MEMORANDUM OPINION

T.S. ELLIS, III, District Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Dillon Mvuri, a member of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the "Union") and a former employee of American Airlines ("American"), is suing the Union for breach of the duty of fair representation and American for breach of the collective bargaining agreement after he was terminated from his position as a baggage handler on January 30, 2017. American and the Union have filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claims are time-barred and, in any event, also fail on the merits. Plaintiff filed oppositions to defendants' motions for summary judgment as well as his own cross-motions for summary judgment against each defendant. All of these motions have been fully briefed and argued.

For the reasons that follow, American and the Union are correct that plaintiff's claims are time-barred. In any event, even assuming plaintiff's claims are not time-barred, his claims nevertheless fail on the merits. Accordingly, summary judgment must issue in favor of the Union and American and against plaintiff.

I.

A.

As an initial matter, it is necessary to be clear as to the content of the summary judgment factual record. In this regard, it is necessary to address whether the parties have complied with the requirements for presenting a summary judgment motion as set forth in Local Rule 56 and the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order inasmuch as a party's compliance or noncompliance with the Local Rule and the Order defines the content of the summary judgment record. Pursuant to Local Rule 56(B) and the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order, a motion for summary judgment must contain a separately captioned section listing, in numbered paragraph form, all material facts that the movant contends are not genuinely disputed. See Rule 56, Local Civ. R.; Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order (Dkt. 32). The nonmovant must then respond to each numbered paragraph indicating whether or not the nonmovant disputes the asserted fact and, if the nonmovant disputes an asserted fact, the nonmovant must cite to the legally admissible evidence in the record supporting the dispute. Failure to respond in this fashion means that the asserted fact will be taken as admitted. Similarly, it is not sufficient when disputing a fact for a nonmovant to provide a narrative without citation to the record. Such a response will result in the fact being deemed admitted. See Integrated Direct Marketing, LLC v. May, 129 F.Supp.3d 336, 345 (E.D. Va. 2015).

Although the Union and American substantially complied with both the Local Rule and the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order,1 plaintiff did not do so. Plaintiff's cross-motions for summary judgment and opposition to defendants' motions failed to comply with the Local Rule.2 Specifically, plaintiff does not cite to any portion of the record when setting forth his own statements of undisputed facts in support of his cross motions for summary judgment against both American and the Union. See Pl. American Opp'n at 8-9; Pl. Union Opp'n at 5-6. Additionally, although plaintiff admits that he "agrees with" 12 of American's 47 undisputed facts and 10 of the Union's 43 undisputed facts, he did not clearly and specifically respond to the remaining 35 facts asserted by American or the remaining 33 facts asserted by the Union. Instead, plaintiff stated his "disagreement" with those remaining 68 facts and often submitted his own narrative response explaining his disagreement without citation to any portion of the record. See Integrated Direct Marketing, 129 F.Supp.3d at 345 (a party's "narrative version of its own interpretation of the facts fails to comply with Local Civil Rule 56(B)"). Moreover, by failing to provide citations to the record, plaintiff fails effectively to dispute the facts as set forth by American and the Union. Accordingly, in these circumstances, "a district court is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to accept the moving party's facts as stated." Caban Hernandez v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007); Foglia v. Clapper, 885 F.Supp.2d 821, 823 (E.D. Va. 2012) (same).

