a grate. DSUF ¶ 7.
7. Plaintiff has no memory of any altercation with defendant Officer Clayton DeLaughder. DSUF ¶ 6. In fact, plaintiff concedes that "there was no altercation with Officer [DeLaughder]." Pl. Resp. to DSUF ¶ 6.
8. Plaintiff has no memory of seeing Officer DeLaughder anytime between when plaintiff left the dormitory and when plaintiff was transferred to the hospital. DSUF ¶ 9.
9. Plaintiff is ignorant as to whether any inmate, other than himself, was denied food or water. DSUF ¶ 13.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Consequently, "[s]ummary judgment must be denied" if the court "determines that a `genuine dispute as to [a] material fact' precludes immediate entry of judgment as a matter of law."
Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and "citing to particular parts of the materials in the record," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), that show "that a fact cannot be ... disputed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1);
A wrinkle arises when the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In that case, "the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case."
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
"In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact," the court draws "all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party."
Plaintiff alleges that defendant DeLaughder used excessive force by tasering plaintiff during the transfer from the dormitory to the single cell. At trial, it will be plaintiff's burden to show that excessive force was used on him.
First, defendants point out that plaintiff has not identified any evidence that DeLaughder used a taser on the plaintiff. Plaintiff himself has no memory of being tasered, or any recollection of anything that happened during the transfer. DSUF ¶ 5; Deposition of Robert Heinke (December 11, 2013) ("R. Heinke Depo.") (ECF No. 36) at 89;
In addition, defendants have offered evidence that DeLaughder did not taser plaintiff. DeLaughder testified that "[a]t no point did I use a taser on Mr. Heinke," and "I did not cause or witness the cause of any injury to Mr. Heinke."
Second, defendants point out that plaintiff entirely fails to offer any evidence that he was subjected to "excessive force." Even if the "other inmates" were correct that someone tasered plaintiff — even if there were any evidence that defendant DeLaughder did so, which there is not — there is no evidence, nor any inference from the evidence or the circumstances, that its use was "excessive." Plaintiff does not assert that every use of a taser, no matter what the circumstances, is excessive force, nor does he offer any authority for such an assertion even if he had made it. In fact, it appears that whether the use of a taser — a "painful and frightening blow" — is justified or not, depends upon the "totality of the circumstances."
The defendants having met their initial summary judgment burden, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that there is a genuine dispute about whether or not he was tasered, and if so, whether or not it was reasonable in light of the circumstances.
Plaintiff's sole response to defendants' factual showing that DeLaughder did not taser plaintiff is two statements in his Opposition brief: "Plaintiff disputes that," and "Plaintiff also contends he was tasered, although he has no access to the jail video surveillance that would have shown that." Plaintiff's Revised Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("PI. Oppo.") (ECF No. 45) at 5.
Plaintiff has utterly failed to meet his burden. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claim that defendants inflicted a constitutional injury by using a taser on plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that DeLaughder broke plaintiff's ankle during the transfer from the dormitory to the single cell, by getting his foot "caught in a grate when he was accosted by defendant DeLaughder." Complaint ¶ 10. Plaintiff also alleges that DeLaughder stepped on plaintiff's foot while it was caught in the grate. Complaint ¶ 11.
Defendants once again point out that plaintiff has offered no witnesses or other evidence of any kind in support of this allegation. As discussed above, defendants note that plaintiff has no memory of what happened to him during the transfer.
Plaintiff once again makes no effort to meet his burden on summary judgment. Rather than identify evidence that would put the issue in dispute, plaintiff simply launches a new line of speculation about what might have happened to him. In his Opposition brief, plaintiff now says that he:
Pl. Oppo. at 5. Plaintiff cites to nothing in support of this transparent speculation. Instead, his own declaration, submitted in opposition to the summary judgment motion, makes plain that the assertions in the brief are pure speculation:
Heinke Decl. ¶ 10.
Although the plaintiff does not argue this, the court notes that plaintiff has presented evidence that he has an injury to his foot, and that the injury occurred while he was in jail.
Plaintiff having again failed to meet his burden to show a genuine dispute about whether DeLaughder caused the injury to his foot, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claim that DeLaugher inflicted a constitutional injury on plaintiff by injuring plaintiff's foot through the use of excessive force.
Plaintiff alleges that during his time in jail, DeLaughder deprived him of "regular meals," and deprived him of "water and food for the majority of the time he was housed in the segregation unit." Complaint ¶¶ 14 & 29.
