PER CURIAM.

The plaintiffs, Connie Chen and Ping Chen, appeal from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant Hopkins School, Inc.1 The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly dismissed their negligence action for failure to make out a prima facie case. They claim that the court used an incorrect standard to evaluate the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, Harry Boardsen, which resulted in the court improperly concluding that Boardsen's testimony failed to present sufficient evidence of liability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The plaintiffs brought a two count complaint on November 9, 2010, against the defendant for injuries alleged to have occurred due to a single car accident.2 In the first count,3 the plaintiffs allege that on or about November 6, 2008, while Connie Chen was a student at Hopkins School (school), the front right tire of her vehicle suffered a catastrophic failure as she was operating it less than one-half mile from the entrance to the school, resulting in an accident and injuries. The plaintiffs assert that the "failure of the tire was caused by a laceration in the tire's sidewall made by a knife or a similarly sharp and pointed object," and that the tire was lacerated while the vehicle was parked in Connie Chen's assigned school parking spot. The plaintiffs alleged five instances of negligence by the defendant, including the defendant's failure "to use surveillance technology as a disincentive to criminal activity and as an aid to apprehending offenders."4 In its answer, the defendant denied the plaintiffs' substantive allegations and asserted multiple special defenses.

On July 17, 2012, the plaintiffs disclosed Boardsen as a security expert. The defendant deposed Boardsen on August 17, 2012. Thereafter, on October 10, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to preclude Boardsen from testifying as an expert. On October 17, 2012, the bench trial began, and the court preliminarily addressed the defendant's pending motion to preclude Boardsen's testimony. Boardsen was not present during the trial.5 The court, after hearing argument from both parties on the motion to preclude, did not grant or deny the motion, but instead asked the parties to stipulate that the court could consider the deposition testimony of Boardsen as trial testimony. The parties agreed,6 and the court stated that after "[h]aving reviewed [Boardsen's testimony] at length," it was "discounting his testimony [because] [i]t is not helpful to the court in making the determination on [the] issue [as to security]."7 Shortly thereafter, the defendant's counsel orally moved to dismiss the case, arguing that without Boardsen's testimony "there is no basis for this case to proceed." The court invited the plaintiffs' counsel to put on any additional evidence, and asked him whether there was "any other theory that's being offered to the court as to how [the defendant] would be held liable...." The plaintiffs' counsel replied that "[t]he only evidence that [he] had was [Boardsen's testimony regarding] the [security] camera," and that he was resting as to the liability portion of the plaintiffs' claim.8 The defendant's counsel again asked for judgment in the defendant's favor on the liability portion of the claim. The court noted the absence of any other evidence of proof of liability, and orally rendered judgment in favor of the defendant.9 This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly dismissed their action for failure to make out a prima facie case because the court used an incorrect standard to evaluate Boardsen's testimony, which resulted in the court improperly concluding that his testimony failed to present sufficient evidence of liability to establish a prima facie claim of negligence. The plaintiffs assert that the trial court impermissibly made findings as to disputed facts, weighed the credibility of Boardsen, and drew inferences against the plaintiffs when evaluating Boardsen's testimony for purposes of "what in effect was a motion for a judgment of dismissal for failure to make out a prima facie case." The plaintiffs argue that "a finder of fact [reasonably] could ... have inferred liability" from Boardsen's testimony. We are not persuaded.

We begin with the law on judgments of dismissal and the standard of review. "If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil action tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested his or her cause, the defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority may grant such motion, if in its opinion the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case.... A prima facie case... is one sufficient to raise an issue to go to the trier of fact.... In order to establish a prima facie case, the proponent must submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove.... In evaluating [the trial court's decision on] a motion to dismiss, [t]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plaintiff's] favor.... Whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case entitling the plaintiff to submit a claim to a trier of fact is a question of law over which our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Padawer v. Yur, 142 Conn.App. 812, 816, 66 A.3d 931, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 927, 78 A.3d 145 (2013); see also Practice Book § 15-8.10

A careful review of the record reveals that the trial court did not impermissibly make findings as to disputed facts, weigh the credibility of Boardsen's testimony, or draw inferences against the plaintiffs. Instead, the court determined that even if Boardsen's testimony was credited, it was insufficient to establish the facts which it was adduced to prove, namely, that the presence of security cameras would have prevented the incident alleged by the plaintiffs.11 To make out a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiffs were required to establish the essential elements of duty, breach of that duty, causation, and actual injury. See Sweeney v. Friends of Hammonasset, 140 Conn.App. 40, 46, 58 A.3d 293 (2013). The plaintiffs did not introduce any other evidence beyond Boardsen's testimony to support their allegations regarding the defendant's failure "to use surveillance technology" or any of the four other negligent acts alleged in the complaint; they called no additional witnesses, and introduced no exhibits.12 We conclude that Boardsen's testimony, even if believed and given the benefit of all favorable inferences, fails to make out a prima facie case for the negligent acts alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.

The judgment is affirmed.