Additionally, plaintiff has submitted his own affidavit in support of his cross-motions for summary judgment and in opposition to defendants' motions for summary judgment. Nowhere in his briefs, however, does plaintiff cite to, or purport to rely, on his affidavit. Moreover, the affidavit, at times, contradicts plaintiff's sworn deposition testimony. To address those contradictions, plaintiff simply denies that his deposition testimony is accurate. See Pl. Union Opp'n at 11 ("The transcript of Plaintiff's deposition is completely wrong and inaccurate in that regard."). Courts have uniformly and sensibly held that a party cannot create a disputed issue of fact by submitting an affidavit that contradicts a party's prior deposition testimony. See, e.g., In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 512 (4th Cir. 2011) (a party "cannot create a dispute about a fact that is contained in deposition testimony by referring to a subsequent affidavit of the deponent"). Courts have also rejected attempts by parties to recant their deposition testimony. See Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 2000). Rule 30(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a deponent has the opportunity to review a deposition transcript for error. If plaintiff failed to do so carefully or waived the right to review the transcript, plaintiff cannot now "conjure up a triable issue of fact" by disputing the accuracy of his transcribed testimony. Margo, 213 F.3d at 61. Essentially, plaintiff attempts to "conjure up" a disputed fact here by disputing his prior testimony. Id. He cannot do so, and therefore the asserted fact is properly taken as admitted.

B.

As a result, the statement of undisputed material facts listed below is substantially based on the defendants' statements of undisputed facts. As for plaintiff's alternative narrative of facts, that narrative has been scoured for facts that might be viewed as in conflict with the facts stated here; where such disputes exist, the plaintiff's facts are, as noted below, either immaterial or not supported by admissible record evidence.

II.

The standard for summary judgment is too well-settled to require extensive discussion here. Simply put, summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and based on those undisputed facts the moving party "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). To serve as a bar to summary judgment, facts must be "material," which means that the disputed fact "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Importantly, at the summary judgment stage, courts must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the non-movant." Dennis v. Columbia Collection Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002).

III.

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, allows plaintiffs to "[b]ring suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization" in federal court. Ordinarily, an employee who wants to sue his employer for violating a collective bargaining agreement must first exhaust the contractual remedies available pursuant to that agreement. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). In a so-called "hybrid § 301" case,9 like the claims presented here, an employee may forego exhaustion by showing "both 1) that the union breached its duty of fair representation and 2) that his employer violated the collective bargaining agreement." Thompson v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 276 F.3d 651, 656 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). A union breaches its duty of fair representation "if its actions are either `arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.'" Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991). In a hybrid § 301 case, both the claim for breach of the duty of fair representation and the claim for breach of the CBA are subject to a six-month statute of limitations. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70 (1983).

Here, plaintiff's complaint consists of three counts: (i) Count I asserts a breach of duty of fair representation claim against the Union concerning plaintiff's discharge; (ii) Count II asserts a breach of the CBA by American concerning failure to provide notice of the Level 3 discipline; and (iii) Count III asserts a breach of the CBA by American concerning plaintiff's discharge. Plaintiff's hybrid § 301 claims for breach of the duty of fair representation and breach of the CBA are untimely because the complaint was filed well after plaintiff had reason to know that the Union had not filed a grievance against American on his behalf and more than six months after plaintiff's discharge. Moreover, plaintiff cannot show that the Union breached its duty of fair representation, because plaintiff points to no evidence that the Union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith. To the contrary, the Union appears to have advocated for plaintiff even after he was terminated. American did not violate any provision of the CBA. Accordingly, plaintiff's motions for summary judgment must be denied and defendants' motions for summary judgment must be granted.

A.

For hybrid § 301 claims, the applicable six-month statute of limitations begins to run when "the plaintiff knows or should have known that a violation of his rights has occurred," or when a plaintiff "discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable due diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged violation." Gilfillan v. Celanese Ag, 24 F.App'x 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2001). As one district court has recognized,

Mincey v. U.S. Postal Serv., 879 F.Supp. 567, 572 (D.S.C. 1995) (citing Flanigan v. Truck Drivers Local 671, 942 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1991)). Courts have also recognized that "a hybrid § 301 action accrues against the company when it accrues against the union." Moore v. United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Int'l Union Local 598, 33 F.App'x 165 (6th Cir. 2002).10

1.

