JENNIFER L. THURSTON, Magistrate Judge.
Defendants move for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. They also move for judgment on the pleadings on qualified immunity grounds as to one of the claims asserted against Defendants Longoria and Noland. Plaintiff opposes the first motion, but he has not asserted any argument against the latter motion. Plaintiff has also filed several discovery-related motions. Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit as to any of his claims, the Court will deny all of Plaintiff's motions, and it will recommend that Defendants' motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies be granted and that the motion for judgment on the pleadings be denied as moot.
Plaintiff moves to stay adjudication of Defendants' motion for summary judgment so that the parties may have an opportunity to conduct discovery before proceeding to the merits of his claims. (Doc. 54.) The Court construes this motion as one brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) and Local Rule 260(b).
Rule 56(d) provides "a device for litigants to avoid summary judgment when they have not had sufficient time to develop affirmative evidence."
This showing cannot, of course, predict with accuracy precisely what further discovery will reveal; the whole point of discovery is to learn what a party does not know or, without further information, cannot prove.
Local Rule 260(b), in turn, provides, in relevant part, "If a need for discovery is asserted as a basis for denial of the motion [for summary judgment], the party opposing the motion shall provide a specification of the particular facts on which discovery is to be had or the issues on which discovery is necessary." E.D. Cal. Local Rule 260(b).
Plaintiff fails to identify any discovery that he believes is necessary to oppose Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Instead, he cites to several cases for the proposition that a court should not grant summary judgment against a party who has not yet had an opportunity to pursue discovery.
The Court found Plaintiff's complaint to state several cognizable claims stemming from multiple, distinct incidents: 1) a First Amendment retaliation claim against Villarrial, Dollarhide, Longoria, and Noland in their individual capacities; 2) an Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Campbell, Morelock, Longoria, Noland and Burns in their individual capacities; 3) an Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim against Dollarhide, Longoria, and Burns in their individual capacities; 4) a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against Longoria, Noland, and Alvarado in their individual capacities; and 5) Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") claims against Alfaro and Sexton in their official capacities.
To facilitate review of Plaintiff's claims and related administrative grievances, the Court will present each incident separately and include evidence of Plaintiff's exhaustion efforts.
Plaintiff is a state prisoner who suffers from a psychiatric disorder, Self-Injurious Behavior ("SIB"), whereby he cuts himself with sharp objects to relieve anxiety and other mental distress. SIB can lead to dangerous levels of self-harm. In September 2016, Plaintiff arrived at California State Prison in Corcoran to participate in the Mental Health Services Delivery System ("MHSDS"). He describes several incidents in which he was deliberately treated poorly by staff members who were aware of his susceptibility to self-harm. Due to these incidents, Plaintiff did indeed engage in self-harm.
Between October and December 2016, Defendants Noland and Longoria openly ridiculed Plaintiff and other MHSDS prisoners who were standing in line for medication. When Plaintiff complained about the treatment to these staff members, Longoria and Noland, along with other officers, hand-cuffed Plaintiff, pushed him into walls while escorting him to a holding cage, locked him in the holding cage for 1-2 hours still handcuffed, and continued to call him names.
There is no evidence that Plaintiff submitted a grievance as to the conduct of thes two Defendants' from October through December 2016. There is, however, an inmate grievance submitted on January 11, 2017, Log No. 17-0305, alleging misconduct by non-party CO Flores and Defendant Noland on January 10, 2017, in the form of tight handcuffs, shoving Plaintiff into a wall, forcefully pushing Plaintiff into a holding cage, and name calling, but this could not have served to exhaust Plaintiff's administrative remedies because it related to a January 2017 incident and it involved different individuals.
On or around February 11, 2017, Plaintiff was assigned to a yard crew position as a part of his mental health treatment. However, Defendants Alvarado, Longoria, and Noland refused to call Plaintiff to report to work or to put Plaintiff to work. In late February 2017, Plaintiff asked Alvarado, Longoria, Noland and other officers why he had not been called to work. Longoria stated, "We don't hire J-cats." Noland laughed, and Alvarado stated, "Go back to your cell. If we want you, we'll call you." Plaintiff was never called to work.
