D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
Dennis Emmett (Emmett) appeals the district court's denial of his motion for early termination of supervised release. We conclude that the district court did not adequately explain its reasons for rejecting Emmett's arguments in favor of early termination, and therefore vacate the district court's order and remand for further proceedings.
Emmett pled guilty to one count of mail fraud on December 12, 2008, and was subsequently sentenced to fifty-one months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. This conviction arose out of Emmett's participation in a scheme to trick victims into investing in fraudulent companies that claimed to purchase lottery tickets and distribute the proceeds to investors. Tens of thousands of people fell victim to this scheme, resulting in total losses between $14 million and $20 million.
Two years after Emmett was released from custody, he filed a motion for early termination of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Emmett argued that continuing his term of probation was a waste of resources because his offense was non-violent; he never violated his terms of supervised release; and the probation office was not providing him with training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.
Emmett appeals the denial of his motion.
Our decisions "have repeatedly held that a district court enjoys significant discretion in crafting terms of supervised release for criminal defendants." United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 557 (9th Cir.2006). Consistent with a district court's broad discretion in imposing terms of supervised release, the language of § 3583(e) gives district courts broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion to terminate supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir.2006). We therefore review the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Townsend, 98 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Lowe, 632 F.3d 996, 997 (7th Cir.2011).
Emmett claims that the district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard, and by failing to provide a sufficient explanation for its decision. We consider each argument in turn.
It is an abuse of discretion to apply the wrong legal standard. United States v. Ruiz, 257 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir.2001). Here, Emmett claims that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by refusing to grant early termination unless Emmett proved undue hardship caused by his supervised release.
The correct legal standard for deciding a motion to terminate supervised release is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The statute provides that, after considering a subset of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a court may terminate a term of supervised release "if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice." Id. § 3583(e)(1). The expansive phrases "conduct of the defendant" and "interest of justice" make clear that a district court enjoys discretion to consider a wide range of circumstances when determining whether to grant early termination. See United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 283 (4th Cir.1999).
The text of § 3583(e) does not support a legal standard that categorically requires a petitioner to demonstrate undue hardship. District courts are directed to exercise discretion in light of a broad range of factors, and therefore a blanket rule denying early termination whenever a defendant fails to prove undue hardship would "completely disregard[] the statute." See Lowe, 632 F.3d at 998-99 (concluding that a "general policy of refusing to consider motions for early termination of supervised release until the final twelve months of the defendant's probation" is not permissible under § 3583(e)). Thus, if the district court had applied an inflexible rule requiring Emmett to prove undue hardship stemming from supervised release, that would have been an abuse of discretion.
Here, however, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion
Instead, the district court's finding that Emmett failed to demonstrate undue hardship is best interpreted as one reason why early termination is not in the "interest of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Under the broad legal standard for granting early termination, it was not an abuse of discretion to consider as one factor among others whether continued supervised release posed an undue hardship.
Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard.
We next consider whether the district court had a duty to explain its reasons for rejecting Emmett's request for early termination of supervised release, and if so, whether it provided a sufficient explanation.
It is a general principle of federal sentencing law that district courts have a duty to explain their sentencing decisions. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc); United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.2013). This duty exists for two distinct prudential reasons. First, explanations allow circuit courts to conduct meaningful appellate review of sentencing decisions. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Second, explanations "promote the perception of fair sentencing," id., creating trust in sentencing decisions by reassuring the public of the judiciary's commitment to reasoned decisionmaking, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). The duty to offer a reasoned explanation applies to the initial sentence imposed by the district court, and also extends to rulings on requests for a sentencing reduction. Carty, 520 F.3d at 992; Trujillo, 713 F.3d at 1009.
A district court's duty to explain its sentencing decisions must also extend to requests for early termination of supervised release.
In light of our conclusion that the duty to explain extends to requests for early termination of supervised release, we must consider whether the record below contains a sufficient explanation for rejecting Emmett's motion. "What constitutes a sufficient explanation will necessarily vary depending on the complexity of the particular case[.]" Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. In each case, however, an explanation must be sufficiently detailed to permit "meaningful" appellate review, and it must state the court's reasons for rejecting "nonfrivolous" arguments. Id.; see also Trujillo, 713 F.3d at 1009 (recognizing that although "there is no mechanical requirement that a sentencing court discuss every factor ... it may be clear from the court's experience and consideration of the record that the factors were properly taken into account," the sentencing court has an obligation to provide some explanation for why it has rejected specific nonfrivolous arguments). The required explanation is "most helpful" when it "come[s] from the bench, but adequate explanation in some cases may also be inferred from ... the record as a whole." Carty, 520 F.3d at 992.
Emmett's motion was denied without a hearing or any response from the government or probation office, and the only explanation in the record is the district court's order stating that Emmett did not demonstrate undue hardship caused by supervised release.
On remand, the district court need not give an elaborate explanation of its reasons
The district court's order is
NGUYEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Dennis Emmett filed a bare-bones ex parte application which merely reargued, in little more than a page, matters already previously considered by the district court. As the majority correctly concludes, the district court applied the proper legal standard to deny Emmett's application. Yet, the majority nevertheless vacates the ruling on the ground that the district court failed to explain adequately its reasoning. Because the majority opinion gives short shrift to the "wide latitude" accorded to district courts in sentencing matters, and needlessly extends our case law in a manner that elevates form over substance, I respectfully dissent.