Plaintiff's claims in Counts I (duty of fair representation) and III (breach of CBA) of the complaint are premised on his January 30, 2017 discharge. As the undisputed material facts reflect, the complaint raising these claims was filed more than six months after plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, that his claims against American and the Union had accrued. In short, plaintiff filed his complaint in this case more than six months after he had reason to know that the Union had not filed a grievance against American concerning his discharge.

To begin with, although a hybrid § 301 case involves separate breaches by the employer and the union, the claims accrue only when the plaintiff knows or should have known of the Union's alleged breach of the duty of fair representation. See White, 128 F.3d at 114; see also Ryder v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 946 F.Supp. 422, 429 (E.D. Va. 1996) ("Only when Ryder knew of this breach [of the duty of fair representation], or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of it, would his claim have accrued."). Thus, a claim against the employer for the breach of the CBA accrues at the same time as the claim for the Union's breach of the duty of fair representation, because it is the Union's breach that excuses the plaintiff's failure to exhaust the grievance process.11 Accordingly, the statute of limitations analysis appropriately focuses on whether plaintiff filed his complaint within six months of when he knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the Union had not filed and would not pursue a grievance concerning plaintiff's discharge.

The undisputed record clearly establishes that paintiff failed to file his complaint within six months of when he knew that the Union had not filed a grievance concerning plaintiff's discharge. In this regard, the undisputed material facts on this summary judgment record show that plaintiff never invoked the grievance process by submitting a grievance to the Union upon his termination. Accordingly, plaintiff had reason to know that no grievance was filed on January 30, 2017 and that the statute of limitations on his claims expired on July 31, 2017. Plaintiff improperly attempts to create a dispute of fact by contradicting his own testimony on this point, which he cannot do. See Vantage Marketing, 31 F.App'x at 114. Because the statute of limitations ran on July 31, 2017, plaintiff's complaint — filed on January 17, 2018 — is untimely and summary judgment must be entered in favor of defendants.

Even if plaintiff's version — which is unsupported by the record — is considered, the result does not change; plaintiff's complaint is still untimely. In this version, plaintiff asserts that he submitted an incomplete, but signed, grievance form to Turay on January 30, 2017. Pursuant to the CBA, the Union had 7 days — by February 6, 2017 — in which to file plaintiff's grievance. That did not occur. And the last date to hold a hearing on any grievance that had been filed would have been February 16, 2017. Thus, by February 16, 2017, plaintiff should have known that Turay did not file the blank grievance form that plaintiff claims he gave to Turay. Plaintiff clearly should have known by February 16, 2017 that the Union was not proceeding with his grievance because plaintiff was not informed of a hearing date. At the very latest, therefore, when plaintiff had heard nothing by April 27, 2017 — the date by which all of the steps of the grievance process would have been completed pursuant to the CBA deadlines — plaintiff should have known that his grievance was not filed and was not being processed. Accordingly, plaintiff, in the exercise of due diligence, having heard nothing from the Union regarding any of these steps, should have inquired of the Union and American regarding the status of his alleged grievance and filed his complaint within six months of April 27, 2017 — namely by October 27, 2017. He did not do so; plaintiff did not file his complaint until January 17, 2018.

Plaintiff claims that he was not informed of the Union's inactivity until September 25, 2017. The law precludes this claim; plaintiff is not permitted to sit back and do nothing as time passes without hearing anything regarding his purported grievance — a grievance that he never filed. On similar facts, the Seventh Circuit, in Metz v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., 715 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983), found that a plaintiff's hybrid § 301 claim was untimely. In Metz, the plaintiff alleged that she repeatedly requested that the union process her grievance, but the union took no action. See id. at 304. In concluding that the plaintiff's claim was untimely, the Seventh Circuit noted that the CBA required that the grievance procedures be exhausted within 23 days and that the union inactivity "should have been discovered by a reasonably diligent claimant prior to the statutory period." Id.12 The same result should occur here; plaintiff — who has a background in labor relations — should have acted promptly when he did not hear from the Union as the various deadlines for the grievance process expire. Instead, plaintiff did nothing; and, in so doing, plaintiff allowed the statute of limitations on his claims to expire.

