MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE:

DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR JONAH ENNERGY LLC'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO TRANSFER (Docket No. 96)

DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR STATE OF WYOMING'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO TRANSFER (Docket No. 97)

FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO SEVER AND TRANSFER (Docket No. 99)

DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR WESTERN ENERGY ALLIANCE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 100)

RONALD E. BUSH, Chief Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the Court are the following motions: (1) Defendant-Intervenor Jonah Energy LLC's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Transfer (Dkt. 96); (2) Defendant-Intervenor State of Wyoming's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Transfer (Dkt. 97); (3) Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the Alternative, to Sever and Transfer (Dkt. 99); and (4) Defendant-Intervenor Western Energy Alliance's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 100). Having carefully considered the record, participated in oral argument, and otherwise being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order:

I. BACKGROUND

The Court has previously described the general contours of this case. See (Dkts. 54, 66, 74, 111). Plaintiffs Western Watersheds Project ("WWP") and Center for Biological Diversity ("CBD") (collectively "Plaintiffs" or "WWP") allege that agency actions of the Department of Interior unlawfully promote and expedite oil and gas leasing on public lands and "will adversely impact essential habitats and populations across the range of the greater sage-grouse . . ., and violate bedrock environmental laws including the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"), the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")." First Am. Compl., ¶ 1 (Dkt. 78). Plaintiffs contend that certain national policy directives and oil and gas leasing and development approvals "systematically disregard the 2015 Sage-Grouse Plan Amendments and ignore cumulative adverse effects to sage-grouse across the Interior West." Pls.' Resp. to Mots. to Dismiss, p. 1 (Dkt. 106).

One such "agency action" is the Normally Pressured Lance Natural Gas Development Project ("NPL Project"). Defendant-Intervenor Jonah Energy LLC ("Jonah") is the proponent of the NPL Project and sought Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") approval to conduct full-field development of natural gas and condensate resources from existing state and federal oil and gas leases in an area wholly within Sublette County, Wyoming.1 See Mem. ISO Mot. to Interv., p. 2 (Dkt. 85-1). Jonah owns the leasing comprising the NPL Project area which is located on lands and minerals administered by the BLM (135,655 surface acres or 96.3% of the NPL Project area), the State of Wyoming (5,123 surface acres or 3.6% of the NPL Project area), and private lands (81 acres or 0.06% of the NPL Project area) in Sublette County. See id. The BLM issued its Record of Decision for the NPL Project ("ROD") on August 27, 2018, allowing Jonah to submit sit-specific applications for natural gas drilling and related development on federal lands within the NPL Project area — specifically, Jonah can submit applications for permits to drill and related rights-of-way for as many as 3,500 natural gas wells, associated infrastructure, and ancillary facilities, resulting in up to 350 wells site-specifically approved per year during the NPL Project's approximate 10-year development period. See id. at pp. 2-3.

The First Amended Complaint (1) specifically added the NPL Project in the "Final Actions" collectively challenged in the First, Second, and Third Claims for Relief,2 and (2) added a new Seventh Claim for Relief alleging that the NPL's Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") and ROD were deficient under FLPMA, NEPA, and the APA. See First Am. Compl., ¶¶ 1a, 12, 122, 225mm-225mmm, 332-343 (Dkt. 78). Plaintiffs seek to reverse and remand the BLM decisions reflected by the FEIS and ROD for the NPL Project. See id. at p. 121.

Jonah, Defendant-Intervenors State of Wyoming ("Wyoming") and Western Energy Alliance ("WEA"), and Defendants David Bernhardt and the BLM (collectively "Federal Defendants") move under FRCP 12(b)(3) to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims challenging the NPL Project, arguing that venue is not proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). Alternatively, they request that Plaintiffs' NPL Project claims be severed and transferred to the District of Wyoming under FRCP 21 and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

II. DISCUSSION

At the outset, Jonah, Wyoming, the Federal Defendants, and WEA move to dismiss Plaintiffs' NPL Project-related claims for improper venue pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(3). Once challenged, a plaintiff bears the burden of showing that venue is proper in the instant forum. See Schenck v. Motorcycle Accessory Warehouse, Inc., 2007 WL 1138915, *1 (D. Idaho 2007) (citing Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also, e.g., 14D Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3808 (4th ed.) (in actions with multiple claims, plaintiff must show that venue is proper for each claim). If a plaintiff sues in a district in which venue is not proper, the court will (upon timely motion) dismiss the action for improper venue, or transfer the case to any district where it could have been brought "if it be in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

A lawsuit against an officer or employee of the United States or a federal agency may be brought in any judicial district in which "(A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A-C). WWP resides in Idaho; hence, venue is proper in this District under § 1391(e)(1)(C) if no "real property" is involved with regard to Plaintiffs' claims concerning the NPL Project — that is, no Defendant resides in Idaho under § 1391(e)(1)(A), and it cannot be said that a substantial part of the events/omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' NPL-related claims occurred in Idaho, or that a substantial part of the NPL Project area that is the subject of Plaintiffs' claims is situated in Idaho under § 1391(e)(1)(B).

