GREGORY M. SLEET, District Judge.
Pending before the court is a petition and a supplemental petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("petition") filed by petitioner Marvin Burton ("Burton"). (D.I.1; D.I. 10; D.I. 23) The State filed an answer in opposition. (D.I.24) For the reasons discussed, the court will deny the petition.
Burton, 2010 WL 3946275, at *1-4.
In August 2005, a Delaware Superior Court jury convicted Burton on one count each of first degree rape (victim under the age of 12), second degree rape (victim under the age of 12), and second degree unlawful sexual contact. The Superior Court sentenced him as a habitual offender to two life sentences plus two years at Level V incarceration. (D.I. 24 at 1) Burton appealed, and his appellate counsel moved to withdraw after finding no arguable meritorious claims for relief to present to the court. See Burton v. State, 907 A.2d 145 (Table), 2006 WL 2434914, at *1 (Del. Aug. 21, 2006). The Delaware Supreme Court informed Burton he could present any issues he wished to include for presentation to the court, but he elected not to do so. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Burton's convictions and sentences. Id.
On August 16, 2007, Burton tiled his first pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion"). The Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion. See State v. Burton, 2008 WL 2359717 (Del. Super. Ct. June 3, 2008). Burton appealed in June 2008, and then subsequently attempted to supplement the record with various affidavits. Because the trial court had not considered the new evidence in the first instance, the Delaware Supreme Court remanded the case to the Superior Court to allow that court to consider Burton's new evidence. See Burton v. State, 968 A.2d 491 (Table), 2009 WL 537194 (Del. Mar. 4, 2009). On remand, the Superior Court granted Burton's request for an evidentiary hearing. See Burton, 2010 WL 3946275. After the evidentiary hearing was held in 2009, but before the Superior Court issued its decision, the State provided Burton with a DVD of C.B. recanting her testimony. (D.I. 10 at 7) The OVD was generated in January 2010 by the Child Advocacy Center ("CAC") in connection with an interview of C.B. regarding her status as a foster child. Id. In this video, C.B. told the interviewer that her accusations against Burton were a "fraud." Id. On March 5, 2010, Burton filed a motion to re-open the record in the Superior Court, alleging that the OVO constituted evidence of Burton's actual innocence and that the DVO also supported his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (D.I. 21-10 at 30, Entry No. 143) The Superior Court docket reflects that the Superior Court planned to schedule a hearing regarding the recantation. (D.I. 21-10 at 30, Entry No. 144) Instead, however, the Superior Court held an office conference on this issue on June 15, 2010. (D.I. 21-10 at 30, Entry No. 154)
On June 18, 2010, the Superior Court denied the motion to reopen, explaining that the scope of the Delaware Supreme Court's remand "is clearly limited to consideration of whether the three new statements [in the affidavits] would have affected my decision on Mr. Burton's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel Therefore, I will consider the record closed and will issue a written decision on the record before me." (D.I. 21-10 at 31, Entry No. 155) After considering the 2009 evidentiary hearing testimony and subsequent briefing, the Superior Court denied Burton's Rule 61 motion in its entirety on September 30, 2010. See Burton, 2010 WL 3946275. Burton appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision. See Burton v. State, 29 A.3d 245 (Table), 2011 WL 4342636 (Del. Sept. 15, 2011).
Represented by counsel, Burton timely filed a federal habeas petition in November 2011. (D.I. 1) In June 2012, Burton moved, with the consent of the State, to stay the habeas proceeding to allow him to exhaust one of his claims. (D.I. 16) The court granted the motion to stay. (D.I. 17)
In June 2012, C.B. pled guilty to first degree assault and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, based on an incident in which C.B. stabbed another woman for talking to C.B.'s son's father. See State v. Burton, 2014 WI. 5468874, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014). During the pre-sentence investigation in that case, C.B. informed the investigator that she was under pressure from Burton's family to recant her claim that he had raped her. Id. The Superior Court sentenced C.B. to eight years at Level V incarceration. (D.I. 23 at 3)
On May 2, 2013, Burton filed a second Rule 61 motion, this time represented by counsel The second Rule 61 motion alleged that his convictions should be vacated and a new trial ordered because of C.B.'s 2010 recantation to the CAC. (D.I. 23 at 4) The Superior Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for August 2013. However, shortly before the originally scheduled postconviction evidentiary hearing in Burton's second Rule 61 proceeding, C.B. informed the state prosecutor that Burton did not have sex with her. See State v. Burton, 2014 WL 5468874, at *3. During a subsequent telephone conference with the judge presiding over Burton's second Rule 61 proceeding, the same prosecutor asked the judge to appoint C.B. counsel because he was considering indicting her for perjury if she persisted in her recantation disavowing her 2005 trial court testimony that Burton had raped and sexually assaulted her. The Superior Court appointed counsel to represent C.B. (D.I. 23 at 4-5) The Superior Court postponed and re-scheduled the evidentiary hearing for November 2013, and then re-scheduled it again for January 2014. (D.I. 24 at 2-3) C.B. testified during the January 2014 evidentiary hearing.