Defendants assert that plaintiff has identified no evidence that DeLaughder deprived plaintiff of food or water. When asked, in Interrogatories, to assert "every fact" supporting his deprivation claim, plaintiff responded that he "submitted several requests for more food or water," that he "was deprived for so long he was weak, his hands were very shaky he was unable to drink water and would ask for assistance but he was not given assistance. Plaintiff believes jail records have evidence of this." Pl. Answers ¶ 10. The response says nothing about DeLaugher's alleged role in this.
Defendants point out that when plaintiff was asked, in Interrogatories, for evidence of the deprivation claim, plaintiff responded that "his food and water were placed at a distance where it was difficult for him to reach by himself," because of his foot injury, as a result of which, "plaintiff lost 30 pounds." Pl. Answers ¶ 11. Plaintiff identified no evidence, and makes no mention of DeLaughder. When asked to "[s]tate every fact which you believe supports your contention that Officer [DeLaughder] failed to take a constitutionally required act," plaintiff's response does not mention any deprivation of food or water. Pl. Answers ¶ 7.
Defendants have met their initial burden on summary judgment regarding the deprivation claim.
In response, plaintiff asserts repeatedly in his brief that he was dehydrated and hungry, and that DeLaughder knew about it.
The only other "evidence" plaintiff submits in opposition to the summary judgment motion are the exhibits to his declaration, none of which shed light on the alleged deprivation, and the declaration of his counsel.
In short, plaintiff has offered no evidence to create a genuine dispute about whether DeLaughder deprived plaintiff of food and water. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on the claim that DeLaughder inflicted a constitutional injury on plaintiff by depriving him of food and water.
Plaintiff alleges that during his time in jail, DeLaughder deprived plaintiff of medical care. Complaint ¶¶ 14 & 29. He alleges that he needed medical care to take care of his severe dehydration, his injured foot and a head injury. Complaint ¶ 17.
Here, at last, plaintiff offers some evidence in support of his claim. Specifically, plaintiff directs the court to evidence that DeLaughder knew of plaintiff's "head injury," namely, a bruise over plaintiff's left eye, that DeLaughder made an official note of it, and that DeLaughder did nothing to get medical attention for it.
Plaintiff offers no other evidence regarding the head injury. The question then, is whether this evidence is enough to avoid summary judgment on plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. It is not.
A Fourteenth Amendment claim that "correction facility officials violated pretrial detainees' constitutional rights by failing to address their medical needs" is analyzed "under a `deliberate indifference' standard."
In this case, the court need not address whether the bruise was a "serious medical need," or whether the failure to summon medical assistance for it was "deliberately indifferent," because plaintiff offers no evidence of any harm resulting from the failure to summon medical assistance for the bruise. It is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility that a head bruise could be indicative of a serious injury, and that ignoring it could lead to dire consequences. However, plaintiff does not provide evidence of any consequences flowing from DeLaughder's failure to summon medical assistance for the bruise. Defendant does not even assert that the bruise represented a serious medical need.
Plaintiff alleges that his foot injury was not treated promptly and that the delay in treatment "made the injury worse and diminished the chances for an optimal recovery." Complaint ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that he continues to have "significant scarring and continuing pain and difficulty ambulating."
In his declaration, plaintiff establishes that his foot injury represented a serious medical need. Indeed plaintiff's evidence shows that plaintiff suffered "a broken right heel."
Plaintiff has not, however, produced any evidence that DeLaughder was "deliberately indifferent" to plaintiff's need for medical treatment of his foot injury. The first inquiry here is whether DeLaughder was aware of the injury. He could not have been deliberately indifferent to an injury that was not brought to his attention in some way.
Plaintiff does assert that his "injuries" were "obvious." R. Heinke Decl. ¶ 14. However, he appears to limit the obviousness claim to the injury "to my head at least."
Plaintiff simply asserts that DeLaughder, through some unspecified mechanism, "either knew that I could not walk," or that DeLaughder caused the injury himself. R. Heinke Decl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff's first theory is, in essence, an absurd claim that plaintiff can read DeLaughder's mind. Plaintiff does not assert that, for example, DeLaughder observed plaintiff's inability to walk, or saw him hobble around, or heard him cry out in pain.
