SMITH, Justice.
These consolidated cases involve petitions for a writ of mandamus filed by the defendant below, Ronda McMichael (case no. 1090150), and by the plaintiff below, Forney L. McMichael (case no. 1090179). In case no. 1090150, we grant the petition and issue the writ. In case no. 1090179, we transfer the petition to the Court of Civil Appeals.
On August 14, 2009, Forney McMichael filed in the Calhoun Circuit Court a complaint for a divorce, seeking to terminate his marriage to Ronda McMichael. In the divorce complaint, Forney sought, among other things, a judgment awarding him "all right, title and interest" in "MACS VACS LLC" ("the LLC"), a business located in Calhoun County. The parties own the LLC jointly with right of survivorship.
The Calhoun Circuit Court entered an ex parte temporary restraining order ("the Calhoun TRO"). In the Calhoun TRO, the court found that "[Forney], and the assets subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, particularly [the] LLC, and the parties' real property and homes . . ., may suffer irreparable harm without the entry of this Order" and ordered, in pertinent part:
On August 25, 2009, the Calhoun Circuit Court entered an order granting Ronda's "motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue" and transferring the divorce action "in its entirety" to the Talladega Circuit
On August 26, 2009—the day after the Calhoun Circuit Court transferred the divorce action to the Talladega Circuit Court—Forney filed a declaratory-judgment action in the Calhoun Circuit Court, contending that Ronda's "disruptive behavior and actions, as well as her breaches of her member's fiduciary duty, have caused the LLC ... damage[ ] to its operation and business." In the complaint, Forney sought "a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties under the LLC's Articles of Organization, Operating Agreement, and the Limited Liability Company Act[, codified at Ala.Code 1975, § 10-12-1 et seq.]." Specifically, Forney sought an order declaring, among other things, that he is the "sole manager" of the LLC; that Ronda "is a member of the LLC, but not the Manager of [the LLC]"; and that "[Forney] and only [Forney] can take the necessary and appropriate action(s) to operate the LLC."
On September 14, 2009, the Talladega Circuit Court held a hearing on a motion filed by Ronda seeking to dissolve the Calhoun TRO. On September 28, 2009, the Talladega Circuit Court entered a consent order concerning various matters including matters regarding the LLC. In the consent order, the Talladega Circuit Court dissolved the Calhoun TRO; stated that Forney would "continue to be the Manager of [the] LLC, accompanied with the rights and duties as stated in the Operating Agreement of [the] LLC"; and stated that Ronda initially would assist with the preparation and filing of the LLC's 2007 and 2008 federal and state tax returns and then "assume a role in the sales division of [the] LLC." The order further provided, in pertinent part:
On September 29, 2009, Ronda moved the Calhoun Circuit Court to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay the declaratory-judgment action ("motion to dismiss"). In the motion to dismiss, Ronda noted that the Talladega Circuit Court had entered an order on September 28, 2009, "with respect to the operation of [the] LLC" and contended that the declaratory-judgment action "is an attempt to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Talladega County Circuit Court, which has properly exercised jurisdiction over [the LLC]." Ronda further
On October 1, 2009, the Calhoun Circuit Court held a hearing on a motion filed by Forney seeking a pendente lite order. On October 2, 2009, the Calhoun Circuit Court entered an order providing, in pertinent part, that Forney is the manager of the LLC, which, the court noted, "is consistent with the Order entered by consent in the parties' divorce action [in the Talladega Circuit Court]"; that, as manager of the LLC, Forney has "the authority to allow [Ronda] on the LLC business premises... and the authority to tell her she cannot come onto those premises or must leave those premises"; that Ronda's duties in the LLC's sales department "do[ ] not require her presence on the LLC's premises"; and that Ronda "can come onto the business premises if invited by the Manager, and she must leave if directed to do so by the Manager."
The Calhoun Circuit Court's October 2, 2009, order also noted that, during the previous day's hearing, it had denied Ronda's oral motion to dismiss, in which she argued that "the LLC does not exist" because, Ronda said, the LLC's articles of organization were improperly filed with the Probate Judge of Calhoun County rather than with the Probate Judge of Talladega County, which is the county where the registered agent for the LLC, Forney, is located.
On October 2, 2009, Ronda filed a petition for rule nisi in the Talladega Circuit Court, alleging that Forney had violated the terms of the Talladega Circuit Court's September 28, 2009, consent order. Specifically, Ronda alleged that Forney had violated the consent order by "transferr[ing] $100,000 from [an] ... LLC account and deposit[ing] said monies into an account at a banking institution without [Ronda's] consent"; by "instruct[ing] [Ronda] not to come on the premises of [the] LLC"; and by attempting to have Ronda arrested "when she entered the [LLC's] premises for work purposes." The petition requested, among other things, that the Talladega Circuit Court require Forney to appear and to show cause why he should not be found in contempt of the consent order.
