NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

KANE, J.

In this marital dissolution case, a judgment was entered by the trial court incorporating the parties' agreement settling all issues (the agreement). The terms of the agreement included a division of the community property in which Gregory Ferreira (Husband) received sole ownership of an insurance business while Lari Dawn Ferreira (Wife) received sole ownership of the family house. Additionally, monthly payments in the amount of $1,667, referred to as "[s]pousal support," were to be paid by Husband "until 6-30-2027," which specific date was when the last mortgage payment on the house would be due. When Wife later remarried, Husband moved to terminate spousal support payments pursuant to Family Code section 4337.1 The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the agreement was ambiguous as to the nature of the monthly payments and, based on extrinsic evidence, concluded that the payments were not spousal support but rather an integral part of the property division and equalization. Husband appeals from that order, contending that the trial court erred in its construction of the agreement, which plainly specified that the payments were spousal support. However, Husband has failed to provide this court with the extrinsic evidence that was considered by the trial court in reaching its determination of the agreement's construction. Because we have not been provided with an adequate record on appeal, we affirm the order of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A judgment of dissolution was entered on June 25, 2007, formally ending the parties' 13-year marriage. Attached as part of that judgment was the parties' mutual agreement on issues such as child custody, child support and property division.2 The agreement provided for joint legal custody of the parties' two minor children, with Wife having sole physical custody and Husband paying designated sums as child support. With respect to the division of community property, Husband received ownership of a business known as Tulare Pacific Ag Insurance Services, Inc. and he was required to make an equalization payment to Wife in the amount of $26,000 by June 30, 2012. Wife received the "[h]ouse and property at ..., Tulare" and the first and second mortgages thereon and, as noted, was entitled to a $26,000 equalization payment from Husband by June 30, 2012. Other lesser assets were divided as well.

Under the heading of spousal support, the judgment stated as follows: "Spousal support shall be paid by ... Husband in the sum of $1667.00 per month made payable to ... Wife on the 18th of the month ... until 6-30-2027 or further Court order. Thereafter, spousal support shall terminate absent a further court order. Spousal Support shall commence on 7-1-07." It was further provided that "If Wife refinances the house or sells the house prior to 6-30-2027, spousal support can be renegotiated."

On or about April 5, 2009, Wife remarried.

On March 18, 2010, Husband filed a motion to terminate spousal support retroactive to Wife's date of remarriage.3 His declaration in support of that motion stated he made spousal support payments every month as ordered by the court, even paying more per month than the $1,667 sum specified. By separate agreement with Wife, Husband had been directly paying the home mortgage, homeowner's insurance and taxes on Wife's behalf regarding the house. Husband eventually learned that his "obligation to pay spousal support terminated when [Wife] remarried pursuant to ... Section 4337." Therefore, he filed the motion to be relieved of that obligation.

Wife opposed the motion, claiming that the monthly payments were not really spousal support, but were equalization payments because of the division of the community property.4 The hearing was held on April 23, 2010. During the hearing, Wife confirmed that the June 30, 2027 date was when the 30-year mortgage on the house would be paid off. She further claimed the agreement with Husband was based on the fact that she would leave the insurance business alone "as long as [the mortgage] was paid until that date." The trial court noted that it was undisputed from the declarations that "the payment was made by [Husband] directly to the mortgage holder"; that is, Husband was paying the mortgage.5 The trial court also stated that one of the declarations showed the payments were not being treated as income for tax purposes. Additionally, the trial court observed from its review of the court file that although the parties' had initially retained experts with respect to valuation of both the insurance business and the home, there was nothing to indicate what those valuations were. The trial court found it strange that, aside from the $26,000 payment (which was attributable solely to Husband's prior defaults in paying the mortgage and Wife having to bring it current), there was no provision for equalization payments concerning the property division.

At the conclusion of the April 23, 2010, hearing, the trial court announced its ruling from the bench. The trial court denied the motion, explaining as follows: "The Court really finds ambiguity in the agreement.... And it's clear I think when you look at the totality of the agreement that the spousal support payment truly was not spousal support. [¶] The parties' declaration[s] indicate that no tax was paid on it because it wasn't viewed as income, that's what you tell me in your declaration[s]. It's immaterial whether the property taxes were paid by [Husband] or [Wife]. But the fact [is] that there are two provisions in the agreement that deal with the issue of spousal support, [and] one ... says if wife refinances the house or sells the house prior to 6-30, 2027, spousal support can be renegotiated. That date is a very specific date which the Court had its suspicions was the same date that the mortgage was to be paid off on the house. [¶] It's also unusual that there would be no equalization payment between the parties because of the receipt of the assets along with the liabilities of the business to [Husband]. [¶] ... [¶] The Court is denying [Husband's] request to terminate this obligation ... to pay on a monthly basis the mortgage." In short, the trial court denied the motion because it agreed with Wife's proffered interpretation that the payments were in reality a part of the property division as a form of equalization.

