JOHNSON, Senior District Judge:
The facts and circumstances surrounding this action have been set forth in two previous orders and in the transcript of the February 26, 2016 oral argument after which the Court denied defendants Emigrant Mortgage Company's, and defendant Emigrant Bank's ("Emigrant" or "Defendants") motion for summary judgment. (
The plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs") are Black property owners or former property owners living in various parts of New York City who, prior to the subprime mortgage meltdown of the late 2000s, applied for and received "STAR NINA" loans from Emigrant, loans for which Emigrant did not require proof of income or assets. Plaintiffs claim those loans were predatory and targeted certain minority communities (particularly Black and Hispanic), designed specifically to strip the equity from their homes by imposing an onerous 18% interest rate upon the occurrence of one late payment. They argue that the one late payment triggering the 18% interest rate was a calculated plan by Emigrant to so deprive them of that home equity, given Plaintiffs' 600 or below credit scores; their payment histories on prior mortgages; the fact that Emigrant's advertising and mortgage closing practices were designed to obscure the likelihood of default (such as allegedly "burying" the rider disclosing the default interest rate in stacks of closing documents); and Plaintiffs' lack of sophistication. Additionally, it is undisputed that none of the Plaintiffs had salaries equaling or exceeding that which would be otherwise required by Emigrant for loans of the amounts disbursed. According to Plaintiffs, Emigrant attempted to avoid responsibility for the inevitable default by having the homeowners sign "Resource Letters" drafted by Emigrant which stated,
Eight Plaintiffs are involved in this suit, all of whom had significant equity in their homes prior to borrowing from Emigrant, and all of whom have either been forced to sell their homes or live in homes that, pursuant to the terms of their respective STAR NINA loans, were secured by mortgages that applied an 18% interest rate once each of the Plaintiffs made a late payment, which each of the Plaintiffs did.
Jean Robert Saint-Jean and his wife Edith Saint-Jean (the "Saint-Jeans") live in a Canarsie home subject to a foreclosure action. At the relevant time, Jean Robert Saint-Jean had a credit score of 540 and Edith Saint-Jean had a credit
Felex and Yanick Saintil (the "Saintils") also live in a forecloseable Canarsie home. Mr. Saintil works as a truck driver and Mrs. Saintil, prior to the stroke she suffered during the pendency of this action, worked as a home health aide. The Saintils closed on a $325,000 STAR loan with an initial interest rate of 9.65% and a monthly payment of $3,145.85. They never earned the approximately $94,000 otherwise required for their loan, and their approximately $3,000 per month payment ballooned to over $4,000 per month by 2007. The Saintils made several unsuccessful attempts to modify their loan. By March 2010, Emigrant approved a loan modification for the Saintils, waived both the default interest provision and approximately $14,000 in "unpaid charges" and reduced their monthly payments to $2,804.38 and their interest rate to 6% for five years. As part of the modification, the Saintils signed a document intended to waive and release all claims they may have had up to the date of the modification. The Saintils were unable to keep up with the $2,804.38 monthly payment and remain in several years' worth of arrears.
Jeanette and Beverley Small (the "Smalls"), a mother and daughter, refinanced their home with Emigrant in August of 2006. They borrowed $330,000 with an interest rate of 9.875%, and a monthly payment of $3,261. After one late payment, their monthly payment shot up to $5,480. The Smalls never earned the approximately $82,000 required for their loan. The Smalls eventually sold their home to avoid foreclosure. The parties dispute the extent of the financial loss the Smalls suffered from their STAR NINA loan, but it is undisputed that the Smalls repaid the amounts then-owed Emigrant in full.
Linda Commodore ("Commodore") refinanced the mortgage on her Manhattan co-op in 2004 through Emigrant's STAR NINA program, and received $125,000. Commodore did not earn the annual income of $54,792 required for the loan and her credit score was 553. Her payments ballooned from $983.38 to almost double that amount after a missed payment. Like other Plaintiffs, she too was denied the opportunity to make a late payment and, like the Smalls, also sold her home to avoid foreclosure. Indeed, Commodore sold her home for $40,000 less than its value.