On October 5, 2009, the Talladega Circuit Court entered an order setting Ronda's petition for rule nisi for a hearing on October 6, 2009. Forney failed to appear for the hearing; he contends that he failed to appear because he did not receive proper notice of the hearing.
Forney moved the Talladega Circuit Court to vacate its October 8, 2009, order finding him in contempt of the consent order. In the motion, Forney argued, among other things, that the Talladega Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the property of the LLC, and, thus, Forney argued, the court's order finding him in contempt for transferring $100,000 from the LLC's Regions Bank account is void. Specifically, Forney argued that the Talladega Circuit Court, while presiding over the divorce action, could not properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the property of the LLC, i.e., the $100,000, because, Forney said, the
Relying on § 10-12-23(b), Forney contended that the Talladega Circuit Court's consent order "could not reach" the property of the LLC. For all that appears, Forney's motion to vacate the Talladega Circuit Court's October 8, 2009, order finding him in contempt of the consent order was denied by operation of law. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.
On October 9, 2009, Ronda filed in the Calhoun Circuit Court a motion for a change of venue, seeking a transfer of the declaratory-judgment action from the Calhoun Circuit Court to the Talladega Circuit Court; it appears that the Calhoun Circuit Court did not rule on that motion.
The parties filed respective petitions for writs of mandamus in the Court of Civil Appeals; the Court of Civil Appeals transferred the petitions to this Court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. This Court stayed all proceedings in both the Calhoun Circuit Court and the Talladega Circuit Court pending resolutions of these petitions. Forney has filed a motion to dismiss Ronda's mandamus petition. However, the arguments Forney raises in the motion to dismiss are also raised in Forney's answer to Ronda's mandamus petition in case no. 1090150, and those arguments actually present reasons stating why Ronda's mandamus petition should be denied rather than dismissed. Accordingly, Forney's motion to dismiss is due to be denied.
Ex parte Bentley, 50 So.3d 1063, 1068 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So.2d 893, 894 (Ala. 1998)).
Ronda presents two issues in her petition for a writ of mandamus. First, she contends that this Court should issue the writ and direct the Calhoun Circuit Court to rescind all orders regarding the operation of the LLC, to make no further orders regarding its operation, and to dismiss the action pending in that court or stay the proceeding there pending resolution of the divorce action in the Talladega Circuit Court. Specifically, Ronda contends that, "[s]ince the Talladega [Circuit] Court has the powers to enter orders regarding the assets of the parties to the divorce action, then it should also enter such orders over
Forney presents seven issues in his mandamus petition; those issues can be combined into the following two issues: (1) Whether the Talladega Circuit Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the property of the LLC such that it could properly find Forney in contempt of its September 28, 2009, consent order for, among other things, transferring $100,000 from an LLC bank account; and (2) if the Talladega Circuit Court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over the property of the LLC, whether the court erred by finding Forney in contempt of that court's September 28, 2009, consent order.
At the outset, we note that there is no dispute as to the Talladega Circuit Court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the divorce action or as to the Calhoun Circuit Court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the declaratory-judgment action. Rather, the threshold issue for this Court's consideration is whether Forney may simultaneously maintain the divorce action in the Talladega Circuit Court and the subsequently filed declaratory-judgment action in the Calhoun Circuit Court. Ronda contends in her mandamus petition, as she did in her motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action, that the Talladega Circuit Court, which was the first of the two courts to assume jurisdiction over these issues, is the proper forum in which to resolve both the divorce action and the issues raised in the declaratory-judgment action, i.e., the parties' dispute concerning the management and operation of the LLC. We agree.
In Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 631 So.2d 865 (Ala.1993), this Court stated:
631 So.2d at 867.
In this case, the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by the Talladega Circuit Court and the Calhoun Circuit Court has resulted in inconsistent orders. The Calhoun Circuit Court's October 2, 2009, order provides that Forney is the manager of the LLC and, as the manager, that Forney may, among other things, refuse Ronda entry onto the premises of the LLC and order her to leave those premises. The Talladega Circuit Court's September 28, 2009, consent order also provides that Forney is the manager of the LLC; however, it does not authorize Forney to make decisions regarding if and when Ronda may enter upon the premises of the LLC. As a result, Forney has been found to be in contempt of the consent order for, among other things, instructing Ronda not to come upon the premises of the LLC; however, under the Calhoun Circuit Court's October 2, 2009, order, it is permissible for Forney to exclude Ronda from the premises of the LLC. This is the very type of conflict the principle set forth in the above-quoted authorities seeks to avoid. See Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 631 So.2d at 867 ("`"All the authorities recognize the importance of carefully preserving the boundary line between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, in order to prevent conflicts...."'" (quoting Ex parte Burch, 236 Ala. at 665, 184 So. at 697 (emphasis added))).