The Superior Court denied Burton's second Rule 61 motion on August 28, 2014. See Burton, 2014 WL 5468874, at *6. In reaching this decision, the Superior Court determined that C.B.'s recantation was not credible, because it was the result of pressure from Burton's family and C.B.'s belief that Burton had served enough time. Id. at *6. The Superior Court also found that C.B.'s foster mother arranged for her to go to the Child Advocacy Center ("CA C") in 2010 so that she could recant. Id. at *2. The court explained that C.B. "is just not a credible witness at this time" and would say "whatever best suits her needs or concerns at the time." Id. at *6.
Burton appealed the denial of his second Rule 61 motion. In November 2014, while his appeal was pending, C.B. wrote a letter to the state prosecutor in Burton's case, asserting that he and his team had led her to believe that with her testimony at the January 2014 hearing in Burton's second Rule 61 proceeding she would be eligible for some type of relief for her own conviction ("tacit agreement").
Upon return of the appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of Burtons' second Rule 61 motion. In so doing, the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly stated that the Superior Court's findings of fact were "supported by the evidence," and gave the factual findings "deference on appeal" Burton v. State, 146 A.3d 64 (Table), 2016 WL 3568189, at *1-2 (Del. June 22, 2016).
In July 2016, upon the parties' joint request (D.I. 18), the court lifted the stay in this case. Burton filed a supplemental petition (D.I. 23), and the State filed an answer in opposition. (D.I. 24)
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") "to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences ... and to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism." Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003). Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only "on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). AEDPA imposes procedural requirements and standards for analyzing the merits of a habeas petition in order to "prevent federal habeas `retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).
When a state's highest court has adjudicated a federal habeas claim on the merits, the federal court must review the claim under the deferential standard contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Finally, when reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must presume that the state court's determinations of factual issues are correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Appel, 250 F.3d at 210. This presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact, and is only rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has "not defined the precise relationship between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1)." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15 (2013); but see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003)(stating that the clear and convincing standard in § 2254(e)(1) applies to factual issues, whereas the unreasonable application standard of § 2254(d)(2) applies to factual decisions).
Burton's original petition for federal habeas relief raises two claims for relief: (1) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to "properly and thoroughly interview, question and call witnesses who would have testified that the complainant did not live at the home of her grandparents at the time the sexual assaults allegedly occurred, in direct contradiction to her trial testimony" (D.I. 10 at 7); and (2) the Superior Court denied Burton his right to due process in his first Rule 61 proceeding by refusing to reopen the record and consider C.B.'s 2010 video-taped recantation before rendering its decision. (D.I. 1 at 9) In his supplement to the original petition, Burton raises a third claim: he was denied due process when the State promised C.B. and her appointed counsel that the State would help with C.B.'s eight year sentence if she disavowed her 2010 recantation and testified at the January 2014 evidentiary hearing that Burton had raped and sexually assaulted her. (D.I. 23 at 14)
In claim one, Burton contends that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately interview witnesses who could have testified that C.B. was not living at Burton's parents' house during the time of the alleged rapes. Burton presented this argument in his first Rule 61 motion, and the Superior Court denied it as meritless. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Therefore, Burton will only be entitled to relief for claim one under § 2254(d)(1) if the Delaware Supreme Court's decision was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
The clearly established Supreme Court precedent governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is the two-pronged standard enunciated by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). Under the first Strickland prong, a petitioner must demonstrate that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," with reasonableness being judged under professional norms prevailing at the time counsel rendered assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Under the second Strickland prong, a petitioner must demonstrate "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error the result would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
In order to sustain an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal See Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253, 259-60 (3d Cir. 1991); Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 891-92 (3d Cir. 1987). Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
When denying claim one, the Delaware Supreme Court correctly identified Strickland as the applicable precedent. See Burton v. State, 29 A.3d 245 (Table), 2011 WL 4342636, at *1 n.3 (Del. Sept. 15, 2011). As such, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law.