Finally, Felipe Howell owned his Queens property outright and did not work. He took out a STAR NINA loan from Emigrant requiring a $2,100 monthly payment in order to finance the construction of a rental property on the same lot with the residence that secured the mortgage. Howell's construction project failed, he was unable to make a single payment, and his mortgage increased to $3,378 per month. As he was unemployed, he did not earn the $51,527 annually that would have been required for him to obtain a full-documentation loan or the amount necessary to make his monthly mortgage payments. Howell's property was foreclosed upon and purchased at auction by Emigrant for $1,000.
Plaintiffs filed suit pursuant to following anti-discrimination statutes: the Fair
On May 23, 2016, a jury trial commenced. The jury determined that Emigrant violated the Federal Fair Housing Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the New York City Human Rights Law. The Saint-Jeans were awarded $180,000 apiece in compensatory damages, the Smalls were awarded $70,000 (to Beverley) and $110 (to Jeanette), Commodore was awarded $185,000 and Howell was awarded $225,000. On June 27, 2016, the jury found that the Saintils were not entitled to any compensatory damages because they knowingly and voluntarily a 2010 loan modification that purported to release all existing claims against Emigrant. None of the parties were awarded punitive damages.
Following the trial, both Plaintiffs and Emigrant filed post-trial motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 50. Defendants take issue with several provisions in the instructions read to the jury by the Court and demand a new trial. They also believe they are entitled to a new trial because (A) Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of discrimination, either through their own testimony or their experts; (B) certain expert testimony by Plaintiffs was impermissible; (C) Defendants' proffered FDIC expert should have been permitted to testify; (D) the jury award is excessive; (E) Plaintiffs' claims are time-barred; and (F) a juror should not have been excused mid-trial. They also argue that are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the Truth in Lending Act claim brought by the Saint-Jeans. Plaintiffs' Rule 50 motion seeks a new trial for the Saintil's, arguing that the 2010 loan modification entered into between Emigrant and the Saintil's is unenforceable. Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the jury finding that Emigrant violated the FHA, ECOA and NYCHRL, the Court should issue an injunction against certain allegedly predatory behavior, including the appointment a monitor to oversee Emigrant's lending practices, and that the Court should retain jurisdiction over the action for a period of three years while such monitoring is conducted.
Based on the submission of the parties, the oral argument held before this Court on June 28, 2017, and for the reasons stated below Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Rule 50(b) permits the Court to enter a judgment as a matter of law and/or order a new trial when there is "such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or the evidence in favor of the movant is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair minded [person] could not arrive at a verdict against [it]."
"A party is generally entitled to a new trial if the district court committed errors that were a `clear abuse of discretion' that were `clearly prejudicial to the outcome of the trial' ... Prejudice is measured by assessing the error in light of the record as a whole."
Rule 59 permits the Court to grant a new trial "on some or all of the issues" and to do so for "any reason a new trial has been heretofore granted in an action in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A).
Sweepingly, Emigrant argues that Plaintiffs failed to present "sufficient evidence of any type of discrimination." This argument fails because the jury verdict indicates that they credited the testimony and/or evidence of the Plaintiffs and/or their witnesses over the testimony and/or evidence presented by Defendants, and the jury was entitled to do so, as Plaintiffs offered over a dozen witnesses. The following brief summary of Plaintiffs' key witnesses provides sufficient evidence from which a jury could find against Emigrant on liability.
Plaintiffs called Rebecca Walzak ("Walzak") as an expert witness. Walzak is a mortgage consultant who testified that she has worked in "all aspects of mortgage lending," including overseeing loan closings in all 50 states, evaluating, reviewing and training lenders on various loan products, working in risk management and quality assurance, underwriting guidelines, monitoring and managing brokers and lenders, analyzing information from servicing groups. The holder of a Master's in Business Administration from the University of Maryland with a Certification in Quality Management from George Washington University, Walzak testified that she has underwritten or reviewed over 100,000 loans during the course of her career and that the STAR NINA loan "contained numerous predatory loaning aspects that ... were the worst [she] had ever seen in a mortgage loan."
Specifically, Walzak testified that STAR NINA's focus on credit scores under 600 indicated that Emigrant was "looking for the borrowers that had the least likelihood to be able to repay the debt." Further, Walzak stated that "No Income No Asset" ("NINA") loans are typically extended to people with credit scores in the 800 range — not the 500s — and that she was unfamiliar with any residential loan product that provided for an 18% interest rate
(Tr. at 128.)