To avoid this result, plaintiff asserts, without citation to any portion of the record, that he made repeated inquiries to the Union on the status of his grievance. The undisputed facts of this case, however, are that plaintiff did not contact Turay, his union steward, until many months after his discharge. See Turay Decl. ¶ 11. By then, plaintiff should have known that his to fime to file a complaint based on these claims was expiring, because plaintiff knew or should have known that the Union had not filed his grievance when February 16, 2017 passed without any notice of hearing. That plaintiff contacted Turay many months after plaintiff's discharge, and many months after plaintiff knew or should have known that no grievance was filed, does not extend the statute of limitations or toll the limitations period. See Marshburn v. Richardson, No. 89-cv-489, 1989 WL 237753, at *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 1989) (holding that continued contact with the union does not give rise to a continuing violation that extends the statute of limitations). Plaintiff does not claim that the Union ever advised him that his purported grievance had been filed. Indeed, the actions that plaintiff did take — emailing American on July 23, 2017 — demonstrate that plaintiff knew that he should have heard from the Union or American regarding his purported grievance well before the date that he sent that email.13

In sum, plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that the Union was not pursuing a grievance on his behalf when no hearing was held by February 16, 2017, the date by which the CBA required a hearing. Plaintiff could have had no doubt that a grievance had not been filed when April 26, 2017 came and passed, and he had heard nothing about any of the steps required to be taken under the CBA. In short, by April 26, 2017, plaintiff should have known that no grievance had been filed and that the Union was not pursuing his grievance at that time. Therefore, plaintiff should have filed his complaint by October 27, 2017 — within six months. Instead, the record in this case shows that plaintiff waited months after his discharge to contact Turay or American and waited until January 11, 2018 to file his complaint in this case, well after the passage of the six month statute of limitations. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims for breach of the duty of fair representation and breach of the CBA concerning his discharge are untimely and summary judgment on Counts I and III must be entered in favor of defendants.

2.

Count II of the complaint asserts that American violated the CBA by failing to notify plaintiff of the Level 3 discipline plaintiff received on October 28, 2016. Plaintiff asserts that he first learned of this discipline at the January 22, 2017 disciplinary hearing and that, pursuant to the Article 20(C) of the CBA, he was entitled to notice of the Level 3 discipline within fourteen days of its issuance. Plaintiff's claim in this respect is also untimely.

As stated, plaintiff had six months from the time the alleged violation of the CBA occurred to file this lawsuit. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169-70. Here, the undisputed facts show that plaintiff learned of the October 2016 discipline when American issued the Level 3 discipline on October 28, 2016. And the record reflects that plaintiff filed no grievance related to that discipline. Accordingly, plaintiff was required to file any complaint based on the October 2016 discipline by April 30, 2017. Instead, plaintiff waited until January 17, 2018 to file his complaint and, in this respect, his claim in Count II is untimely.

Seeking to avoid this result, plaintiff relies on his unsupported argument that he did not learn of the October 28, 2016 Level 3 discipline until January 22, 2017. Plaintiff, however, does not allege that he asked the Union to file a grievance related to his lack of notice of that discipline. Accordingly, even under plaintiff's version of the facts, his claim in Count II remains untimely, because plaintiff was required to file any claim related to the Level 3 discipline by July 24, 2017 — six months after he admits that he learned of the October 28, 2016 Level 3 discipline. To satisfy the six-month statute of limitations, plaintiff's complaint should have been filed well before January 2018 and summary judgment on Count II must be entered in favor of American.

B.