The court must also determine if the Delaware Supreme Court reasonably applied Strickland to the facts of Burton's case. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105-06. When performing this inquiry, the court must review the Delaware Supreme Court's denial of Burton's ineffective assistance of counsel allegations through a "doubly deferential" lens. Id. "[T]he question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable, [but rather], whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard." Id.
In this case, Burton was charged by indictment with one count each of first and second degree rape for having penile-vaginal intercourse and for digitally penetrating his then eleven-year-old daughter. The indictment alleged that the rapes occurred between August 1, 2004 and September 15, 2004. During the evidentiary hearing in the first Rule 61 proceeding, defense counsel testified that he presented a three-pronged defense theory at trial: (l) C.B. made up the allegations to retaliate against Burton because she had been caught with other boys; (2) Burton and C.B.'s mother were separating and C.B.'s mother put C.B. up to making these allegations so that Burton would be incarcerated and the mother could keep his property; and (3) the telephone records submitted by Burton proved he was either never alone with C.B., or when he was, he was constantly on the phone with C.B.'s mother and had no opportunity to rape C.B. (D.1. 21-12 at 20-29, 30-34, 40-41) Defense counsel testified that he interviewed the witnesses on Burton's list prior to trial, and that none of these witnesses informed him that C.B. had not lived in her grandparents' house during the time-period alleged in the indictment. Defense counsel explained that he believed Burton had provided this list of potential witnesses to support Burton's defense that C.B. was making up the allegations to get back at Burton after he informed C.B.'s mother about C.B.'s sexual activity with boys. (D.I. 21-12 at 30) Finally, defense counsel testified that both Burton and his mother had told him that C.B. had lived in Burton's mother's house during the relevant time-period and that no other witnesses had offered information in their pre-trial interviews to contradict that fact. (D.I. 21-12 at 39-40); see also Burton, 2011 WL 4342636, at *1.
The Superior Court examined the parties' briefs, the statements and affidavits provided by Burton, and the testimony at the two-day evidentiary hearing in Burton's first Rule 61 proceeding, and made the following factual determinations:
Burton, 2010 WL 3946275, at *17. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment on post-conviction appeal after determining "the Superior Court's factual findings to be supported by competent evidence and not clearly erroneous." Burton, 2011 WL 4342636, at *2.
After reviewing the record, the court concludes that claim one does not warrant relief. First, the record demonstrates that the Superior Court weighed the credibility of the witnesses and statements before it, and made detailed factual findings to support those conclusions. The allegations in Burton's petition and corresponding affidavits regarding defense counsel's alleged failure to properly interview the witnesses who could have allegedly supported Burton's contention that C.B. was not living at his parents' house during the relevant time period do not constitute clear and convincing evidence rebutting the Superior Court's detailed factual finding that Burton's assertion regarding C.B.'s place of residence was not credible. Consequently, the court accepts the Superior Court's factual finding as correct.
In turn, since Burton's witnesses at trial placed C.B. in Burton's parents' house at the time he raped her, he cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for defense counsel's alleged inadequate questioning of the potential witnesses on the list Burton provided. See Burton, 2010 WL 3946275, at *17. Therefore, the court concludes that the Delaware Supreme Court reasonably applied Strickland in holding that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance with respect to his investigation and questioning of the witnesses identified by Burton. Accordingly, the court will deny claim one.
In claim two, Burton contends that his due process rights were violated during his first Rule 61 proceeding when the Superior Court denied his motion to re-open the postconviction record with the 2010 videotaped recantation by C.B. (D.I. 10 at 17) Burton argues that the DVD would have established his actual innocence and corroborate his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The DVD of C.B.'s recantation was generated in January 2010, months after the Delaware Supreme Court remanded the issue back to the Superior Court in March 2009. The Superior Court denied Burton's motion to reopen the record and supplement his first Rule 61 motion with the DVD in June 2010, explaining that the scope of the Delaware Supreme Court's remand "is clearly limited to consideration of whether the three new statements [in the affidavits] would have affected my decision on Mr. Burton's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." (D.1. 21-10 at 31, Entry No. 155) Considering that the DVD did not exist until eight or nine months after the Delaware Supreme Court's remand, the court is perplexed by the Superior Court's reference to the Delaware Supreme Court's remand as somehow preventing it from considering the recantation DVD. Given the tragic and convoluted history of this case, as well as C.B.'s age during this process (she was eleven years old when Burton sexually abused her, twelve years old when she testified during Burton's trial, and seventeen years old when she recanted her trial testimony in the DVD), reviewing C.B.'s recantation DVD would have provided an additional opportunity to protect the integrity of the overall judicial process.