On May 3, 2010, Husband filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order denying his request to terminate spousal support. On June 4, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, reaffirming its prior ruling that the payments "were in fact not spousal support but were part of the equalization payments provided to [Wife] in exchange for [Husband's] ability to assume the entire insurance business as his division of the community property of the parties."

Husband appeals from the order denying his request to terminate spousal support due to his wife's remarriage.

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, we note that if Husband is correct that the monthly payments in the agreement were spousal support, section 4337 would clearly apply. That section provides: "Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of a party under an order for the support of the other party terminates upon ... the remarriage of the other party." A party seeking to overcome the presumption of section 4337 must prove the requisite agreement to continue support after remarriage by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Marriage of Cesnalis (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1272.) "No particular words are required to waive section 4337 and make spousal support continue upon remarriage, but silence will not do. [Citations.] There must be a written agreement on the issue or the subject. [Citations.]" (Ibid.; accord, In re Marriage of Thornton (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 251, 254.) Here, there is nothing in the agreement indicating an intention to continue support after remarriage or to otherwise waive the automatic termination provision. Therefore, if the monthly payments were spousal support, the trial court erred in denying Husband's motion to terminate such payments.

However, as noted, the trial court determined the agreement was ambiguous and ultimately found based on extrinsic evidence that the monthly payments were not spousal support at all. Husband's appeal challenges those determinations. We begin our discussion with a review of the rules regarding consideration of extrinsic evidence when the meaning of an agreement is disputed. Those rules will serve to highlight the fact that we, like the trial court, must consider the extrinsic evidence in order to determine whether the agreement is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation adopted by the trial court.

The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264.) "The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties' intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties. [Citations.]" (Morey v. Vannucci (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.)

Where the meaning of the words used in a contract is disputed, the trial court must provisionally receive any proffered extrinsic evidence which is relevant to show whether the contract is reasonably susceptible of a particular meaning. (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 39-40.) Even if a contract appears unambiguous on its face, a latent ambiguity may be exposed by extrinsic evidence that reveals more than one possible meaning to which the language of the contract is yet reasonably susceptible. (Morey v. Vannucci, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.) "The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible." (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co., supra, at p. 37.)6

Thus, interpretation of the agreement entails a two-step process involving a consideration of the extrinsic evidence and the words of the contract: "First, the court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence concerning the parties' intentions to determine `ambiguity,' i.e., whether the language is `reasonably susceptible' to the interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic evidence the court decides the language is `reasonably susceptible' to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting the contract. [Citation.]" (Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165.)

On appeal, we review independently the threshold question of whether the contractual language is ambiguous and whether proffered extrinsic evidence is therefore relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is reasonably susceptible. (ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1267.) Where the extrinsic evidence is not in conflict, construction of the contract is a question of law, and the appellate court independently construes the writing. (Id. at pp. 1267-1268, & fn. 4.) When competent extrinsic evidence is in conflict, and thus requires resolution of credibility issues, any reasonable construction will be upheld as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, if the extrinsic evidence is not itself conflicting, but the parties draw conflicting inferences, we will independently draw inferences and interpret the contract. (Id. at p. 1268, fn. 4.)

As is clear from this summary, our responsibility on appeal is to review the words of the agreement along with the extrinsic evidence that was before the trial court and determine, de novo, whether the agreement is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation offered by Wife. (ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267; Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 22 ["We review the agreement and the extrinsic evidence de novo" (fn. omitted)].) The problem is that we were not furnished with all the relevant extrinsic evidence that was before the trial court, and upon which the trial court relied in reaching its decision about the meaning of the agreement. Specifically, Husband did not include in the record on appeal the declaration filed by Wife in opposition to the original motion to terminate spousal support.7 The trial court made reference to Wife's declaration several times during the April 23, 2010, hearing, and apparently was persuaded to a significant extent by what was set forth therein, but we do not have that evidence before us.

Husband's failure to provide an adequate and complete record means that his appeal fails. A judgment or order is presumed correct and appellant has the burden of overcoming this presumption by affirmatively showing error on an adequate record. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) "`A necessary corollary to this rule [is] that a record is inadequate, and appellant defaults, if the appellant predicates error only on the part of the record he provides the trial court, but ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of the proceedings below which may provide grounds upon which the decision of the trial court could be affirmed.'" (Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435, citing Uniroyal Chemical Co. v. American Vanguard Corp. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 285, 302.) That is, if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, as is the case here, "`the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.'" (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) "Failure [of an appellant] to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [appellant]." (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.)

DISPOSITION

The order of the trial court is affirmed. Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.

Wiseman, Acting P.J. and Levy, J., concurs.