As noted, plaintiff's claims against the Union for breach of the duty of fair representation and against American for breach of the CBA are not only time barred, they also fail on the merits. Because a plaintiff must establish both a breach of the duty of fair representation and a breach of the CBA,14 an analysis of the merits properly begins with a determination whether the Union's conduct is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 499 U.S. at 67. And, a union's actions are "arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational." Id. (internal citations omitted). Similarly, the duty of fair representation prohibits "only `invidious' discrimination, such as discrimination based on constitutionally protected categories like race or gender." Jeffreys v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 354 F.3d 270, 276 (4th Cir. 2003). Bad faith involves "fraud, or deceitful or dishonest action." Id. (internal citations omitted). As the undisputed factual record reflects, plaintiff's claims fall far short of meeting this standard.

1.

In Count I, plaintiff asserts that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to pursue a grievance challenging plaintiff's discharge. Plaintiff does not assert that the Union discriminated against him;15 rather, plaintiff argues that the Union was arbitrary and acted in bad faith. Plaintiff claims that the following acts are evidence of the Union's breach of its duty: (i) the Union's reliance on the Last Chance Agreement; (ii) Turay's denial that plaintiff gave him a signed grievance form to file; (iii) the Union's failure to communicate with plaintiff regarding its abandonment of his grievance; (iv) Baskett's interactions with plaintiff and conduct following plaintiff's termination; and (v) the Union's failure to challenge the October 2016 Level 3 discipline. None of these examples demonstrates that the Union acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. To the contrary, the summary judgment record demonstrates that the Union worked diligently on plaintiff's behalf and successfully convinced American to retain plaintiff in his job, only to have plaintiff reject two offers to retain his job.16

Each of plaintiff's arguments is easily dismissed. To begin with, the Last Chance Agreement — which plaintiff signed — was an admission by the Union and by plaintiff that American was justified in terminating plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff's revocation of the agreement does not erase these admissions by plaintiff and the Union.17 It is not irrational or unreasonable for the Union to determine that the Union should not pursue a grievance where the Union and plaintiff have signed an agreement acknowledging American's just cause to terminate the plaintiff.18

Next, plaintiff argues that Turay's statement that he did not receive a grievance form from plaintiff demonstrates the Union's deceitfulness and bad faith. Yet the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff did not file a grievance or give Turay a grievance form. Plaintiff's unsupported allegations that he left a blank grievance form with Turay establishes, at most, that there was a miscommunication between plaintiff and Turay. Turay did not understand that plaintiff wished to file a grievance concerning plaintiff's discharge. See Turay Decl. ¶ 10. Indeed, the exchange between Turay and plaintiff many months after plaintiff's discharge demonstrates the extent of the miscommunication between them: plaintiff was inquiring about a grievance he thought the Union had filed and Turay was informing plaintiff that it was too late to file a grievance concerning his discharge.19 A miscommunication constitutes "simple negligence, ineffectiveness or poor judgment" which is "not sufficient to establish a breach of the duty." Basnight v. HRSA-ILA Mgmt., No. 4-cv-782, 2006 WL 2850650, at *9 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2006).20 To the contrary, at his deposition, plaintiff agreed that Turay was friendly and that Turay was sincere in his various recommendations to plaintiff. It is difficult therefore to see that the Union was deceitful. In addition to this miscommunication, plaintiff complains about a lack of communication from the Union. But the Union had no reason to contact plaintiff following his termination, as plaintiff did not file a grievance and all parties had signed the Last Chance Agreement before he was discharged. See Groves, 815 F.3d at 182 (union failure to contact plaintiffs "did not contribute to the employee's failure to exhaust their contractual remedies").21 Had plaintiff intended for the Union to file a grievance, he bore responsibility for following up with the Union after his termination. Yet plaintiff did not inquire regarding his alleged grievance for many months. See Turay Decl. ¶ 11. Thus, these communication problems between plaintiff and the Union, to the extent they were errors on the Union's part do not demonstrate bad faith or establish a breach of the duty of fair representation.

