CHARLES F. LETTOW, Senior Judge.
Pending before the court is the United States' ("the government's") motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"), see Def.'s Mot, to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 8, and the plaintiff's amended cross-motion for summary judgment, see Am. Mot. for Summ, Judgment ("Pl.'s Cross-Mot."), ECF No, 11. Because this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the complaint and Mr. Sanders has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, the government's motion to dismiss Mr. Sanders' complaint is GRANTED. Mr. Sanders' cross-motion for summary judgment is accordingly DENIED.
The basis for Mr. Sanders' complaint is not readily apparent. The complaint states that Mr. Sanders'"position is simple [and] well[-]grounded in fact and law," Compl. at 2, but Mr. Sanders does not provide any factual underpinnings for his claim, see Compl. The submissions by Mr. Sanders appear to use a cryptic messaging system, making it difficult to decipher. Many differently formatted words seem to have no apparent relation to one another besides a common root letter. See, e.g., Compl. at 3 ("enunciated essential establishments ev(ident)oking, e(xactly)ecutive, explicit extr(acts)ments") (formatting removed).
Despite these obstacles in understanding the gist of the present case, the genesis of the litigation ostensibly stems from previous litigation involving Mr. Sanders. See Compl. Exs. 1-5. In 2006, Mr. Sanders was married to his then-wife, Tiyani Kuanda-Sanders. The two resided in an apartment in Michigan, along with their shared child. Compl. Ex. 1. On a morning in 2006, Mr. Sanders got into an argument with Tiyani, eventually striking her in the face with a closed fist and threatening her life while holding a knife. Compl. Ex. 1, at 1 (Detroit Police Department report); Compl. Ex. 2, at 1 (Detroit police investigator's report).
Unhappy with this development, Mr. Sanders sued the Detroit Police Department, the two officers involved in his arrest, two state judges, and the City of Detroit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan eventually found that Mr. Sanders' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, as "Tiyani Sanders consented to law enforcement's entry into her apartment," and Mr. Sanders "did not object to the officers' request to enter his apartment." Sanders, 2017 WL 548949, at *3.
The Tucker Act provides this court with jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). To invoke this court's Tucker Act jurisdiction, "a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages." Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)). If a plaintiff fails to raise a claim under a money-mandating provision, this court "should [dismiss] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Federal Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cty. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
A claim in this court is "barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2501. This six-year statute of limitations is jurisdictional. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134 (2008).
Mr. Sanders, as plaintiff, must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court must "accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff's complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id. (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). "If a court lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case, dismissal is required as a matter of law." Gray v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 95, 98 (2005) (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868); Thoen v. United States, 765 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also RCFC 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint that "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" shall be dismissed. To survive a motion invoking Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is bound "to take the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986); see also Cambridge v. United States, 558 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009). "However, regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel, `conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.'" McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Taylor v. Books A. Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also, e.g., Williams v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 263, 275 (2011).
The government contends that Mr. Sanders' complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) "for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Def.'s Mot. at 1. According to the government's motion, "Mr. Sanders'[] complaint is illegible in place and otherwise difficult to understand," id., but that, "[e]ven when liberally construed, Mr. Sanders has failed to articulate a cognizable claim that would demonstrate that he is seeking relief based upon an express or implied-in-fact contract with the United States, or a money-mandating provision of law, as required by the Tucker Act." Id (citation omitted).
As a preliminary matter, in his complaint, Mr. Sanders fails to provide "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction," RCFC 8(a), based on the Tucker Act or otherwise, see Ruther v. United States, No. 18-1110C, 2018 WL 5095451, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 17, 2018). Although Mr. Sanders cites a litany of federal statutes
Additionally, this court may only hear claims against the United States. Although the caption on Mr. Sanders' complaint shows the United States as the defendant, Mr. Sanders does not seek relief against the United States. See Compl. at 1-2. In prior litigation, Mr. Sanders sued the Detroit Police Department, two of its officers, and two state court judges. In reality, Mr. Sanders apparently is renewing his claims against these non-federal officials and agencies. But the court has no jurisdiction over any allegations against these parties and consequently cannot hear claims against them. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); New Am. Shipbuilders, Inc. v. United States, 871 F.2d 1077, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over tort claims); Brown v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 322, 328 (2009) (this court lacks jurisdiction over criminal matters) (citing Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 2, 4 (2006)).
When viewing other parts of Mr. Sanders' complaint in light of his prior litigation, it is possible that Mr. Sanders is claiming a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment. Compl. at 2. This court, however, only has jurisdiction over constitutional violations when the Constitution requires payment of monetary compensation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); see also Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216 ("Not every claim invoking the Constitution . . . is cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the United States."); Jan's Helicopter Serv., 525 F.3d at 1308 (quoting Greenlee Cty, 487 F.3d at 876). The Fourteenth Amendment only applies to states, and is therefore inapposite in this court. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV. And although the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does apply to the federal government, it is not money-mandating and does not implicate this court's jurisdiction. See Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Therefore, the court determines Mr. Sanders fails to carry his burden in establishing this court's jurisdiction over his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
Moreover, even assuming that Mr. Sanders' complaint alleged adequate grounds for jurisdiction, his claim would be time-barred. Any claim brought before this court must have occurred within the past six years. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501. As Mr. Sanders' claim arose in 2006 nearly 12 years ago — any action would need to have been filed before 2013, at the very latest. See Sanders, 2017 WL 548949, at * 1. Since the six-year requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2501 is jurisdictional in nature, the untimeliness alone bars the court from hearing Mr. Sanders' claim. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 134.
A jury convicted Mr. Sanders of domestic violence stemming from an incident over a decade ago. Since then, Mr. Sanders has re-litigated that same event numerous times in the federal courts, often filing frivolous motions and tying up judicial resources in the process. The complaint filed with this court is the most recent iteration of this futile struggle. But Mr. Sanders has had his day in court, multiple times over. And even if he had not, this court is not the proper venue for Mr. Sanders to continue to seek relief after being denied redress in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and the Sixth Circuit. In the interest of the efficient use of judicial resources and to minimize the cost and delay of litigation, see RCFC Appendix A, dismissal of Mr. Sanders' complaint is warranted.
For the reasons stated, the government's motion to dismiss Mr. Sanders' complaint is GRANTED. Mr. Sanders' complaint shall be DISMISSED. Mr. Sanders' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.154982508154982508
No costs.
It is so
The appendix to his complain, however, is neatly organized and coherent.