The Court has previously considered venue motions in this case, specifically whether Plaintiffs' (still ongoing) dispute over the way oil and gas lease sales are handled on public lands involves real property under § 1391(e)(1)(C). The Court ruled that such a challenge did not "relate to matters of right, title, and interest" and thus did not implicate real property for venue purposes. See 9/4/18 MDO, p. 10 n.7 (Dkt. 66) (citing WWP v. Salazar, 2009 WL 1299626, *2 (D. Idaho 2009)). Without conceding the point, Jonah, Wyoming, the Federal Defendants, and WEA now argue that Plaintiffs' recent challenge to the NPL Project is distinguishable. The Plaintiffs' NPL claim, they argue, centers on real property because it involves only the BLM's approval of a discrete oil and gas development project located entirely in Wyoming. See Jonah's Mem. ISO Mot. to Dismiss, pp. 6-8 (Dkt. 96-1); Wyoming's Mem. ISO Mot. to Dismiss, p. 13 (Dkt. 97-1); Fed. Defs.' Mem. ISO Mot. to Dismiss, pp. 5-9 (Dkt. 99-1); WEA's Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 100) (joinder). Plaintiffs disagree, responding that their claims relative to the NPL Project are independent of and will not adjudicate Jonah's right or title to any underlying mineral leases; instead, they seek to ensure that the BLM complies with its NEPA and FLPMA obligations in managing oil and gas development/operations in the NPL Project area. See Pls.' Resp. to Mots. to Dismiss, pp. 6-12 (Dkt. 106).

Untangling these arguments is not a straightforward exercise. Though there is a difference between Plaintiffs' claims surrounding the NPL Project on the one hand and those speaking to the BLM's oil and gas leasing policy on public lands affecting sage-grouse habitat/populations on the other hand (see infra), whether the former claims involve real property as contemplated by § 1391(e)(1)(C) is not obvious. Regardless, a definitive answer is not required here, because the Court must decide whether to transfer Plaintiffs' NPL Project-related claims even if the claims do not involve real property. In other words, even if venue is proper in the District of Idaho, the Court must still take up the requests made by Jonah, Wyoming, the Federal Defendants, and WEA to sever the claims under FRCP 21 and transfer them to Wyoming federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). And, even if venue is improper in the District of Idaho, the Court would consider, as an alternative to dismissal, whether the NPL claims should be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to any district in which they could have been brought "if it be in the interest of justice." Whether claims are dismissed or transferred under § 1406(a) is discretionary, but generally transfer is preferred over dismissal, recognizing that "[t]he `interest of justice' language acts as a limitation on transfer." Reilly v. Levin, 2015 WL 13236640, *8 (D. Idaho 2015) (citing Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1993); Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1201 (4th Cir. 1993)).

For the reasons described below, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims over the NPL Project should be transferred to Wyoming federal court. Therefore, the Court does not speak to the propriety of asserting such claims in this District in the first instance — that question need not be answered considering the other factors at play.

A. Plaintiffs' NPL Project Claims Are Severed

Severance is a preliminary procedural step in cases where a court intends to transfer only a part of a larger action. Because 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) "authorizes the transfer only of an entire action and not of individual claims," a court may properly sever certain claims, create "two or more separate `actions,'" and then "transfer certain of such separate actions while retaining jurisdiction of others." Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir. 1968); see also 7 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1689 (3rd ed.) ("Even when venue is proper as to all defendants, the court may sever a claim against a party and transfer it to a more convenient forum or sever an unrelated claim and give it separate treatment when doing so would be in the interest of some or all of the parties.").

Even when different claims are otherwise properly joined in a single case, a trial court has the authority to sever "any claim against a party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. There is broad discretion in deciding whether to sever claims that are "discrete and separate," but a court will abuse its discretion if the severance separates an otherwise "essentially unitary problem." Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1297 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that district courts "possess broad discretion . . . to make a decision granting severance."); 7 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1689 (3rd ed.) ("Questions of severance are addressed to the broad discretion of the district court.").

Hence, "[p]articular claims may be severed from the main action and proceeded with separately, where the asserted right to relief does not arise out of or relate to the same transaction or occurrence or there is no question of law or fact common to the parties." Green Meadows Partners LLP v. Tomkinson, 2006 WL 6885989, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Even where the claims are based on the same transaction or occurrence and involve common legal and factual questions, the court still may sever claims for purposes of convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to promote the expeditious resolution of the litigation. See Ferger v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 2006 WL 2091015, *1 (W.D. Wash. 2006).