Professor Ian Ayres also testified for Plaintiffs. Ayres holds a doctorate in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a degree from Yale Law School, where for 23 years he has taught and studied statistical tests of race and gender discrimination, including mortgage lending. He was offered as and permitted to testify as an expert in statistical tests of predatory lending and discrimination. Ayres defined "predatory [lending] terms" as "terms in a mortgage that artificially increase the chance that the mortgage will fail," such as pre-payment penalties and default interest, both of which were present in the STAR NINA program. In particular, Ayres testified that in Emigrant's STAR NINA program, the default interest provision made the loans more profitable in that the loans were "issued primarily on the basis of the equity that was built up in the house and not on the credit characteristics of the borrow," which he referred to as "perverse" and unlike any of the other mortgage portfolios he reviewed.
Ayres also compared the census track of communities in relation to the number of STAR NINA borrowers in that community. According to Ayres, in communities with 10% or less African-American or Latino residents, Emigrant's STAR NINA loans constituted 23% of their refinance loans. However, Ayres testified that as the percentage of African-American and Latino residents increased upwards of 80% of a given community, Emigrant's STAR NINA loans comprised 45% of those offered in the area.
Holly Perlowitz ("Perlowitz"), former Senior Vice President at Emigrant Mortgage Company, and former Co-President of Emigrant Mortgage Company, testified
Perlowitz admitted that after the STAR program was discontinued, Emigrant's salesforce saw a sharp decrease in "enhanced incentives" that Emigrant offered them for closing on STAR NINA loans. Moreover, Perlowitz admitted that Emigrant did not wish to work with brokers who could not find potential "no doc"
Howard Milstein ("Milstein"), the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Emigrant since 2004 testified that STAR NINA loans were nonperforming at a rate of up to 20%, but such failure rate did not result in losses to the bank and he was "not especially" concerned about the level of delinquencies. So unconcerned was Milstein, he testified, that the Board of Directors (chaired by Milstein) approved an increase in the amount of STAR NINA lending that Emigrant would undergo.
Milstein testified that he was aware that the bank was developing relationships with brokers of color or with ties to communities of color, comparing those relationships to the bank's need for Korean-speaking brokers if he wished the bank to do business among Korean-Americans. Specifically, Milstein was asked whether he "targeted particular ethnic groups who were not in the mainstream so that they would receive information about [Emigrant's] loan products." Milstein answered "[w]ell, they would be groups considered underserved by our regulators."
Dr. Charlton McIlwain ("McIlwain") is the Associate Dean of Faculty Development at New York University. There, he is also a Professor of Media, Culture and Communications. McIlwain holds a doctorate in Communication from the University of Oklahoma and in addition to teaching, has for at least 18 years conducted research on areas of race and media, "particularly studying racial queuing, racial targeting, the ways that racial messages and other forms of racial-ized communication advance certain ends and the way they affect both our attitudes and behavior." McIlwain was permitted by the Court to testify as an expert in marketing advertising. McIwain testified that he reviewed Emigrant's advertising budget between 2005 and 2008 and found that 76% of its advertising went into four publications: Caribbean Life newspaper, Black Star News, Hoy (a Spanish-language newspaper) and Mizona (another Spanish-language newspaper). McIlwain also testified that 82% of Emigrant's overall advertising was in newspapers circulated in areas with a combined Black and Latino population of
Accordingly, this Court finds that Emigrant has not met its burden of demonstrating that the jury verdict on liability was the result of "surmise" or "conjecture," or was otherwise unreasonable.
Emigrant argues that the jury instructions on intentional discrimination, disparate impact and gross unfavorability misstated the law and warrant a new trial. They also argue that certain instructions they proffered were incorrectly altered or incorrectly omitted altogether.
On June 20, 2016, the Court held a charge conference at which Emigrant made the same or similar arguments, all of which were rejected. On Emigrant's Rule 50 motion, the Court again rejects Emigrant's arguments following reasons.