"In fashioning conditions of supervised release, a district court `has at its disposal all of the evidence, its own impressions of a defendant, and wide latitude.'" United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 557 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004)). And "[i]n light of this `wide latitude,' we give considerable deference to a district court's determination of the appropriate supervised release conditions, reviewing those conditions deferentially, for abuse of discretion." Id. This significant degree of discretion also applies, of course, when the court is asked to modify or terminate supervised release. United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 946-47, No. 13-30017, 2014 WL 878832, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2014).
Naturally, though, the court's discretion is not unbounded. Weber, 451 F.3d at 557. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the district court must "consider[]" the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and explain its decision. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc) (district court must explain initial sentencing determination). "However, we have held that there is no mechanical requirement that a sentencing court discuss every factor; even where a judge never mentions `§ 3553(a),' it may be clear from the court's experience and consideration of the record that the factors were properly taken into account." United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.2013) (citing Carty, 520 F.3d at 995-96). While the court should generally address "nonfrivolous" arguments raised by a defendant, the majority opinion fails to acknowledge that such arguments must also be "specific," and "tethered to a relevant § 3553(a) factor in support of a requested sentence[.]" Carty, 520 F.3d at 992-93.
Now consider the facts of this case. The Presentence Report prepared by the probation office, and reviewed by the court prior to sentencing, extensively detailed the offense conduct, the relevant sentencing factors, Emmett's criminal history, and
Ultimately, "[w]hat constitutes a sufficient explanation [by the district court of its sentencing decision] will necessarily vary depending on the complexity of the particular case[.]" Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. Emmett's application for early termination of supervised release is not complex. In fact, there is nothing to it. When Emmett was originally sentenced, he did not object to the court's imposition of a three-year term of supervised release. Now, he has filed an application that, in little more than a page, mostly reiterates arguments already made at the time of sentencing, before the same district judge who originally sentenced him.
What does Emmett's 450-word filing actually say? First, he argues that further supervision is unnecessary because he has not reoffended and has complied with the terms of his sentence. That contention, which is not tethered to a § 3553(a) factor, is plainly meritless and does not require a response. On the day Emmett was sentenced, he was fully expected, and indeed legally required, to comply with the terms of his supervised release.
It is defendant's burden to establish that he is entitled to the rarely-granted remedy of early termination of supervised release. Weber, 451 F.3d at 559 n. 9 (citing United States v. Weintraub, 371 F.Supp.2d 164 (D.Conn.2005)). This is usually accomplished by alerting the district court to "unforeseen" or "changed circumstances" that implicate its initial sentencing decision and analysis. United States v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1997)). See also Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(b) Advisory Committee Note (§ 3583(e) recognizes that the "sentencing court must be able to respond to changes in the [defendant's] circumstances as well as new ideas and methods of rehabilitation"). To be sure, changed circumstances are not necessarily required to warrant early termination — but that is so merely to preserve district courts' discretion, not to relieve defendants of their burden. See Bainbridge, 746 F.3d at 949, 2014 WL 878832, at *5. Mere reargument of matters already considered by the court, and without citation to the relevant § 3553(a) factors, certainly borders on frivolous within the meaning of Carty, 520 F.3d at 992, and in any case, cannot possibly merit relief.
Here, the district court quite reasonably exercised its considerable discretion to deny Emmett's application summarily, commenting only that continued supervision would not entail any "undue hardship" — an apparent reference to the only arguable "changed circumstance," namely Emmett's unemployment, and his argument, citing § 3553(a)(2)(D), that the probation office is not providing him any vocational training. If the court's order is terse, that simply reflects the scanty basis for Emmett's request. So what more does the majority want the district court to address? It does not say specifically, but the troubling implication of its opinion is that even when a district court receives a cursory application that merely reiterates known facts, without any identified connection to the relevant legal factors, it nonetheless must take the time to explain again why its prior sentencing decision still holds.
To reach its conclusion, the majority relies heavily on United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.2013), but the comparison is completely inapt. In Trujillo, the defendant offered "fairly extensive arguments and evidence" in support of his request to modify his sentence pursuant to retroactive revisions to the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. Trujillo's arguments had never been raised previously to the district court, and concerned important changes in the law that might render his custodial
By contrast, nothing prevents appellate review here. The record is brief and undisputed. Under the majority view, if the district court had said, "I considered these facts already," would that have led to a different result? Presumably so, but isn't that already quite obvious from the record? The majority opinion ignores the flimsiness of Emmett's request, which leads it to an unreasonable conclusion.
Two additional points: First, the majority faults the district court for failing to hold a hearing, while ignoring that Emmett never requested one. Instead of a formal motion, Emmett chose to file an ex parte application with the apparent expectation that the court would handle it in chambers. Generally, no hearing is required if the court refuses to modify defendant's sentence. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(c) (subject to exceptions, court must hold a hearing "[b]efore modifying the conditions of probation or supervised release" (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Nonahal, 338 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir.2003) ("the rule does not compel the court to hold a hearing before refusing a request for modification"). Nor is a hearing required if the defendant waives his request for one. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(c)(2)(A). Plainly, none was required here.
Second, the majority criticizes the district court's decision to rule without a response from probation or the government. But the court knew full well from Emmett's ex parte application that probation and the government opposed early termination. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-19.1 (requiring statement of opposing counsel's position to be included ex parte applications). And not even appellant contends that it was necessary or important for court to solicit the latter parties' views before adjudicating the motion. Given the near total lack of anything new, I cannot find fault with the district court's view that a more formal objection from the government was unnecessary.
In short, the majority's impractical, overly formalistic approach not only fails to give the usual "considerable deference to a district court's determination of the appropriate supervised release conditions," Williams, 356 F.3d at 1052, it also needlessly burdens our already overloaded district courts. I must dissent.
