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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
POOCHIGIAN, J.
Adverse Action
Appellant William Mathews II (Mathews) works as a correctional lieutenant at Kern Valley State Prison for respondent, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). On February 11, 2008, CDCR served a notice of adverse action on Mathews. On February 22, 2008, Mathews was served with an amended notice.1
Mathews appealed the disciplinary action and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge appointed by the California State Personnel Board. The administrative law judge indicated to CDCR's counsel that it did not appear CDCR would be able to prove its charges.
Settlement
In April 2011, the parties signed a settlement agreement — called a stipulation and release — between the parties (hereafter the "Stipulation"). The Stipulation provided that CDCR would "withdraw and rescind" its notice of adverse action (and the amended notice). In exchange, Mathews "waive[d] any and all rights to a portion of his back pay consisting of six (6) months of back pay to which he would otherwise be entitled for the period of unemployment beginning February 22, 2008[,] through March 31, 2011."
The Stipulation also provided that Mathews would return to full time duty at Kern Valley State Prison on April 1, 2011.2
On April 22, 2011, the State Personnel Board issued a "Decision Approving Stipulation for Settlement" (hereafter the "Decision"). The Decision contained several recitals, including the following:
"WHEREAS, the Board is . . . satisfied that the parties have voluntarily agreed to the disposition of the matter pending before the Board as set forth in the settlement; and,
"WHEREAS, the Board also finds that the settlement is consistent with the interests protected by the State's merit civil service system as defined in Article VII of the California Constitution and the State Civil Service Act (Government Code section 18500 et seq.); and,
"WHEREAS, in approving the settlement, the Board expresses no opinion as to whether the terms of the settlement are otherwise reasonable under the circumstances of the case. . . ." (Bold print and underline in original.)
The recitals were followed by a single operative clause reading: "IT IS RESOLVED that pursuant to the authority as set forth in Government Code section 18681,[3] and in accordance with the Board's precedential decision Pamela Martin (1991) SPB Dec. No. 91-03, the State Personnel Board adopts the stipulation for settlement as its decision in the case." (Bold print in original.)
CDCR Does not Pay Interest on Mathews's Back Pay
According to Mathews, "CDCR began making payments throughout November and December of 2011, purporting to comply with the SPB's final decision. The CDCR's last payment to [Mathews] arrived on December 19, 2011. However, none of the payments included interest on the withheld salary. . . ."4
Litigation in Superior Court
On May 1, 2013, Mathews filed a verified petition for a writ of mandate in Kern County Superior Court. Mathews argued that he was entitled to interest on his back pay for the period of February 22, 2008, to March 31, 2011 (minus the six months of back pay he waived in the Stipulation). The petition alleged that CDCR had a ministerial duty to pay the interest, had failed to do so, and should be compelled to pay by a writ of mandate.
The parties submitted briefing and oral argument to the superior court. On June 28, 2016, the court denied the petition and judgment was entered accordingly on September 19, 2016. Mathews appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. CDCR is Foreclosed from Arguing Mathews Failed to Use an Adequate Legal Remedy in Lieu of Mandamus
A writ must be issued in cases "where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) CDCR argues that Mathews is not entitled to a writ because he had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Namely, Mathews "could have requested a hearing before the [State Personnel] Board to seek clarification on what, if any, interest payment he was entitled to." For the reasons explained below, we conclude CDCR is foreclosed from making this argument.
Mathews's verified writ petition contained various allegations, including paragraph 12, which reads in full: "Petitioner [i.e., Mathews] has exhausted all administrative remedies required to be pursued by and available to him and has no effective administrative remedy presently available to compel the relief requested below." (Italics added.) In its answer to the writ petition, CDCR admitted paragraph 12 was true.
Paragraph 13 of Mathews's verified writ petition alleged as follows: "Petitioner does not have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In its answer to the writ petition, CDCR admitted paragraph 13 was true.
Code of Civil Procedure section 431.20, subdivision (a) provides: "Every material allegation of the complaint. . . not controverted by the answer, shall, for the purposes of the action, be taken as true."5 "An admission in a pleading is conclusive on the pleader. [Citation.]" (Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272.) "`When allegations. . . are admitted by the answer[,] [] no evidence need be offered in their support; [] evidence is not admissible to prove their untruth; [] no finding thereon is necessary; [] a finding contrary thereto is error.' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1271.)
Because CDCR admitted in its pleading that Mathews had "no effective administrative remedy" and no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," it cannot contravene those admissions now.6
II. CDCR is not Obligated to Pay Interest to Mathews Under Section 19584
Mathews argues he is entitled to interest under section 19584, which provides in pertinent part:
"Whenever the [State Personnel Board][7] revokes or modifies an adverse action and orders that the employee be returned to his or her position, it shall direct the payment of salary and all interest accrued thereto, and the reinstatement of all benefits that otherwise would have normally accrued. . . ."
The plain language of the statute makes clear when it applies and when it does not. It applies whenever a specific entity — i.e., the State Personnel Board — engages in two specific actions — (1) revokes/modifies an adverse action and (2) orders the employee returned to his or her position. It does not apply in any other situation.
The situation described in section 19584 is not present here. Pursuant to the Stipulation, CDCR "agree[d] to withdraw and rescind the Notice of Adverse Action. . . ." Even assuming this is equivalent to "revok[ing]. . . an adverse action" (§ 19584), the revocation was effected by CDCR, not by the State Personnel Board.
Furthermore, while Mathews was "returned to his. . . position" (§ 19584) under the Stipulation, that was accomplished by a settlement with CDCR, not an "order[]" (ibid., italics added) of the State Personnel Board. That is, CDCR was not ordered to return Mathews to his position, it agreed to do so voluntarily in exchange for Mathews's waiver of six months of back pay.
Our conclusion is not altered by the fact the State Personnel Board's Decision subsequently "adopt[ed] the stipulation for settlement as its decision in the case." This language does no more than signify the State Personnel Board's acceptance of the Stipulation as resolution of Mathews's case. The State Personnel Board's Decision did not order Mathews returned to his position. Rather, the State Personnel Board's Decision adopted and made binding CDCR's voluntary agreement to return Mathews to his position.8
CDCR has no duty to pay interest under section 19584. As a result, we affirm the judgment denying the writ petition.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover appellate costs.
LEVY, Acting P.J. and SNAUFFER, J., concurs.