Similarly, plaintiff's arguments concerning the October 28, 2016 Level 3 discipline fail to establish that the Union breached its duty of fair representation in this regard. This argument fails because plaintiff never asked the Union to challenge the Level 3 discipline. Moreover, as discussed infra in Section III.C.1, plaintiff points to no provision of the CBA establishing that plaintiff could not be terminated before receiving a Level 3 discipline. Again, the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation where plaintiff failed to communicate his desire to file a grievance and misunderstood the CBA to preclude discharge before receipt of Level 3 discipline.

In a surprising twist of logic, plaintiff also asserts that Baskett's filing of a grievance in December 2017 demonstrates the Union's deceitful contact. To the contrary, the uncontroverted evidence in the summary judgment record is that in December 2017 Baskett filed a grievance challenging plaintiff's termination as "an additional effort to obtain relief for Mr. Mvuri." Baskett Decl. ¶ 8. Baskett does not suggest that the grievance was filed because the Union realized it was meritorious, rather the grievance was filed to accommodate plaintiff's desire to file a grievance. Significantly, contrary to plaintiff's claim of a breach of the duty of fair representation, the Union's efforts contributed to plaintiff receiving offers from American for the very relief that plaintiff seeks in this litigation — reinstatement to his position. Far from showing that the Union acted arbitrarily or in a manner hostile to plaintiff, the summary judgment record reflects that the Union successfully obtained reinstatement for plaintiff, which plaintiff rejected. The fact that Baskett did not file a grievance until December 2017 does not demonstrate any inconsistency or arbitrariness by the Union, but rather the Union's desire to accommodate plaintiff.

In sum, plaintiff has produced no evidence — either in support of his own motion for summary judgment or in opposition to defendants' motions for summary judgment — that the Union's conduct was "grossly deficient or in reckless disregard" of his rights. Hodges v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 88 F.App'x 584 (4th Cir. 2004). Here, the Union — and plaintiff — had already conceded in the Last Chance Agreement that American was justified in terminating plaintiff's employment. It is hardly surprising that the Union would not then turn around and claim that such termination was unjust. The Union's conduct was well within the "wide range of reasonableness" permitted for such decisions. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 499 U.S. at 76. Thus, the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation and defendants' motions for summary judgment must be granted.

2.

In Count II, plaintiff bases his hybrid § 301 claim against American on the failure to provide plaintiff with notice of the October 2016 Level 3 discipline. Although Count II is asserted only against American, plaintiff cannot recover unless he establishes that the Union breached its duty of fair representation in this regard. See Thompson, 276 F.3d at 656 (an employee may forego exhaustion only by showing both a breach by the employer and the union). Nowhere in the complaint or in his briefs does plaintiff assert that he asked the Union to file a grievance related to the Level 3 discipline. Moreover, there is no allegation that any act by the Union "played some role in the employee's failure to exhaust his contractual remedies" as required to state a hybrid § 301 claim. Groves, 815 F.3d at 182. In Groves, the Fourth Circuit held that there "must be some causal nexus between a union's breach of its duty of fair representation and an employee's failure to exhaust contractual remedies." Id. There, as in this case, the plaintiffs failed to file a grievance with the Union. Id. On these facts, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. See id. Similarly, plaintiff here has not alleged nor submitted legally admissible evidence that he ever requested that the Union file a grievance based on the lack of notice of the Level 3 discipline. Therefore, he cannot justify his failure to exhaust his contractual remedies based on a breach of the duty of fair representation by the Union. Accordingly, the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation with respect to the Level 3 discipline, and summary judgment must be entered in favor of American.

C.

1.

Count III alleges that American violated the CBA with respect to plaintiff's discharge by:22 (i) failing to follow progressive discipline policies; and (ii) terminating plaintiff without just cause. This claim fails on the merits because plaintiff can point to no provision of the CBA establishing that he was entitled to progressive discipline. Moreover, plaintiff admits that, with respect to his January 2017 discipline, he did what American has accused him of doing — namely being in the bag room when he was assigned to the ramp. Thus, plaintiff's motions for summary judgment must be denied, and defendants' motions for summary judgment must be granted.