We conclude that, because the Talladega Circuit Court initially exercised jurisdiction over the parties and their property in the divorce action, it must be allowed to pursue and exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all coordinate tribunals; thus, the Calhoun Circuit Court erred in denying Ronda's motion to dismiss insofar as it denied the alternative relief requested in the motion, namely, an order staying the declaratory-judgment action pending resolution of the divorce action in the Talladega Circuit Court. See Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., supra; see also Ex parte Murphy, 886 So.2d 90, 94 (Ala.2003) ("`It must be recognized ... that all matters related to a marriage may come within the authority of the court sitting in equity when the parties submit themselves to its jurisdiction by the filing of a suit for divorce.'" (quoting Oliver v. Oliver, 431 So.2d 1271, 1276 (Ala.Civ.App.1983), citing in turn Owens v. Owens, 281 Ala. 239, 201 So.2d 396 (1967) (emphasis added))).
Accordingly, Ronda's petition in case no. 1090150 is due to be granted as to this issue.
Section 12-3-10, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he Court of Civil Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of ... all appeals in domestic relations cases, including annulment, divorce, adoption, and child custody cases and all extraordinary writs arising from appeals in said cases." Section 12-3-11, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
Because this issue arises from an order entered by the Talladega Circuit Court in a domestic-relations case, it falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals. See § 12-3-10; § 12-3-11.
Forney argues that the Talladega Circuit Court erred by finding him in contempt of its September 28, 2009, consent order; however, Forney may not seek relief from a finding of contempt by a petition for writ of mandamus. See Ex parte Boykin, 656 So.2d 821 (Ala.Civ.App.1994), in which the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
656 So.2d at 827-28 (footnote omitted); see Rule 70A(g), Ala. R. Civ. P. (providing that an adjudication of contempt is reviewable by either an appeal or, in certain circumstances, the writ of habeas corpus).
In his reply brief in case no. 1090179, Forney contends that, if this Court determines that the finding of contempt is reviewable by appeal rather than by petition for writ of mandamus, this Court should treat his mandamus petition as an appeal for the purpose of considering the propriety of the contempt finding; however, jurisdiction to review a finding of contempt arising from a domestic-relations case lies not with this Court but, instead, with the Court of Civil Appeals. See K.S.C.C. v. W.H.C., 857 So.2d 830, 835 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) ("The Court of Civil Appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a finding of contempt—criminal or civil—if the finding of contempt arises out of a domestic-relations case." (citing Tetter v. State, 358 So.2d 1046 (Ala.1978); Rule 70A, Ala. R. Civ. P.)); Shonkwiler v. Kriska, 780 So.2d 703, 705 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (same).
For the above-stated reasons, in case no. 1090150 we grant the petition and issue the writ. Specifically, we direct the Calhoun Circuit Court to stay the declaratory-judgment
Because, as discussed in Parts IV.B. and IV.C. of this opinion, this Court is without jurisdiction to review the issues presented by Forney's petition for a writ of mandamus, we hereby transfer Forney's petition in case no. 1090179 back to the Court of Civil Appeals. Insofar as Forney's petition challenges the propriety of the Talladega Circuit Court's finding of contempt, his petition shall be treated as a timely filed appeal.
1090150—MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION DENIED; PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
1090179—PETITION TRANSFERRED.
COBB, C.J., and LYONS, WOODALL, STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, and SHAW, JJ., concur.
COBB, C.J., and LYONS, WOODALL, STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, and SHAW, JJ., concur.
MURDOCK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in case no. 1090150 and concurring in part and dissenting in part in case no. 1090179).
I do not see how we can apply the principles explained in Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 631 So.2d 865 (Ala.1993), which we purport to apply in Part IV.A. of the main opinion, without deciding—indeed, I think we inherently have decided implicitly, if not explicitly, in Part IV.A.—the issue described in part IV.B. I therefore would extend this Court's opinion (and it is within our supervisory authority to do so) to fully explain why the Talladega domestic-relations court has the power to issue and enforce its order requiring the parties to act in a manner that avoids diminution of the value of their respective ownership interests in the LLC. Compare Gibbs v. Gibbs, 653 So.2d 300 (Ala.Civ.App.1994), with Ten-Eyck v. TenEyck, 885 So.2d 146 (Ala.Civ. App.2003). I therefore respectfully dissent as to Part IV.B. of the main opinion.
I concur with the main opinion in all other respects.