Nevertheless, the court recognizes that its role on habeas review is not "to make its own subjective determination of guilt or innocence." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993). This court's perception of what it would have done if presented with a similar scenario is also not relevant to the habeas analysis. Additionally, the "federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioner's conviction; what occurred in the petitioner's collateral proceedings does not enter into the habeas calculation." Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998). Hence, since Burton's ultimate criticism in claim two is with the Superior Court's analysis in a state collateral proceeding, the court concludes that claim two does not allege an issue cognizable on federal habeas review. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 247 (3d Cir. 2005)(explaining the "main event" for habeas purposes is the original trial). The court will deny the instant claim for failing to present a proper basis for habeas relief.
In his final claim, Burton contends that the Superior Court and the Delaware Supreme Court unreasonably held that the State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct during his second Rule 61 proceeding. Specifically, he contends that he was denied due process of law because the State "unethically promised C.B. and [her post-conviction counsel] that [it] would help reduce C.B.'s eight year sentence if C.B. disavowed her 2010 recantation and testified at the January 27, 2014 hearing consistent with her trial testimony that [Burton] had raped and sexually assaulted her." (D.I. 23 at 14) According to Burton, the State's "unethical conduct improperly tainted C.B.'s testimony at the recantation hearing and thereby denied [Burton] due process of law." (D.I. 23 at 14) Burton argues that the Delaware state courts made an unreasonable factual determination under § 2254(d)(2) that no prosecutorial misconduct had occurred, and that the state courts' reliance on this unreasonable factual determination resulted in those courts unreasonably applying federal law under § 2254(d)(1) when denying his second Rule 61 motion.
As an initial matter, the court again concludes that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review because Burton's ultimate criticism is with the Delaware state courts' analysis in a state collateral proceeding. Therefore, the court will deny claim three for failing to present a proper basis for habeas relief.
Although the court's determination that claim three is not cognizable provides a sufficient ground to deny the instant claim, given the somewhat tortured history of this case and the severity of Burton's punishment, the court feels compelled to address Burton's contentions that the Delaware state courts unreasonably determined that C.B.'s January 2014 recantation was unreliable and unreasonably determined that there was no tacit agreement between the State and C.B. regarding her January 2014 testimony. A thorough review of the record in this case, as well a review of the available documents in C.B.'s 2012 criminal proceeding, reveals that there were inconsistencies in C.B.'s story pre-dating the August 2013 meeting between C.B. and the State. For instance, the documents in C.B.'s criminal proceeding demonstrate that she told numerous counselors, as well as the attorney who represented her in her criminal trial, that Burton raped her. During the January 2014 evidentiary hearing in Burton's case, C.B. provided the following testimony:
Finally, in April 2014, C.B. filed a motion to modify her sentence in her own criminal proceeding. She wrote a letter to the judge, stating that Burton had raped and molested her. See Burton, 2014 WL 5468874, at *5. C.B.'s sentence was reduced from eight years to six years.
In August 2014, the Superior Court denied Burton's second Rule 61 motion. Burton appealed, and while his post-conviction appeal was pending, the Delaware Supreme Court was informed about the "tacit agreement" between C.B. and State. The Delaware Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the Superior Court in June 2015, with instructions for it to hold a hearing on the issue of the tacit agreement. (D.I. 23 at 8) The Superior Court held two hearings: one in August 2015, and one in September 2015. C.B. testified during the August 2015 hearing that her appointed counsel spoke to the State and the judge in her criminal case, and that they "were in agreement to given me my plea that I signed which was four years [] ... They were willing to give me that if I kept my story the same my testimony the same that [Burton] raped me. And if I changed my story, I wasn't going to have any relief on my post-conviction." (D.I. 22-13 at 33) According to C.B., it was her attorney who reached this agreement with the State. (D.I. 22-13 at 35) During the August 2015 hearing, C.B. testified that the answers she provided during the January 2014 hearing about her conversations with the State in 2013 were not entirely truthful. (D.I. 22-13 at 37) Finally, both the State and the social worker testified at the August 2015 hearing that the State only told C.B. to tell the truth, and the social worker's notes from that meeting support that testimony. See Burton, 2015 WL 6735833, at *5.
Although Burton creatively argues in this proceeding that the State's "unethical pressure explains the multiple inconsistencies that permeated C.B.'s testimony at both the January 31, 2014 and August 31, 2015 hearings," the court is not persuaded that C.B.'s inconsistencies can be attributed to the State's alleged pressure or tacit agreement it made with CB. in August 2013. As previously explained, C.B. herself admitted that she has told so many lies that she cannot keep her stories straight, including the ones she told to counselors prior to August 2013. In turn, the court's review of available filings in C.B.'s criminal proceedings and filings in Burton's case demonstrate that the inconsistencies in C.B.'s stories began well before August 2013.
