CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR., Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Cynthia Lewis brought a pro se action, purportedly under the Court's federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, in which she sought to forestall the foreclosure of real property she inhabits at 1020 Old Town Road, Trumbull, Connecticut. Doc. 1. The Defendants are banking institutions who, at one time or another, were involved with the mortgage on that property in respect of which foreclosure is sought. Id.
Thereafter, Plaintiff Cynthia Lewis filed a "Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction" asking the Court to reconsider some form of relief enjoining Defendants from any further attempts to dispossess Plaintiff from her property using an allegedly fraudulently conveyed mortgage contract. Doc. 21.
This Court issued a ruling (the "Order of Dismissal"), dismissing the case. See Lewis v. Guardian Loan Co., No. 19-cv-704 (CSH), 2019 WL 3938150, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 20, 2019). In the Order of Dismissal, the Court concluded that it was unable to assume jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's motion because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred her claims as a matter of law; and, accordingly, the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff's requests for relief. See id. at *2.
Plaintiff has now filed a motion for reconsideration. Doc. 23 ("Reconsideration Motion"). The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history and will only relate those facts necessary to address the arguments raised in Plaintiff's Reconsideration Motion.
Regarding motions for reconsideration, this District's Local Rules state that:
D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c).
The Second Circuit has explained that "[t]he major grounds justifying reconsideration are `an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'" Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This standard is "strict," and reconsideration should be granted only if "the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). If "the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided," the court should deny the motion for reconsideration and adhere to its prior decision. Id.
With respect to pro se litigants, it is well established that "[p]ro se submissions are reviewed with special solicitude, and `must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 706 F. App'x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff appears to make three overarching arguments for reconsideration. First, that her causes of action are not inextricably intertwined with the state foreclosure action and that this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over her case. Doc. 43 ¶¶ 6, c, g-h. Second, and relatedly, that the Court should have reached the merits of Plaintiff's lawsuit (i.e., that Plaintiff's mortgage was procured by fraud). Id. ¶¶ a-b, d. Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Defendants perpetrated fraud upon the court in connection with the state court judgment. Id. ¶¶ d-f. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims seeking reconsideration lack merit and the Court will not modify its ruling dismissing Plaintiff's action.
As noted above, Plaintiff first claims that her causes of action are not inextricably intertwined with the foreclosure action in state court. Id. ¶ 6. Likewise, Plaintiff argues that this Court maintains subject matter jurisdiction over her case. Id. ¶¶ c, g-h. However, these arguments appear to be an attempt to relitigate the Court's prior conclusions.
"It is well-settled that a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple." Cope v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 15-cv-01523 (CSH), 2017 WL 4542045, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 11, 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, "a motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
Plaintiff's arguments appear to be just that—an attempt to relitigate the Court's prior conclusion that "the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff's action in this Court." Lewis, 2019 WL 3938150, at *2. In particular, in the Order of Dismissal, the Court first explained the four factors that courts consider when analyzing the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. (quoting McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010)). The Court then explained that all four Rooker-Feldman factors were present in Plaintiff's case. See id. For example, the Court discussed how: (1) Plaintiff lost in the foreclosure action in the Connecticut Superior Court and strict foreclosure was entered against her; (2) that Plaintiff alleged that she had been injured by the Connecticut court's adjudication in the foreclosure action; (3) that the judgment of strict foreclosure entered in state court predated this action; and (4) that allowing Plaintiff to proceed would have required the Court to re-adjudicate issues already litigated and resolved in Connecticut Superior Court. See id. The Court then explained that for those reasons, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Plaintiff's action in this Court. See id. As the Order of Dismissal stated: "Plaintiff's allegations are inextricably intertwined with the prior state court judgment of strict foreclosure, such that her federal claim would succeed only if the state court wrongly decided the issues." Id. at *1.
Plaintiff in her Motion for Reconsideration does not point to any "controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Van Buskirk v. United Grp. of Companies, Inc., 935 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff does not point to any error committed by this Court, either. Doc 23. Nor does Plaintiff present any new facts or evidence, or any other reason that justifies Plaintiff's requested relief. Id.