The Court charged the jury that if it believed that that the evidence demonstrated that the STAR NINA loans were grossly unfavorable and intentionally targeted certain groups based in part on race, color or national origin, it could find discrimination under the FHA, ECOA and NYCHRL. The plain words of the instruction are as follows:
(Dkt. No. 522 at 33.) Emigrant presents three arguments that this instruction requires the Court to grant them a new trial. They argue that "the jury was not instructed in any way on Plaintiffs' intentional-targeting theory;" that evidence of animus is a necessary component of intentional discrimination and that it was improper to reference Hispanic borrowers when none of the Plaintiffs are Hispanic.
Emigrant's argument that the charge fails to take into account Plaintiffs' theory of targeting is plainly specious and semantic: the intentional offering of
Next, Emigrant argues that Plaintiffs were required to show discriminatory animus, and that the instructions failed to inform them of that. This Court disagrees. In
The Court's charge on pretext was as follows:
(Dkt. No. 522 at 34.) Emigrant takes issue with this charge because it "it is not enough to dis believe [sic] the [defendant]; the factfinder must believe plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination." (Def. Mem. of Law at 5 (emphasis in original).) However, Defendants rely in that regard on
Emigrant posits four objections to the Court's disparate impact jury instruction. Each are without merit.
The relevant instruction read as follows:
(Dkt. No. 522 at 35-36.) Emigrant argues that this charge warrants a new trial because this charge relieved Plaintiffs of their burdens of identifying a specific discriminatory practice or policy and demonstrating that it caused disparity; because the instruction would have permitted the jury to find Emigrant liable if STAR NINA loans had an identical impact on white borrowers, and because the third step in the analysis did not require Plaintiffs to prove the existence of an actual available alternative to the STAR NINA loan product but simply a theoretical alternative with "less discriminatory effect."
The first two arguments are simply meritless and need not detain us long: the instruction did not relieve Plaintiffs of either the burdens alleged. First, the plain language of the instruction states that the specific discriminatory practice alleged is Emigrant's practice of offering the STAR NINA loan product. Second, Plaintiffs offered evidence at trial that STAR NINA loans had a substantial adverse impact on African-American or Hispanic borrowers. Emigrant's contentions to the contrary merely attack the level of specificity required to prove these allegations. A jury instruction is not a summation. The Court is not required to summarize all of the evidence presented by Plaintiffs of each element of the STAR NINA loan product — its advertising, its target audience, its relationship to its broker, or each and every one of its particulars.
Emigrant's additional objections to the jury instructions have been considered by this Court and are without merit.
Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in instructing the jury as to whether the waiver executed by the Saintils was knowing and voluntary. The Court instruction read as follows:
(Dkt. No. 522 at 38.)
Plaintiffs argue that, by using the language "there is no particular factor that must be in Emigrant's favor," this instruction would have allowed two impermissible outcomes: (1) the jury may have found for Emigrant on only one factor of the six non-exhaustive factors but found the waiver to be knowing and voluntary nevertheless based on an incorrect assumption that one factor is sufficient; and (2) the jury may have believed that all six non-exhaustive factors needed to favor the Saintils to in order for them to invalidate the waiver.
Plaintiffs' arguments are meritless. As to the former, the instruction explicitly states that the jury is to consider the factors "under the totality of the circumstances." Therefore, the instruction both provides the jury with a non-exhaustive list and a mandate to consider the six factors given. As to the latter, the jury was instructed that the burden of proof was on Emigrant to establish that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. (Dkt. No. 522 at 10.) It would have been impermissible (and not a result of the reading of this instruction) for them to have shifted the burden to the Saintils to prove all six factors.
Emigrant claims they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiffs' claims were untimely, given the two year statute of limitations on FHA. However, this argument was presented to this Court and rejected by this Court at the motion to dismiss stage. (
The requirements for equitable tolling are (1) that the defendant concealed the existence of a cause of action; (2) the action commenced within the applicable limitations period; and (3) plaintiffs' failure to bring the action sooner was not from the absence of due diligence. Of these prongs, Emigrant primary argues there was no concealment involved in the offering of the STAR NINA loan. Where fraudulent concealment can be demonstrated, a defendant may not present a statute of limitations defense as to any such claim.
While Emigrant cites
While, as explained,
"There is no magic formula for determining when a contract ... is void as against public policy."