On March 29, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance, Log No. 17-2955, complaining about the refusal of various yard officers to call Plaintiff to work because of his mental health status.
On May 11, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a Reasonable Modification or Accommodation Request ("RAP") on a CDCR 1824 form, Log No. 17-2507, complaining about the failure of facility staff to allow Plaintiff to report to work because of his "mental health psychiatric disability." Goree Decl. Ex. GG (Doc. 49-5 at 215-16). The RAP was denied on June 1, 2017, because Plaintiff's request did not include any disability discrimination issues.
On June 4, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance regarding the RAP denial. Goree Decl. Ex. JJ (Doc. 49-5 at 258-60). This grievance appears to have been related to the earlier-filed grievance, Log No. 17-2955, and construed at the second level of review as a staff complaint. It was partially granted at the second level of review on July 13, 2017, and then denied at the third level of review on November 3, 2017. Decl. of M. Voong in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 204b 11, Ex. YY (Doc. 49-7 at 85-86, 91-92). This grievance did not exhaust Plaintiff's administrative remedies as to this incident because the grievance was processed at the final level of review after this case was initiated.
On January 23, 2017, there was a gang-related disturbance at CSP-Cor. Although Plaintiff was not involved, he was ordered to lay prone and was shivering in wet grass for two hours. Campbell and Morelock secured Plaintiff's wrist with excessively tight restraints. They then commented that Plaintiff was an MHSDS inmate as they roughly searched Plaintiff and removed his pants, exposing his buttocks. During the search, Plaintiff's pubic hairs were forcefully ripped out. Defendants roughly pulled up Plaintiff's pants and boxer shorts, causing Plaintiff discomfort. As Plaintiff was putting his feet into his shoes, Defendants shoved him forward, preventing Plaintiff from putting on one shoe and causing other prisoners to laugh.
On January 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance, Log No. 17-0465, concerning this incident. Goree Decl. Ex. W (Doc. 49-5 at 102-09). This grievance was converted to a staff complaint and was partially granted at the second level of review on July 28, 2017. Plaintiff was informed that he could appeal the decision by submitting an appeal to the Secretary's/Third Level of Review, but there is no evidence that Plaintiff submitted the appeal for further review. This grievance therefore did not exhaust Plaintiff's administrative remedies as to this incident.
On or about April 12, 2017, Plaintiff's counselor determined that Plaintiff was eligible for a Level III override referral to a progressive programming facility at California State Prison — Los Angeles ("CSP-LAC"). On May 30, 2017, Plaintiff learned that the referral was not going through. On June 2, 2017, Dollarhide advised Plaintiff that his case needed to be taken back to the committee to be approved. Then, on June 4, Dollarhide said that Villarrial had intervened and stopped the Level III override from going back to the committee because Plaintiff "files a lot of complaints." Villarrial refused to hold a new committee for Plaintiff's referral. He also falsified information about Plaintiff not meeting behavioral requirements, using this as a pretense to reject Plaintiff's referral.
Plaintiff filed several grievances regarding referrals to other institutions. On May 31, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance, Log No. 17-2954, complaining about his exclusion by the Unit Classification Committee ("UCC") on May 3, 2017, from an override to another facility. Goree Decl. Ex. HH (Doc. 49-5 at 221-23). Plaintiff claimed he met all the requirements for a transfer, but he was denied due to a "bogus" Staff Separation Alert that he claims was planted in his file. Plaintiff's grievance was denied at the first level of review on June 22, 2017, and then at the second level of review on September 11, 2017.
On June 11, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance, Log No. 17-3020, regarding a "botch[ed]" UCC action from May 24, 2017. Goree Decl. Ex. KK (Doc. 49-5 at 265-68). This grievance was bypassed at the first level of review and then partially granted at the second level of review on August 1, 2017.