Rather, Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that her causes of action are not inextricably intertwined with the foreclosure action—and, that the Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's case—in an attempt to relitigate issues already decided. See Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
Plaintiff next seeks to argue the merits of her case—and Plaintiff again requests that the Court reach the merits, too. According to Plaintiff, her complaint "show[s] a likelihood of success on the merits . . . which establishes [her] claims to be entitled to . . . relief." Doc. 43 ¶ a. Plaintiff further claims that this Court's Order of Dismissal "does not address the question of whether the judgments rendered in the State Court is [v]oid as a matter of law" and that it did not "reach a determination of . . . the merits of Plaintiff's claims." Id. ¶ b. Plaintiff then proceeds to the merits of her case, contending that she submitted a prima facie case that Defendants "do not have a right to enforce a [m]ortgage contract that was induced by fraud." Id. ¶ d.
The Court previously addressed this. The Court explained that it could not reach the merits of Plaintiff's case because the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff's requests for relief. See Lewis, 2019 WL 3938150, at *2. Alternatively, the Court explained that "to the extent Plaintiff's complaint can be liberally construed to allege injury stemming from the same transaction but not directly caused by the foreclosure judgment—i.e., so that her claims are not all barred by Rooker-Feldman—these claims would still be subject to dismissal on the ground of claim preclusion." Lewis, 2019 WL 3938150, at *3. The Court cited to Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc. v. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc., for the proposition that the doctrine of claim preclusion "precludes not only litigation of claims raised and adjudicated in a prior litigation between the parties (and their privies), but also of claims that might have been raised in the prior litigation but were not." 779 F.3d 102, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2015). The Court also cited to O'Connor v. Pierson for a similar proposition—i.e., that under Connecticut law, "[c]laim preclusion prevents the pursuit of any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made." 568 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court then noted that Plaintiff had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims" in her Connecticut state court action, and that to the extent her claims were not barred by Rooker-Feldman, they must nevertheless be dismissed under the doctrine of claim preclusion. Lewis, 2019 WL 3938150, at *3.
The Court's analysis in the Order of Dismissal applies with equal force to Plaintiff's arguments in the instant motion. For the reasons stated previously, this Court will not address the merits of Plaintiff's case because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff's requests for relief pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. Alternatively, to the extent that Plaintiff's complaint can be liberally construed to allege injury stemming from the same transaction but not directly caused by the foreclosure judgment, those claims would still be subject to dismissal—and the Court will not reach the merits of those claims, either—on the ground of claim preclusion. See id. Plaintiff has not submitted any law to the contrary and she has not identified any errors in the Order of Dismissal. There is no reason, therefore, to disturb the Court's prior Order of Dismissal on this basis.
Lastly, Plaintiff once again argues that Defendants "participated or contributed in perpetrated fraud upon the Court in order to procure a judgment" in the foreclosure proceeding. Doc. 43 ¶ e; see also id. ¶ f. This is an additional attempt to relitigate issues that the Court resolved in the Order of Dismissal. Previously, the Court concluded that Plaintiff's allegations of fraud upon the court did not overcome the Court's conclusion that Rooker-Feldman barred the case. The Court recounted Second Circuit precedent holding that, "[w]here a party asks the federal court to grant him title to his property because the foreclosure judgment was obtained fraudulently, Rooker-Feldman bars [that party's] claim." Lewis, 2019 WL 3938150, at *2 (quoting Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014)). The Order of Dismissal also noted that in the context of state court judgments of foreclosure, "any attack on a judgment of foreclosure is clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. Ocwen Home Loan Servicing, 74 F.Supp.3d 504, 514 (D. Conn. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 632 F. App'x 32 (2d Cir. 2016)).
Nonetheless, Plaintiff once again raises conclusory allegations regarding fraud upon the Court—that "Defendant(s) . . . have participated or contributed in perpetrated fraud upon the Court in order to procure a judgment that, for all intents and purposes, have violated Plaintiff's Civil Rights." Doc. 43 ¶ e. Plaintiff is merely seeking to relitigate an issue already resolved in the Order of Dismissal, and she does not provide any relevant or controlling law that the Court overlooked or identify any errors with the Court's prior analysis.
For the reasons discussed herein and in the Order of Dismissal, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. 23] is DENIED. The Court adheres to its prior Order of Dismissal, which dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. See Lewis, 2019 WL 3938150, at *3.
It is SO ORDERED.