Federal Defendants3 argue that "[s]everance of the NPL Project claim is appropriate because that claim relates specifically to a discrete oil and gas project in Wyoming and therefore is factually and legally distinct from Plaintiffs' other claims. . . . Unlike the other claims, the NPL Project claim is a challenge to a distinct project based on specific allegations regarding the planning and NEPA process for that project." Fed. Defs.' Mem. ISO Mot. to Dismiss, p. 11 (Dkt. 99-1). Plaintiffs counter that, despite the NPL Project's existence, common questions of law and fact predominate between it and the lease sale claims. See Pls.' Resp. to Mots. to Dismiss, pp. 12-13 (Dkt. 106) ("[I]n approving each lease sale or development project, including NPL, BLM failed to heed the `prioritization' directive under the 2015 Sage-Grouse Plan Amendments, in violation of FLPMA and the APA (Claim One); failed to follow the best available sage-grouse science, in violation of FLPMA and the APA (Claim Two); and failed to study cumulative effects of oil and gas development on sage-grouse or reasonable management alternatives, in violation of NEPA and the APA (Claim Three). These claims are predicated on common factual and legal issues, including the meaning of the prioritization directive and impacts to sage-grouse associated with oil and gas development."); but see infra (comparing Plaintiffs' NPL Project claims with balance of lease sale claims).

There are similarities and some overlap between such circulating claims, but one set (the NPL Project claims) is not like the rest. While the NPL Project claims could be viewed as collapsing into Plaintiffs' essential allegations, the factual backdrop to those claims (as well as defenses) is unique to the NPL Project in ways that do not apply to the lease sale claims. There is a fundamental difference between leasing decisions and project-level decisions that actually authorize oil and gas development. Different primary decision-makers are involved, considering different regulatory variables, leading to what are intended to be customized decisions and end-results. Together, these considerations reveal that Plaintiffs' NPL Project claims are substantively different than leasing decisions and the totality of Plaintiffs' claims does not represent an "essentially unitary problem." The Court therefore exercises its discretion to sever Plaintiffs' NPL Project claims.4

B. Plaintiffs' NPL Project Claims Are Transferred to the District of Wyoming

"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The statute allows for such a transfer "to prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The party seeking the transfer bears the burden of demonstrating that the transferee district is a "more appropriate forum." Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000). Motions to transfer venue lie within the broad discretion of the district court and must be determined on an individualized basis. See id. at 498.

There are two steps in making that decision. First, the Court must decide whether the case could have been brought in the forum to which the transfer is sought — meaning the proposed transferee court has jurisdiction and venue is proper there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 1985). If so, the second step calls for a case-specific analysis that balances the plaintiff's interest in choosing a forum against the aggregate considerations of convenience and the interest of justice/fairness. See Steward Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); Jones, 211 F.3d at 498-99. Among the private-interest and public-interest factors for the court to consider are: (1) plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) convenience of the parties; (3) convenience of the witnesses; (4) ease of access to the evidence; (5) familiarity with the applicable law; (6) feasibility of consolidation with other claims; (7) any local interest in the controversy; and (8) the relative court congestion and time [to] trial in each forum. See Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986).

On balance, these factors justify transfer of Plaintiffs' NPL Claims to the District of Wyoming, as explained to follow.

1. Step One: Where the Action Might Have Been Brought

"In determining whether an action `might have been brought' in a district, the court looks to whether the action initially could have been commenced in that district." Hatch, 758 F.2d at 414 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs do not dispute that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), they could have brought their NPL claims in the District of Wyoming. See, e.g., Pls.' Resp. to Mots. to Dismiss, pp. 15-20 (Dkt. 106) (only addressing factors involving transfer analysis, not issue of venue in District of Wyoming itself).5 Therefore, the Court turns to the parties' other arguments regarding transfer under § 1404(a).

2. Step Two: Convenience and the Interest of Justice

Environmental cases such as this one typically are "resolved by the court examining the administrative record to decide cross-motions for summary judgment. . . . There are no witnesses to consider, and documentary evidence is as easily provided in one venue as another, especially in this age of electronic transmission." Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 2007 WL 2023515, *5 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).6 Further, because all federal courts are competent to decide federal issues correctly, coupled with the fact that this Court has been actively involved in the case since its inception in April 2018 (though largely in matters preceding Jonah's intervention), there is no reason to conclude that transfer from the District of Idaho to the District of Wyoming will assist with relative court congestion and the time to trial. See 9/4/18 MDO, pp. 11-12 (Dkt. 66). In sum, the convenience factors are basically neutral, distilling the Court's focus down to the strain between Plaintiffs' choice of forum in Idaho and Wyoming's more localized interest in the NPL Project.