On June 21, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance, Log No. 17-3177, complaining about Dollarhide and Villarrial's denial of Plaintiff's override. Goree Decl. Ex. II (Doc. 49-5 at 250-253). The grievance was screened on June 22, 2017, and it was rejected for having exceeded the allowable number of appeals within a 14-day period.
On September 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance, Log No. 17-4797, regarding a classification review held by Villarrial and Dollarhide on September 6, 2017.
On two to three occasions, Longoria and Noland pushed Plaintiff into walls, put him in a holding cage, and insulted him as he was seeking mental health care. These Defendants were aware of Plaintiff's susceptibility to psychological injury.
There is no evidence that Plaintiff filed a grievance or otherwise attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies as to this incident.
On June 7, 2017, Dr. Amajoyi informed Dollarhide that Plaintiff was using the weekly issued razors to self-harm and recommended Plaintiff be provided a job assignment. On June 20, 2017, Dr. Amajoyi again called Dollarhide and said that Plaintiff was using the weekly issued razor to self-harm and to recommend that Plaintiff be given a job assignment. Dollarhide took no action, and Plaintiff continued to engage in self-harm.
There is no evidence that Plaintiff filed a grievance or otherwise attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies as to this incident.
Plaintiff was prescribed psychotropic medication to take as needed to deter the urge to self-harm. On August 6, 2017, Plaintiff went to pick up this medicine but was prevented from going to the medication window for over an hour because of a disturbance. Plaintiff informed Noland that he needed the medication to prevent his self-harm. Noland replied "Stupid J-cat" while throwing Plaintiff's medication cup to the ground. Noland moved Plaintiff to sit in the direct sunlight in temperatures above 90 degrees, telling other officers, "This guy is a J-cat, so watch him, and if he moves, shoot him." Plaintiff was left in the sun for over an hour.
On August 7, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance, Log No. 17-4198, complaining about this incident. Goree Decl. Ex. LL (Doc. 49-5 at 287-94). This grievance was converted to a staff complaint and partially granted at the second level of review on September 28, 2017. The institutional inquiry revealed no wrongdoing on the part of any staff members, and Plaintiff was informed that he could appeal to the third level of review if he wished to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff, however, did not pursue this appeal any further. Accordingly, Log No. 17-4198 did not exhaust Plaintiff's administrative remedies.
On August 29, 2017, Plaintiff was scheduled to meet with a psychologist. While waiting, he was placed in a holding cage for five hours without food, water, medication or bathroom access. Plaintiff became agitated and manipulated his restraints to engage in self-harm. When Burns saw Plaintiff's cuts and blood, he opened the holding cage door and said, "Stupid J-cat, you fucked up my cage with all this blood." He then pushed Plaintiff into walls and pushed his chest into a door causing Plaintiff to fall to his knees. Burns removed the bloodstained handcuffs and challenged Plaintiff to a fight. Plaintiff refused.
Burns then secured Plaintiff's handcuffs from behind, bending Plaintiff's wrists and forcefully raising his arms, causing pain in Plaintiff's wrist, neck and shoulders. Burns urged Plaintiff to resist, but again Plaintiff refused. Burns joked that Plaintiff cut because he was, "a mentally retarded crack baby." Plaintiff felt humiliated.
When Plaintiff was released, he asked for medical attention for his wounds. Burns replied, "You only get medical attention after you fight me." Burns again asked Plaintiff to fight him, and Plaintiff again refused. Burns then ordered the nurse to falsely record that Plaintiff had refused medical aid. Plaintiff was returned to housing without treatment and still bleeding.
On September 5, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a CDCR 602 HC Health Care Appeal complaining about this incident, Log No. CO-SC-17000004.
The court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion, and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact.
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses.
