BRIAN H. CORCORAN, Special Master.
On June 3, 2015, Mark Greer filed a petition seeking compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program ("Vaccine Program").
Petitioner has now filed a motion requesting final attorney's fees and costs, dated April 19, 2017. See ECF No. 32 (Ex. 14) ("Fees App."). Petitioner requests reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs in the combined amount of $21,238.08 (representing $19,509.60 in attorney's fees, plus $1,728.48 in costs). Fees App. at 1-2. Additionally, and in accordance with General Order No. 9, Petitioner represents that he did not incur any personal costs in connection with this case. Id. at 2; ECF No. 32-3 (Ex. 16).
Respondent reacted to the motion on May 3, 2017, indicating that he is satisfied that the statutory requirements for an award of attorney's fees and costs are met in this case, but deferring to my discretion the determination of the amount to be awarded. ECF No. 35 at 2. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply on May 10, 2017. ECF No. 37. In it, Petitioner argued that Respondent's choice to not take a position on the fees award prejudices Petitioner, as it is Respondent's responsibility to note if a request for attorney's fees and costs is unreasonable. Id. at 2. Petitioner otherwise reiterated his request for attorney's fees and costs as set forth in his fees application. Id.
As a successful Vaccine Program petitioner, Mr. Greer is entitled to a fees award. The hourly rates requested herein are in accordance with those I and other special masters have previously awarded to Petitioner's counsel, Ms. Danielle Strait.
The majority of the hours expended on this matter (85.8 hours in total) were also reasonable. The time it took to resolve the case was mainly the product of the parties' damages discussions. But fees and costs associated with settlement are properly reimbursable. Thomas v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 92-46V, 1997 WL 74664, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 3, 1997) (rejecting Respondent's assertion that the fees and costs should necessarily be lower when a case settles without a hearing).
I will, however, make one adjustment to the requested hours. On June 23-24, 2015, the billing invoices reflect 8.9 hours of attorney time devoted to travel to visit Petitioner, on top of 2.5 hours actually meeting with Petitioner. Fees App. at 3. It is common practice in the Program to compensate hours spent traveling at one-half of the normal hourly attorney rate, although the fact that an attorney is traveling is not automatically dispositive of how to treat such attorney time. See, e.g., King v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-584V, 2009 WL 2524564, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 27, 2009); Kuttner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 06-195V, 2009 WL 256447, at *10 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 16, 2009). In some situations, an award of full attorney's fees for travel is appropriate if sufficient documentation exists specifying the work performed while traveling. Gruber v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 91 Fed. Cl. 773, 791 (2010).
Here, the billing invoices list several entries related to the same meeting with Petitioner. The entries related to actual travel are separate from the time spent meeting with Petitioner, and they do not reveal that any work was being performed during counsel's travel time. Fees App at 3. Thus, the time entries reflect work that does not merit full compensation under Program standards, and I will therefore (in accordance with the usual practice) only award 4.45 of the 8.9 hours billed to this travel activity, resulting in a deduction of $1,312.75.
As noted above, Petitioner additionally requests an award of litigation costs for counsel in the amount of $1,728.48, reflecting payments for the filing fee, medical records, and travel costs associated with a meeting with Petitioner. Ex. 15 at 1. Respondent has offered no specific objections to these costs, and upon review of the record I find that they are reasonable.
Accordingly, based on the reasonableness of Petitioner's request, I hereby