"It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601. Additionally, it is "unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any credit transaction ... on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract)." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). These are among the terms found in the FHA and ECOA, both of which the jury found Emigrant to have violated. Moreover, in issuing the STAR NINA loan program in the matter they did, Defendants were also found to have violated them more broadly interpreted NYCHRL, the provisions of which must "be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights laws ... have been so construed."
Of course, the existence alone of statutes meant to prevent certain harms is not sufficient to render unenforceable waivers of claims that could have been brought pursuant to those statutes. More is needed.
Policies ought not be considered in a vacuum. Indeed, in denying Emigrant's motion to dismiss, this Court put the instant action in context by providing a historical overview of mortgage lending in the United States, (Dkt. No. 258 at 5-8), fraught as it has been with the systematic demarcation of zones largely population by Black and Latino residents and parsing of them as exempt from investment locations,
Although Emigrant modified the Saintil's loan in 2010 to terms not subject to FHA, ECOA or NYCHRL scrutiny by the jury, the Saintils were back in default within five months of the modification and owing Emigrant over $700,000 at the time of trial, with monthly payments of $3,750 expected of them, notwithstanding their reduced incomes, Mrs. Saintil having suffered a stroke in the interim, and Emigrant's policy of refusing to accept partial payments from STAR NINA customers.
The modification thus did little to bring the Saintils within reach of making regular payments for any considerable length of time, which "raise[s] concerns about [Emigrant's] motivations."
Emigrant argues that it is entitled to a new trial because, prior to deliberation, the Court dismissed Juror Number 3, who repeatedly expressed concerns about missing a personal planned event if the jurors did not reach a verdict in the first and only day of deliberation that occurred before her event.
As Emigrant correctly articulates, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 47(c), "the court may excuse a juror for good cause." FED. R. Civ. P. 47(c). According to the Advisory Committee Notes, "[s]ickness, family emergency or juror misconduct that might occasion a mistrial" are potential grounds for dismissing a juror, while a juror's refusal "to join with fellow jurors in reaching a unanimous verdict" is not. The Advisory Committee Notes on what may constitute "good cause" are not exhaustive.
The trial in this matter commenced on May 23, 2016. On Wednesday June 22, 2016, Juror No. 3 privately expressed to the courtroom deputy her displeasure with the length of the trial because on Friday June 24, the juror was expected to attend a bachelorette party in the Hamptons and did not wish to deliberate that day (or possibly did not wish to deliberate any day beyond June 23). The jury had yet to begin deliberating.
The Court called Juror No. 3 into the courtroom and, outside the presence of the other jurors, informed her that she would
The Court only revisited the question of keeping Juror No. 3 after she again approached the courtroom deputy outside of the courtroom, increasing her level of disbelief and vexation, adding that "she can't believe she's been here this long, she has a life, and that she can't believe she's being made to stay." (
Based on the facts of Juror No. 3's excusal, Emigrant claims that it is entitled to a new trial. (
Emigrant also claims that there should have been a hearing before Juror No. 3 was excused. (
"It is well settled that calculation of damages is the province of the jury."
Moreover:
In the instant case, the jury found that Emigrant violated the FHA, ECOA and NYCHRL. In doing so, they implicitly credited at least some of Plaintiffs' witnesses over those brought by the Defendants, as they were permitted to do. However, the source of the damages assessed is not clear, and a new trial is therefore warranted.
The jury found that Edith Saint-Jean was entitled to $180,000 in damages, and that Jean Robert Saint-Jean was also entitled to $180,000, for a total of $360,000 to the mortgagors of the Saint Jean property. As of the date of the verdict, Emigrant posited that the Saint-Jeans owe $789,081.39, which amount constitutes $369,311.93 in principal, $259,085.88 in "base rate" interest, $95,785.02 in default interest, $505,02 in late charges, $43,665.33 in taxes paid Emigrant, $13,366 in insurance paid by Emigrant, $5,756.21 in water bills paid by Emigrant and $1,606.00 in "other" fees paid by Emigrant. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, ask the court to carve out "charges that would never have accrued had the Saint-Jeans never met Emigrant or been subjected to Emigrant's discriminatory loans" (such as interest, penalties and fees) from the amounts due and hold the Saint-Jeans responsible for $384,035.95. Though this amount is a little more than half of what Emigrant deems owed, it is still nearly $25,000 more than the $360,000 awarded to the Saint-Jeans by the jury. Viewing the jury award as the sole method available to the jury to compensate the Saint-Jeans for three laws they found to have been broken by Emigrant, an award of $360,000 falls short of the amount the Saint-Jeans owe (even under Plaintiffs' conservative estimate of the sum due), to say nothing of the issue of losses due to emotional or mental anguish, if any.