Generally, when a Defendant moves for summary judgment on an affirmative defense on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward with evidence which would entitle him to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, inferences drawn from the underlying facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence.
"No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory.
The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal administratively "any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). To exhaust available administrative remedies, a prisoner must proceed through three formal levels of appeal and receive a decision from the Secretary of the CDCR or his designee.
The amount of detail in an administrative grievance necessary to properly exhaust a claim is determined by the prison's applicable grievance procedures.
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3-4).
Exhaustion of administrative remedies may occur if, despite the inmate's failure to comply with a procedural rule, prison officials ignore the procedural problem and render a decision on the merits of the grievance at each available step of the administrative process.
Plaintiff's claims are premised on conduct occurring between September 2016 and August 2017. Because Plaintiff filed his complaint on October 2, 2017, he may proceed only on those claims that were exhausted before this case was initiated.
Between September 2016 and October 2017, Plaintiff filed 24 non-healthcare grievances and 15 healthcare grievances.
Once the Defendants met their initial burden, the burden shifted to Plaintiff to come forward with evidence showing that something in his particular case made the existing administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.
As summarized above, the PLRA requires proper exhaustion. In California, that means filing a grievance and following the proper procedures to see that grievance through the third level of review. In his opposition, Plaintiff makes three general arguments regarding those grievances converted to staff complaints. First, he cites to several cases, including
In contrast, the second level responses to Plaintiff's grievances that were converted to staff complaints specifically informed Plaintiff that he needed to proceed to the third level of review for exhaustion.
Plaintiff next argues that staff members reviewing his grievances failed to comply with institutional directives regarding the inclusion of other issues in the grievance. In support, Plaintiff cites to Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.9(i)(2), which states only that the inmate must be informed that the converted staff complaint will not address any other issues, and that those other issues must be appealed separately. The basis of Plaintiff's argument is unclear since it is evident that he was informed of the need to pursue other issues in a separate grievance:
Lastly, Plaintiff claims his grievances suffice to exhaust his administrative remedies because they allege "an ongoing prison practice of discrimination against a specific class." But there is no such claim in this case. As the December 21, 2017 Screening Order found, "Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Defendants helped promulgate or ratify any policy or practice that allegedly violated Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants allowed or encouraged . . . correctional staff to harass Plaintiff appear purely speculative." (
The Court now turns to the six converted grievances that Plaintiff claims exhausted his administrative remedies: (1) Log No. 17-0305 (Goree Decl. Ex. V), (2) Log No. 17-0465 (Goree Decl. Ex. W), (3) Log No. 17-2955 (Voong Decl. Ex. YY), (4) Log No. 17-4198 (Goree Decl. Ex. LL), (5) Log No. 17-4797 (Voong Decl. Ex. AAA), and (6) Log No. CO-SC-17000004 (Gates Decl. Ex. N).
Plaintiff argues that Log No. 17-0305 satisfies the exhaustion requirement as to the October through December 2016 conduct of Defendants Noland and Longoria. As noted above, though, Log No. 17-0305 concerns a single incident (as opposed to 2-3 incidents), it involves non-party CO Flores and Defendant Noland (not Defendants Longoria and Noland), and it covers a different time (January 10, 2017 versus a period stretching from October through December 2016). Goree Decl. Ex. V. This grievance therefore could not have exhausted Plaintiff's administrative remedies as to the claims against Noland and Longoria.
Log No. 17-0465 complained of Campbell and Morelock's conduct on January 23, 2017. Goree Decl. Ex. W. This grievance was converted to a staff complaint and partially granted at the second level of review on July 28, 2017. Plaintiff was then informed that exhaustion required him to proceed to the third level of review, but he did not proceed to that level. Plaintiff's opposition asserts no argument that would justify his failure to exhaust.