The alternate theory, that DeLaughder knew of the injury because he "injured me when I arrived at the cell, smashing my ankle with the door when I entered," is pure speculation — along with plaintiff's speculation that the injury occurred when his foot was caught in a grate — since plaintiff testifies that he was unconscious at the time the injury occurred, and that he has "no recall of those events."
Defendants, on the other hand, have produced actual evidence that DeLaughder did not initially know of plaintiff's foot injury, and that as soon as he became aware of it, he reported it to "the on duty supervisor."
Plaintiff asserts that while he "was in a solo cell," he was hungry and asked "for food and water."
These bare-boned assertions are simply not enough support a claim that DeLaughder knew that plaintiff was becoming dehydrated, or that food and water were being withheld. To the contrary, plaintiff's own testimony refutes any inference that might otherwise be drawn that the withholding of water had anything to do with DeLaughder. During his deposition, plaintiff stated that he "begged for water." Deposition of Robert Lawrence Heinke (December 11, 2013) ("Heinke Depo.") at 100. However, he admitted that he did not ask DeLaughder for water.
Q. Okay. Do you remember asking for water at any time when you were in there?
A. Yes. I begged for water.
Q. And whom did you beg?
A. In other words, the officer that was looking in the window.
Q. Who was that officer?
A. I don't know. There's so many officers that work at the jail.
Q. Was it DeLaughder?
A. No. DeLaughder was the last one that I remember.
Q. I'm saying the one that you asked for water, was that DeLaughder?
A. No.
Heinke Depo. at 100. Further, plaintiff offers no evidence of any kind that DeLaughder was aware of any problem with plaintiff's access to food or water, or his state of dehydration.
Meanwhile, defendants have produced evidence that plaintiff had appropriate access to food and water, and that DeLaughder was not aware that plaintiff was dehydrated or deprived of food and water.
There are two basic routes to Section 1983 County liability pursuant to
Plaintiff has offered no evidence of any County action or policy (for example, inadequate supervision or training) that caused plaintiff any injury, or that DeLaughder committed any constitutional tort for which the County could be liable.
Defendants will therefore be granted summary judgment on the claim that the County is liable for any constitutional injury to plaintiff.
Plaintiff asserts a state claim based upon the same completely unsupported allegations that comprise his federal constitutional claim. For the reasons stated above, defendants will be granted summary judgment on this claim also.
Plaintiff alleges that he was a person with a disability while in jail, because of his heel injury. Complaint ¶ 36. He alleges that he was discriminated against because of his disability, in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. On the motion to dismiss, this claim survived solely because plaintiff adequately
Defendants assert that plaintiff cannot produce evidence of any adverse action taken against him that was the result of his disability. In addition, defendants have produced evidence that plaintiff was not deprived of food and water, as discussed above.
In response, plaintiff has produced no evidence of any kind to show that his disability was the cause of his allegedly being deprivation of food and water, or suffering any other adverse action by defendants. Indeed, plaintiff has produced no evidence of the key allegation that saved his Complaint from dismissal — the allegation that the guards ridiculed him for his injury when he requested necessities.
The court will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim.
Plaintiff alleges that a jail employee tasered him "for no reason," and that DeLaughder broke his ankle. Complaint ¶ 39. As discussed above, defendant has shown that plaintiff has identified no evidence that he was tasered by DeLaughder or anyone else, and no evidence that DeLaughder broke his ankle.
The court will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on the battery claim.
The mystery of this case is what plaintiff has been doing from the time he filed his original complaint until the close of discovery. One thing is clear. He has not bothered to adduce evidence that could withstand a motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons stated above,
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is
2. This case is
3. The Clerk is directed to close this case.
The court notes that plaintiff's counsel, in her declaration, asserts that she questioned DeLaughder during his deposition, and that he told her "nothing to indicate he was qualified to evaluate Mr. Heinke's mental or physical status." Dove Decl. ¶ 10.
Since there is plainly no constitutional injury here, the court need not evaluate counsel's bizarre decision not to simply excerpt DeLaughder's deposition and attach it as an exhibit to her declaration. Instead, counsel presents DeLaughder's testimony as a hearsay statement, with no citation to the deposition itself (indicating that perhaps counsel is just recounting what she happens to remember of the deposition), and with herself as a percipient witness to what DeLaughder testified. Although counsel cites to specific pages of the deposition later (¶ 11), she has not submitted the deposition to the court, nor any excerpts from it.