In that regard, while substantial deference is typically given to Plaintiffs' choice of forum, there is less reason for such deference when "the operative facts have not occurred within the forum of original selection and that forum has no particular interest in the parties or the subject matter." Pacific Car and Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1968); see also Klamath Tribes v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2018 WL 3570865, *7 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ("However, even if venue is proper here, when the environmental impact alleged is not in the district chosen and defendants move to transfer to the affected area, then plaintiff's chosen forum is given less consideration.") (citing Sierra Club v. U.S. Defense Energy Support Ctr., 2011 WL 89644, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (giving chosen forum little weight because "the underlying action is not connected to the Northern District of California."); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of State, 2009 WL 3112102, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (giving chosen forum little weight when none of operative facts occurred within district and district had little interest in parties or subject matter)).

Here, the only connection between the portion of this lawsuit relating to the NPL Project and the District of Idaho is WWP's residence in Hailey, Idaho. In stark contrast, the NPL Project's very existence is inextricably linked to Wyoming. For example:

The details described above highlight the fact that the ARMPA (which Plaintiffs claim the NPL Project violates) reflects the BLM's recognition of Wyoming's CAS as a viable greater sage-grouse management tool, such that Plaintiffs' challenge to the NPL Project's FEIS and ROD essentially challenges Wyoming's CAS — an extensive plan for managing and conserving sage-grouse populations and habitat in Wyoming, developed over many years and at significant expense through the collaborative efforts of diverse Wyoming-centric stakeholders. Whether Plaintiffs have confidence in or criticism for the Wyoming CAS does not change its inherent ties to Wyoming and it is therefore distinguishable from the Plaintiffs' more expansive challenges to oil and gas lease sales across the western United States (which the Court did not sever and transfer earlier). See 9/4/18 MDO, p. 11 (Dkt. 66) ("The subject-matter of this lawsuit [(pre-NPL Project claims)], however, is much more expansive. Plaintiffs contend that, as to such sales (regardless of which state is involved), there are common violations of federal laws predicated on strategic policy directives from the Trump Administration which, in turn, will result in cumulative impacts threatening sage-grouse across the sage-grouse range. The Plaintiffs' claims are not specific to any particular transferee district; hence, they argue, and the Court is persuaded, that nothing about the fact of the lease sales (and any corresponding local interest in the same) raises a compelling argument in favor of transfer. In short, they exist independently from whether Federal Defendants complied with federal law; the leases may be local, but the challenged national policies that created them are not.") (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted). Additionally, recognizing the NPL Project's ties to Wyoming, its impacts (economic, environmental, and otherwise) are logically most distinctly absorbed by Wyoming interests — this is true even without Plaintiffs' challenge to the NPL Project and therefore especially so in light of that same challenge.

In sum, Wyoming's connection to the NPL Project, and thus also to Plaintiffs' claims challenging the NPL Project, is more pronounced than Idaho's and operates to overcome Plaintiffs' original choice of forum in this District. See, e.g., Klamath Tribes, 2018 WL 3570865 at *7 (acknowledging current and transferee forums' interests in having localized controversies decided at home, stating that "courts consider specific environmental locales or the location of the protective species that `can give certain districts an especially acute interest' in deciding cases there.") (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 2013 WL 120185, *6 (N.D. Cal. 2013)); Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 944 F.Supp. 13, 19-20 (D.D.C. 1996) ("Moreover, suits such as this one, which involve water rights, environmental regulation, and local wildlife — matters that are of great importance in the State of Colorado — should be resolved in the forum where the people `whose rights and interests are in fact most vitally affected by the suit — the people of [Colorado].") (quoting Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 167 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Simply put, Wyoming's interests predominate over Idaho's. Plaintiffs' NPL Claims are therefore transferred to the District of Wyoming.

III. ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that (1) Jonah's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Transfer (Dkt. 96); (2) Wyoming's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Transfer (Dkt. 97); (3) Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the Alternative, to Sever and Transfer (Dkt. 99); and (4) WEA's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 100) are GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as follows:

1. Plaintiffs' NPL Claims are not dismissed. In this respect, the above motions are DENIED.

2. Plaintiffs' NPL Claims are severed from this case pursuant to FRCP 21 and transferred to the District of Wyoming pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In this respect, the above motions are GRANTED.

The Clerk shall transfer Plaintiffs' NPL Claims — as represented broadly by Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief (see supra at p. 8, n.4) — to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.