Jeanette Small was awarded $110,000 by the jury and Beverley Small was awarded $70,000, for a total of $180,000 to the former mortgagors of the Small's property. In May 2008, the Smalls satisfied their 2006 STAR NINA loan from Emigrant by selling their property after they defaulted on their $330,000 loan.
After falling behind in payments on her August 2004 $125,000 STAR NINA loan and borrowing $26,512.63 to catch up on her arrears (most of which consisted of past-due interest), Linda Commodore fell behind again in 2006. Her efforts to catch up were thus far thwarted by Emigrant's policy of refusing partial payments. Commodore's loan was secured by her property, which in 2007 was valued at $350,000. In August 2006, Emigrant initiated foreclosure of her loan for a mere $6,844 in arrears. In October of 2007, Commodore's property sold at auction for $310,000. Of that amount, she remitted approximately $161,000 to Emigrant, an amount exceeding the principal borrowed from Emigrant, notwithstanding her 18 months of payments and $25,000 personal loan she took to catch up on arrears once the 18% default interest rate was triggered. Commodore testified as to the stress and sadness that accompanied the process of attempting to catch up, failing to do so, and ultimately losing her home to avoid foreclosure: "I was just devastated. I couldn't open mail. I couldn't sleep. I couldn't do anything. I had a friend come to my ... apartment and open my mail for me and read it for me which is how I found out about the foreclosure." (Tr. at 1706.) Commodore, who described herself as "in a very, very dark place," moved in with her children in North Carolina and put her lifelong belongings in storage, of which she eventually lost possession.
The jury awarded Commodore, who has since rented her own studio, $185,000. As with the Smalls, it is not possible to determine how this amount was selected; and, as with the Smalls, Commodore's satisfaction of her STAR NINA loan means that she did repay in full a loan (with its concomitant fees, penalties and default interest rate) found by the jury to violate the law. There was substantial testimony about the emotional effect this process had on Commodore, which could have played a factor in her award. Yet, the Court cannot determine how much credence this testimony was given compared to either the complaints of emotional damages made by the other Plaintiffs or to Commodore's financial loss.
The largest individual jury award went to Felipe Howell. As stated,
In any event, it is not within the province of this Court to speculate as to how the jury arrived at the amount of damages awarded to Plaintiffs. Indeed, as demonstrated,
Some homeowners still occupy the subject property (and have not paid Emigrant in accordance with the loan). Others sold (or lost) their homes and fully satisfied the terms of loans deemed illegal by the jury, remitting various fees and large sums of interest and penalties that the still-occupying homeowners are being asked to remit. Some are currently renting apartments and have lost their status as homeowners and possibly the creditworthiness to become homeowners in the near or distant future. And in what may be the most extreme case, Howell went from owning a home outright to having his home sold back to Emigrant for $1,000. In short, the STAR NINA program had very different emotional and economic effects on each of the Plaintiffs and this Court cannot determine the extent that the jury weighed that testimony or arrived at each Plaintiff's actual damages.
Because the relationship between the damages awards and the various losses alleged (loss of equity, loss of home ownership or home ownership potential, and/or emotional distress damages) cannot be sufficiently ascertained, it cannot be said that the damages awards succeed at restoring Plaintiffs to their pre-STAR NINA loan positions.
Because this Court has determined that a new trial on damages is warranted, it is at this stage premature to address Plaintiffs' requests for (1) a disposition of Edith Saint-Jean's Truth in Lending Claim
All remaining arguments (most of which were raised and rejected
For the foregoing reason, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part. The parties are hereby directed to appear on September 27, 2018 at 9:30am for a status conference.
SO ORDERED.