Plaintiff claims that American violated the CBA by failing to issue a Level 3 discipline before his termination in January 2017. As discussed supra, the undisputed material facts show that plaintiff was issued a Level 3 discipline on October 28, 2016. Even if plaintiff's unsupported allegations were sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact, however, plaintiff's argument fails because he cannot show that any provision of the CBA was violated by American's purported failure to issue a Level 3 discipline. Plaintiff points to two provisions of the CBA which mention progressive discipline. In Article 28(A), the CBA provides that: "Level I, II, and III disciplinary letters ... shall not remain in [employees'] personnel record for a period of more than twelve (12) active motions except when associated with a higher discipline level." Likewise, Article 8(H) provides that "[e]mployees on level three (3) of the progressive discipline or attendance control programs are not eligible for any system transfers." Neither provision, however, compels or requires the use of progressive discipline. Nor do other provisions of the CBA require that American engage in progressive discipline. By contrast, American's Rules of Conduct specifically provide that "[s]ome violations of our Guiding Principles and Rules of Conduct will result in immediate termination." Rules of Conduct at 2.

Both the Union and American produced evidence that progressive discipline is not required. Turay, a union steward, averred that "progressive discipline is not specifically required by the CBA" and that American "has terminated employees without first using all the progressive disciplinary steps." Turay Decl. ¶ 3. Likewise, Gaskins, a manager, averred that "the Company reserves the right to progress an employee to any [discipline] level or terminate an employee without first using the progressive disciplinary system." Gaskins Decl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff conclusorily asserts that American has always used progressive discipline; however, plaintiff provides no citation to any portion of the record or the CBA that supports his allegation. Accordingly, the undisputed facts demonstrate that progressive discipline was not required under the CBA.

Plaintiff also asserts that American violated the CBA by discharging him without just cause. The letter formally discharging plaintiff stated that plaintiff was terminated for engaging in "intentional work slow-downs or reductions in productivity or workmanship or willful refusal or failure to follow a direction from management or refusal to perform assigned work." Plaintiff argues that he never violated any of those provisions. At his deposition, however, plaintiff admitted, with respect to the January 7, 2017 incident: "I did what they [American] said, but I was not wrong or culpable." Mvuri Depo. I Tr. at 94:5-9. Moreover, in the Last Chance Agreement, plaintiff conceded that American had just cause to terminate his employment. Although that agreement was later revoked, plaintiff's admission that his behavior warranted discharge does not disappear. Moreover, plaintiff's disciplinary history belies plaintiff's denial of reductions in productivity or refusals to perform assigned work. Even discounting the October 2016 discipline, plaintiff was disciplined four times in the two years prior to the January 7, 2017 incident for similar behavior. Accordingly, plaintiff's discharge did not violate the CBA, and summary judgment must be granted in favor of defendants.

2.

Count II of the complaint asserts that American violated Article 20(C) of the CBA by failing to notify plaintiff of the Level 3 discipline that plaintiff received on October 28, 2016. Yet, the undisputed record facts establish that plaintiff received notice of the Level 3 discipline when the discipline issued in October 2016. Plaintiff's unsupported statement does not effectively dispute defendant's legally admissible evidence and create a dispute of material fact. Even if plaintiff did not receive notice of this discipline, plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on this Count because, as discussed supra, his claim is untimely, and plaintiff cannot show that the Union violated any duty of fair representation in connection with the Level 3 discipline. See Thompson, 276 F.3d at 656. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of American must be entered on Count II.

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motions for summary judgment will be granted and plaintiff's cross-motions for summary judgment will be denied.

An appropriate order will issue separately.

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Opinion to the pro se plaintiff and all counsel of record.