Relatedly, the court rejects Burton's assertion that the existence of the tacit agreement caused C.B.'s inconsistent stories and therefore negatively affected the Superior Court's credibility determination. The January 2014 hearing transcript and a letter from C.B.'s attorney requesting a closed courtroom suggests that the presence of Burton's family members in the courtroom influenced her testimony, rather than any tacit agreement with the State about a possible sentence reduction in C.B.'s case.
Finally, since the Superior Court judge who made the factual findings at issue here presided over both Burton's criminal trial and his Rule 61 proceeding, that particular judge was in the best position to make such credibility determinations. For all of these reasons, the court cannot conclude that the Delaware state courts unreasonably determined that C.B. was not a credible witness based on the evidence before it.
The court's acceptance of the state courts' determination that C.B. was not credible, along with its conclusion that any tacit agreement between C.B. and the State did not negatively affect C.B.'s January 2014 testimony, essentially obviates the need to address the reasonableness of the Delaware state courts' factual determination that there was no tacit agreement between C.B. and the State. Nevertheless, after reviewing the record, the court cannot conclude that the Delaware state courts unreasonably determined there was a lack of evidence demonstrating the existence of a tacit agreement. The State testified that no agreement existed, C.B.'s attorney described a tacit agreement, and C.B. indicated that her attorney told her she would get leniency if she testified Burton had raped her. The Superior Court found the State's account of the events to be the most believable. When viewed in context of the entire record on this issue, Burton's arguments do not constitute clear and convincing evidence rebutting the Superior Court's factual determination, nor do they demonstrate that the Superior Court's factual determination was based on an unreasonable determination of the evidence before it.
Moreover, the court is not persuaded by Burton's attempt to rebut the Delaware state courts' factual determination with a June 10, 2016 Delaware Supreme Court decision approving the March 23, 2016 report filed by the Delaware Board on Professional Responsibility imposing a thirty-day suspension for the Deputy Attorney General who prosecuted Burton's case. Since the suspension was imposed in connection with the Deputy Attorney General's comments and actions in a case completely unrelated to Burton's case, See In re Gelof, 142 A.3d 506 (Table), 2016 WL 3419111 (Del. June 10, 2016), the 2016 professional disciplinary decision cited by Burton is completely irrelevant to the issue presented here.
In addition, the applicable standard of review for factual determinations made in the state courts under § 2254(d)(2) is whether the state court's factual finding was incorrect in light of the evidence presented
Finally, even if what occurred in Burton's collateral proceeding should or could enter into the habeas calculation, and even if there had been a tacit agreement, the court would still not grant relief for claim three. In order for a prosecutorial misconduct claim to warrant federal habeas relief, the prosecutor's actions must have "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180 (1986). A prosecutorial misconduct claim must be examined in "light of the record as a whole" in order to determine whether the conduct "had a substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Pursuant to Third Circuit precedent, this inquiry involves examining "the prosecutor's offensive actions in context and in light of the entire trial, assessing the severity of the conduct, the effect of the curative instructions, and the quantum of evidence against the defendant." Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2001). Simply alleging misconduct fails to establish a violation of due process because the focus of the Darden inquiry is the unfairness of the trial, not the conduct of the prosecutor. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).
Here, Burton has failed to demonstrate that the existence of any alleged tacit agreement rendered the January 2014 evidentiary hearing and/or the Superior Court's denial of his second Rule 61 motion unfair. The Superior Court's determination that C.B.'s recantation was not reliable was based on its conclusion that C.B. was not credible for a number of reasons independent of the existence or non-existence of a tacit agreement. See Burton, 2014 WL 54568874, at *4-5. Moreover, C.B. did not disclaim her 2010 recantation at the January 2014 hearing. Her testimony at the hearing was not consistent with her trial testimony and, on balance, actually helped Burton rather than the State. Thus, the court cannot conclude that the State's alleged tacit agreement prejudicially affected Burton's substantial rights.
Accordingly, the court will deny claim three.
When a district court issues a final order denying a § 2254 petition, the court must also decide whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011). A certificate of appealability is appropriate when a petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" by demonstrating "that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The court has concluded that Burton's petition fails to warrant federal habeas relief. The court is persuaded that reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion to be debatable. Therefore, the court will not issue a certificate of appealability.
For the reasons stated, Burton's petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 2254 is denied without an evidentiary hearing or the issuance of a certificate of appealability. An appropriate order shall issue.
