MINDY MICHAELS ROTH, Special Master.
On August 15, 2014, Sara Sajbel ("Ms. Sajbel," or "petitioner") filed a petition as representative of the estate of her deceased son, B.B.T., for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.
On August 11, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Motion for Fees, ECF No. 87. Petitioner requests attorneys' fees in the amount of $68,846.10 and attorneys' costs in the amount of $37,337.09, for a total amount of $106,183.19. Motion for Fees, Tab A at 4. In accordance with General Order #9, petitioner's counsel represents that petitioner incurred $1,633.95 in out-of-pocket expenses. Id.
On August 22, 2017, respondent filed a response to petitioners' Motion for Fees. Response, ECF No. 88. Respondent provided no specific objection to the amount requested or hours worked, but instead, "respectfully recommend[ed] that the Special Master exercise her discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys' fees and costs." Id. at 3. Petitioner did not file a reply. This matter is now ripe for decision.
The Vaccine Act permits an award of "reasonable attorneys' fees" and "other costs." § 15(e)(1). If a petitioner succeeds on the merits of his or her claim, the award of attorneys' fees is automatic. Id.; see Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S.Ct. 1886, 1891 (2013). However, a petitioner need not prevail on entitlement to receive a fee award as long as the petition was brought in "good faith" and there was a "reasonable basis" for the claim to proceed. § 15(e)(1).
The Federal Circuit has endorsed the use of the lodestar approach to determine what constitutes "reasonable attorneys' fees" and "other costs" under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under this approach, "an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys' fees" is calculated by "multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate." Id. at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). That product is then adjusted upward or downward based on other specific findings. Id.
Special masters have substantial discretion in awarding fees and may adjust a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing petitioners with notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009). Special masters need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner's fee application when reducing fees. See Broekelschen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (2011).
A "reasonable hourly rate" is defined as the rate "prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on "the forum rate for the District of Columbia" rather than "the rate in the geographic area of the practice of petitioner's attorney." Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1349). There is a "limited exception" that provides for attorney's fees to be awarded at local hourly rates when "the bulk of the attorney's work is done outside the forum jurisdiction" and "there is a very significant difference" between the local hourly rate and forum hourly rate. Id. This is known as the Davis County exception. See Hall v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 640 F.3d 1351, 1353 (2011) (citing Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. EPA, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
In this case, Mr. Gage's firm is located in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Special masters have consistently denied forum rates to legal professionals practicing in the Cheyenne area. See, e.g., Onikama v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1348V, 2017 WL 1718798 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 3, 2017); Anthony v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-860, 2016 WL 7733084 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 15, 2016). Therefore, forum rates do not apply in this case.
The requested hourly rates for Mr. Gage
Likewise, the requested hourly rates for Mr. Gage's paralegals, Ms. Susan McNair, Mr. Brian Vance, Ms. Helen Nelson, and Ms. Kara Sutton are consistent with rates previously found to be reasonable. Onikama, 2017 WL 1718798 (Finding an appropriate hourly rate for Ms. McNair and Mr. Vance to be $120); Auch v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-673, 2016 WL 3944701 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 20, 2016)(Finding an appropriate hourly rate for work performed in 2013 by Ms. Nelson and Ms. Sutton to be $110.08).
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the requested rates to be reasonable.
Attorneys' fees are awarded for the "number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation." Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Saxton ex rel. Saxton v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). "Unreasonably duplicative or excessive billing" includes "an attorney billing for a single task on multiple occasions, multiple attorneys billing for a single task, attorneys billing excessively for intra office communications, attorneys billing excessive hours, [and] attorneys entering erroneous billing entries." Raymo v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 129 Fed. Cl. 691, 703 (2016). While attorneys may be compensated for non-attorney-level work, the rate must be comparable to what would be paid for a paralegal or secretary. See O'Neill v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-243V, 2015 WL 2399211, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 28, 2015). Clerical and secretarial tasks should not be billed at all, regardless of who performs them. See, e.g., McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *26. Hours spent traveling are ordinarily compensated at one-half of the normal hourly attorney rate. See Scott v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-756V, 2014 WL 2885684, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 5, 2014) (collecting cases). And "it is inappropriate for counsel to bill time for educating themselves about basic aspects of the Vaccine Program." Matthews v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No 14-1111V, 2016 WL 2853910, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 18, 2016). Ultimately, it is "well within the Special Master's discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work done." Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1522. In exercising that discretion, special masters may reduce the number of hours submitted by a percentage of the amount charged. See Broekelschen, 102 Fed. Cl. at 728-29 (affirming the Special Master's reduction of attorney and paralegal hours); Guy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 403, 406 (1997) (same).
Mr. Gage billed 3 hours on April 13, 2016 and 3 hours on April 14, 2016 as "travel at ½ rate," but billed at his full hourly rate of $311. Motion for Fees, Tab C, at 17. While an attorney may bill for work peformed while traveling, "special masters consistently award compensation for travel time at 50% of the billing rate in the Vaccine Program." Hocraffer v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-533V, 2011 WL 3705153, at * 24. Therefore, attorneys' fees will be reduced by $933.00.
With the exception of the foregoing, the amount of hours billed seems reasonable and I see no erroneous or duplicative billing. See generally Motion for Fees, Tabs C-G. I therefore see no reason to further reduce petitioner's fees.
Petitioner requested a total of $37,337.09 in attorneys' costs, including $34,200 in expert fees to Dr. Byers, $1,771.27 in travel costs, and $916.65 in costs associated with obtaining medical records. See Motion for Fees, Tab H, at 42-43, 60.The undersigned finds petitioner's requested costs to be reasonable.
Petitioner requested $1,633.95 in out of pocket expenses, including $1,121.75 in costs associated with setting up the estate, as required by the Program, and $404.20 for hotel rooms for Mr. Gage and Dr. Byers for March 23, 2016.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this Decision.