Log No. 17-2955 appealed the denial of a RAP concerning staff members allegedly mistreating Plaintiff and excluding him from a work assignment because of his mental health. Goree Decl. Ex. JJ. Construed as a staff complaint, it was partially granted at the second level of review on July 13, 2017, and it was denied at the third level of review on November 3, 2017. The conversion of this grievance therefore had no bearing on Plaintiff's ability to proceed through all levels of review. Moreover, this grievance could not serve to exhaust administrative remedies as to any claim in this action because the third level response is dated after the initiation of this case.
Log No. 17-4198 concerned the mistreatment of Plaintiff on August 7, 2017, while he was standing in line to receive pain medication. Goree Decl. Ex. LL. This grievance was partially granted at the second level of review, and Plaintiff did not proceed to the third level of review for exhaustion. Plaintiff's opposition asserts no argument that would justify his failure to exhaust.
Log No. 17-4797 concerned a September 6, 2017, classification review held by Villarrial and Dollarhide. Voong Decl. Ex. AAA (Doc. 49-7 at 127-29). This grievance was converted to a staff complaint and ultimately denied at the third level of review on February 14, 2018. The conversion of this grievance therefore had no bearing on Plaintiff's ability to proceed through all levels of review. Moreover, this grievance could not serve to exhaust administrative remedies as to any claim in this action because the third level response is dated after the initiation of this case.
Health care appeal Log No. CO-SC-17000004 concerned the August 29, 2017, incident in which Burns was upset with Plaintiff for having cut himself in the holding cage. Gates Decl. Ex. N. The grievance was deemed a healthcare staff complaint and ultimately denied at the final level of review on May 9, 2018. This grievance could not have exhausted Plaintiff's administrative remedies because the process was completed after this action was initiated.
Plaintiff also identifies two grievances that he claims were improperly canceled or rejected: (1) Log No. 17-0692 (Goree Decl. Ex. X) and (2) Log No. 17-6129 (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. G).
On January 10, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a CDCR 1824 RAP, assigned Log No. 17-0224, regarding the "discriminatory ridicule" he has endured from correctional officers between September 2016 and January 2017 because of Plaintiff's mental health problems and enrollment in MHSDS.
Plaintiff appealed the cancelation of Log No. 17-0692 in a separate grievance that was assigned Log No. 17-1110. Goree Decl. Ex. X. On April 11, 2017, this new grievance was denied at the second level of review after it was determined that the cancelation of Log No. 17-0692 was appropriate.
Plaintiff presents no argument as to why the cancelation of Log No. 17-0692 was improper. In any event, this grievance concerned only verbal harassment, which Plaintiff was previously informed is not actionable on the facts alleged.
Log No. 17-6129 was filed on November 28, 2017 and concerns a UCC action dated November 20, 2017. Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. G. This grievance was filed after Plaintiff initiated this case, and therefore it cannot serve to have exhausted Plaintiff's administrative remedies as to any claim.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that there were improper or biased staff reviewers for three of his grievances: (1) Log No. 2954 (Voong Decl. Ex. BBB), (2) Log No. 17-3020 (Voong Decl. Ex. CCC), and (3) Log No. 17-4797 (Voong Decl. Ex. AAA). Each of these grievances was resolved at the third level of review after this case was initiated. Accordingly, none of them could have served to exhaust Plaintiff's administrative remedies.
Plaintiff initiated this federal civil rights action on October 2, 2017, and the Court screened his complaint and found it to state multiple claims based on eight separate incidents. In their moving papers, Defendants have presented evidence showing that administrative remedies were available to Plaintiff, but that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to any of his claims. In his opposition, Plaintiff argued that several of his grievances did exhaust his administrative remedies and/or that circumstances rendered such remedies unavailable. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that any of his claims were exhausted or that remedies were unavailable to him.
On April 12, 2019, discovery in this case was stayed pending resolution of Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 52.) Since then, Plaintiff has filed three discovery-related motions. (Docs. 55, 63, 69.) Each of these motions will be denied in light of the discovery stay.
Based on the foregoing, the Court
Additionally, the Court
These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) days after being served with the findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
